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1. INTRODUCTION 
Consulting and engineering design activities are important for the 
conception and execution of investment projects, and therefore for the process 
of capital formation. If a country does not have the capacity to perform such 
activities, projects will be conceived, designed and carried out by foreign 
organizations, involving a loss of decision power and the danger of inappro- 
priate technical solutions which do not correspond to the conditions and needs 
of the recipient country. In addition, important opportunities will be lost 
to favour purchases of domestic equipment, inputs and technical services, and 
to create effective links between research institutions and the productive 
sector. 
Optimal investment projects and self-reliance on technological matters 
depend crucially on having consulting and engineering capabilities of one's 
own and employing them properly. Developing countries should have an interest 
in establishing their own consulting and engineering design organizations 
(CEDOs), developing them so they can efficiently carry out their activities, 
and utilizing them in the most appropriate manner. This is increasingly being 
understood by some countries which have formulated policies for such purposes. 
In other developing countries, however, such a need is not yet properly 
appreciated. 
The present paper explores this subject on the basis of previous work by 
many authors, the results of studies sponsored by several developing agencies,l/ 
the conclusions of a number of seminars on consulting and engineering that have 
taken place in the last few years, and the personnel experience of many people 
consulted by the present author. The purpose is to identify a number of aspects 
on which it would be desirable to conduct comparative research in a few 
developing countries, and to suggest how such research may be carried out. The 
results will be discussed at a meeting to be sponsored by the International 
Development Research Centre, in early 1979. 
1/ See Annex 1. 
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The author has profited from the views of many persons, of which 
Anil Malhotra, Geoffrey Oldham and Mario Kamenetzky should be mentioned. 
He has had occasion to discuss some of the ideas here presented at meetings 
in the Centre for Social Research on State and Administration (CISEA) in 
Buenos Aires, and is grateful to the CISEA Director and staff members for 
their comments and advice. 
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2. NATURE OF CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING. DEFINITIONS 
Modern industrial development, which implies the introduction of new 
technologies and the execution of complex investments, has brought about the 
appearance of intellectual and professional activities that take care of 
these tasks and specialise in them. We may refer to them as "consulting 
and engineering" (C & E) activities, 
These activities organize and apply knowledge for purposes of investment 
and production. In the first case, they form an interface between the planning 
exercise (selection of projects, their economic evaluation, choice of the most 
appropriate product design and process technology) and the implementation of 
projects (which includes detailed design and engineering, procurement of plant, 
preparation of contract documents, supervision of construction and erection, 
commissioning and testing of plant and equipment and its initial start-up). 
In the area of production, they provide valuable services for the proper 
operation and maintenance of the plant, the solution of management problems, 
and the training of personnel. When backed by research and development, they 
provide the necessary support for adapting and improving imported technologies 
to render them appropriate to the "use environment", and also for creating and 
applying new technologies. 
There seems to be no general consensus about what types of intellectual 
products should be included under the labels "consulting services" and 
"engineering services". The terms "consulting","consultancy", "consulting 
engineering", "engineering", "project engineering", "detailed engineering", 
"technical advice", and other related terms, are used differently in various 
countries and by diverse national and international institutions. Table 1 at 
the end of this section shows a number of alternative definitions. 
What is clear is that consulting and engineering (C & E) activities are 
characterised by certain methods of work, or methodologies, and by a multi- 
disciplinary approach. The services produced are not just of a technical 
nature: they refer to the general conception of a project, to its economic 
aspects., to the implementation of the general project, to the conception and 
organisation of a system, training programme, etc., and to inputs into management, 
training activities, economic studies. Hence there is an accent on profes- 
sionalism and multidisciplinarity; the methodology is not strictly "technical" 
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but should also include economic, management and training aspects; and the 
purpose of the services is to conceive and implement investment projects, and 
to contribute in the efficient operation of the resulting installations. 
To clarify concepts it is important to use the approach of services and 
not of those who supply the service. The latter approach would only bring 
confusion, since in many cases a contractor provides C&E services and on 
doing so he is acting as a consulting engineer. On the other hand, if a 
consulting engineer constructs, he acts as a contractor. It is necessary 
therefore to arrive at an operational definition of consulting and engineering 
activities, and C&E services, and indicate that these services should be 
provided by capable organizations, which may be of different types, the 
"consulting and engineering design organizations" or CEDOs. 
The concept we propose of consulting and engineering design services is 
simple. Such services are rendered at different stages of a project, as shown 
in the following table:1/ 
SERVICES STAGE OF A PROJECT 
Pre-investment services 1.Prefeasibility studies (Surveys, 
identification, evaluation). 
2.Project feasibility study. 
Project execution services 3.Project engineering (Engineering surveys, 
detailed engineering, product engineering, 
organization and management, information 
systems). 
4.Project implementation (Procurement, 
construction-supervision). 
5.Commissioning and start-up (includes 
personnel training). 
Services for operation and 6.Production and maintenance. 
maintenance 
1/ This table emerged as a result of discussions at the STPI meeting on 
Consulting and Engineering Services, Caracas, 1975. 
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Consulting services would comprise the "preinvestment services" as well 
as advisory services in the two other categories, the rest being "engineering 
services". Then: 
- consulting services: include preinvestment services (prefeasibility 
and feasibility), as well as services rendered to a client related to the 
coordination, control and supervision of project execution, and to operation 
and maintenance of productive installations; 
- engineering services (or engineering design services): those related 
to project engineering (basic engineering, detailed engineering), product 
design and engineering, and other design activities.l' 
Consulting services at the preinvestment stage may involve various 
disciplines --engineering, architecture, economics, finance law, ecology, 
and occasionally even medical, psychological and educational sciences-- in 
order to conceive and appraise a project so that a sound decision may be made. 
The contributions of professionals from those disciplines must be integrated 
through multidisciplinary work. The result is based on estimates of various 
parameters which may change in value in the future --input costs may vary, an 
unexpected geological fault may appear, a new and better technology may be 
produced-- so that there is an uncertainty attached to it. 
Engineering services come into the picture when the main characteristics 
of the project have been decided upon and a technology has been chosen. They 
are mainly performed by engineers and collaborating technicians and draftsmen. 
Uncertainty of the outcome is much lower than at the preinvestment stage, so 
that we may qualify consulting services as "probabilistic" and engineering 
services as "deterministic". 
We may classify C&E services in different ways, such as the type of 
service, the branch of economic activity to which it is rendered, the type 
of client, etc. This allows a fine division that can be expressed in the 
form of a matrix, for instance by crossing type of service and economic branch, 
Some people prefer to call "consulting engineering services" the services 
under the three categories, provided they are rendered by an organization 
apart from the client. Others prefer to speak of "design engineering 
services". The semantic problem will probably be very difficult to sort 
out to everyone's satisfaction since different terms are already in use 
in different countries and sometimes have a legal meaning; however, the 
conceptual scheme shown would seem to have general validity. 
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a classification that has been employed by UNIDO in surveys of C&E and by 
OECD in its research on the subject. A complete project can be subdivided 
in portions that can be performed by different agents, and this can be of 
help for programming purposes. 
Consulting and engineering services are required by different types of 
users. Organizations in the public sector often need them to prepare and 
implement all kinds of investment projects, for instance, Ministries, planning 
commissions, regional development authorities (very numerous in the Latin 
American countries, where more than 30 such organizations are carrying out 
investment programmes that run into several billion dollars), public enter- 
prises in mining, oil, petrochemicals, fertilizers, transport, power, etc., 
development banks, and institutions that have to do with the promotion of 
industrial development. Private industry is usually a less important client. 
Small and medium scale enterprises are potential clients of a wide variety of, 
C&E services, particularly those that have to do with management, technical 
assistance and information problems. 
The cost of preinvestment consulting services is only a very small 
fraction --1 to 3 per cent in most cases-- of the total cost of the invest- 
ment, but such services are crucial to lay out good projects from the technical 
as well as the economic and social points of view. In a developing country 
the intervention of a local consulting organization may mean that the project 
is conceived with much more relevance to local needs and conditions than if a 
consultant from a central country is employed. Local engineering may contribute 
further in that sense, for instance, by maximizing the domestic inputs. 
.Consulting and engineering services may be supplied by different types of 
producers of such services, or CEDOs: 
a) private individual consultants and C&E firms, which may go under the 
name of "consulting engineers", "engineering societies", etc., and which 
restrict themselves to rendering C&E services; 
b) public C&E firms which are similar to private CEDOs except for being 
State-owned; 
c) other public organizations that supply C&E services in addition to 
other services, for instance, industrial research institutes, industrial design 
organizations, vocational training institutions, productivity centres, 
technical information services; 
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d) captive or in-house organizations in public or private enterprises, 
which may be called engineering departments, project departments, etc., and 
may be temporary or permanent. 
e) in-house organizations in contractors, capital goods producers and 
assemblers, which frequently use C&E services to sell their goods and 
services. 
C&E activities in developing countries are in general not fully developed. 
Domestic CEDOs tend to be weak, and demand is geared to a varying but important 
extent towards foreign CEDOs or their local subsidiaries and joint ventures. 
At an early stage of development, C&E capabilities tend to be concentrated on 
construction and civil engineering, as well as on pre-investment services in 
general. CEDOs devoted to industrial investments make their appearance and 
gather strength as industrialization proceeds. The scope of activities becomes 
wider and in some cases basic engineering capabilities are achieved. 
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TABLE 1 
Some definitions of "consulting" and "engineering" 
1. Committee of Engineering of the Sixth French Plan: "Engineering is defined 
as the set of activities, essentially intellectual, which have the purpuse 
of optimizing investment, whatever the nature, in its choices, in the 
technical processes for implementation, and in its management". 
2. Jacques Perrin ("Terminology and Economic Function of Engineering", OECD, 
Paris, 1976): "Engineering is a set of methods and of organizational 
structures which allow to master the interdependence of scientific, 
technical, economic and financial information necessary for the optimum 
conception or realization of investment in a coherent productive ensemble". 
3. "Glossary" adapted at the CODELCA Meeting (Mexico, 1975): 
- Consulting Services are the activities involved in the organization of 
technological knowledge, relating its possibilities and uses to the 
context and to the physical, economic and social requirements. 
(a) Pre-investment consulting services: those which take place before the 
materialization of an investment to identify, prepare and evaluate 
projects and to select appropriate technologies. 
(b) Consulting services for operation: those which constitute inputs for 
the materialization of an investment, or for the operating stage of 
an investment which has already materialized. 
- Engineering Services apply knowledge to develop data, documents and draw- 
ings with the purpose of implementing physical facilities for economic 
activities, and of optimizing and maintaining existing facilities. (This 
definition may be used to cover administrative, educational, health, and 
other systems which produce services). 
4. E.Felices ("Development of Local Engineering Capabilities for Industry: 
Case Study of Peru", OECD, 1978): "Project engineering supplied by multi- 
disciplinary groups of consultants maybe understood as the capacity that 
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TABLE 1 (cont.) 
allows to convert ideas and initiatives into technical and economic 
concepts that can be appraised for the purpose of deciding about an 
investment; to transform such concepts into a design that can be 
efficiently built; and to complete the execution of projects within the 
delay, qualities, costs and operating yields which have been forecasted 
when the decision was taken to allocate resources to the project". 
5. A.Malhotra ("Consulting and Engineering Design Organizations", paper 
prepared for IDRC, June 1976): "Consultancy and engineering services 
can be characterized on the basis of the output which is produced at each 
stage of a project as indicated in the table below: 
Type of services 
i. Consulting services including 
economic management, etc. 
ii. Preliminary engineering 
iii. Design engineering 
iv. Procurement services 
v. Inspection services 
vi. Fabrication and construction 
supervision services 
vii. Maintenance services 













6. Report of UNIDO Meeting on "Industrial Consultancy Services in Developing 
Countries", 1978: "Consultancy services may be of different types: 
- Pre-investment services: techno-economic, pre-feasibility, feasibility 
and evaluation studies, including market, location, technology, economic, 
commercial and financial aspects; preparation of terms of reference and 
invitations for tender; evaluation of bids. 
Project implementation services: choice of technology and equipment; 
detailed engineering; specifications, tendering, bid evaluation and 
contracting; negotiation of agreements (financial, commercial, know-how, 
management); supervision of project execution (construction, procurement, 
installation, start-up, training); inspection and acceptance of goods, 
services and finished installations; design and implementation of management, 
production and marketing systems. 
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TABLE 1 (cont.) 
- Services for management and production: technical assistance and trouble- 
shooting; production planning and control; cost control and cost 
reduction; product design and development; process improvement; quality 
control and maintenance systems; sales and inventory systems; expansion 
programmes; personnel training; management information and control 
systems, etc. 
Consultancy services may be offered to many different branches of 
industry, and to supporting institutions such as Ministries and R&D centres. 
Some consultancy organizations will specialize in one or two specific branches, 
as happens for instance in iron and steel, hidroelectric generation, petro- 
chemicals, etc." 
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3. ROLE OF CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING 
Consulting and engineering design activities are very important to 
conceive and implement investment projects, including the expansion of existing 
installations, and to improve production and management activities. 
If'a country does not have the capacity to produce these services, 
particularly in the case of pre-investment consultancy, projects will be 
conceived, designed and executed by foreign-based CEDOs. This is the situation 
in many developing countries, and it implies a number of draw-backs, principally 
the use of inadequate technological solutions, the need to import capital goods 
and production inputs that might have been supplied locally, and the continuing 
dependence on foreign know-how and foreign skills. 
CEDOs in developing countries have a wider and deeper role than those in 
industrialized countries. This is due partly to the different conditions under 
which they operate - cultural and technical environments, lack of readily 
available information, need to undertake lengthy training of their human 
resources, the relative ignorance and unfavourable attitudes of their clients, 
etc. The principal difference, however, lies in the important socio-economic 
role they may fulfill, through the carrying out of projects which are more 
appropriate to local conditions and through putting in motion a complex process 
that may have significant impacts on development beyond the contribution of the 
project in question. 
When C&E activities are carried out by domestic CEDOs, there may be in 
the first place a number of positive consequences on the projects on which 
work is done, from which will benefit the project-owners and ultimately the 
whole economy. Better projects may be prepared and better decisions may be 
adopted than if a foreign consultant is engaged, through having a better know- 
ledge of local conditions, choosing more adequate technological solutions, 
disaggregating investment "packages", absorbing foreign technology more 
efficiently, and using foreign consultancy inputs in a way that will maximize 
their benefits and reduce their draw-backs. A local CEDO may choose appropriate 
technologies which a foreign CEDO might not even consider)' There may even 
1/ For instance, small paper plants which may be justified by reasons of 
transport costs, seasonal production andother local factors. Such a 
solution would probably not be envisaged by a foreign CEDO accustomed to 
large, "efficient" paper plants. 
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be a reduction in the cost of projects and their foreign exchange component, 
since local consultancy services are often much cheaper and there is a higher 
proportion of local inputs. 
Perhaps more significant in the long run are the consequences that may 
trascend the limits of the project itself. Locally conceived and designed 
projects tend to make a more intensive use of local inputs, thus increasing 
the demand for local capital goods, materials and components, technology, 
technical services and highly skilled technical and professional manpower.. 
Positive effects take place on the diffusion of knowledge, which may be 
circulated among enterprises and from R&D to production. New skills, attitudes 
and capabilities are introduced throughout the industrial spectrum, principally 
problem-solving capacities, bargaining power vis-a-vis foreign investors and 
foreign suppliers of technology and equipment, local expertise for the main- 
tenance of plant (thus decreasing technical vulnerability), etc. CEDOs may 
link up local R&D institutions with the productive sector, taking charge of 
the engineering aspects of new technical solutions and carrying out technical 
assistance tasks once industrial production has started. 
These are significant positive impacts on development, and on the attain- 
ment of self-reliance, as the management of knowledge by nationals is strengthened 
and autonomy in technical matters increases.l/ 
Some authors --of which Perrin has been the most persuasive-- feel that 
consulting and engineering play a unique and very crucial role in industrial 
development because of their being at the crossroads of a flow of information 
and decisions between productive units, capital goods manufacture and research 
and development. C&E link these three parts of the economic system, and also 
provide links with the financial system. Through the projects carried out by 
domestic CEDOs it is possible to maximize impacts from the productive units 
to the other two activities, thus promoting the development of an integrated 
industrial system. Industrial development without employing domestic C&E 
capabilities would rely indefinitely on imported technical solutions and 
imported capital goods. 
1/ Annex 2 examines in detail the role that domestic CEDOs may play in the 
transfer of technology. Annex 3 describes the different tasks and 
decisions that take place in an investment project. 
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C&E activities may achieve therefore a high social utility in terms of 
their impacts on development. Two important national objectives would then 
be the increase of domestic C&E capabilities and their proper utilization so 
that a high social efficiency will result from the resources allocated to 
investment. 
The public sector may play an important role in this regard. In many 
developing countries the State has taken up growing responsibilities in 
dynamic activities such as petroleum, energy, transport, iron and steel, 
shipbuilding, heavy chemicals, pulp and paper, cement, etc., and public enter- 
prises have become the main --if not the only-- concentrations of economic 
power under national control able to face foreign-owned firms. They constitute 
very important decision centres with the power to affect profoundly different 
sectors of national activity. Investment projects in those branches, however, 
have often been bought from foreign suppliers through "turnkey" purchases, and 
the participation of domestic C&E and industry has tended to be limited. 
A change in traditional patterns of behaviour would have important effects on 
industrial development. This may also be true for private enterprise too. 
There should be an effort to open up investment "packages", which often combine 
financing, technology, capital goods, construction and various technical 
services. By doing so, it may be possible to obtain maximum local participation 
in the supply of goods and services for the investment. 
A turnkey plant may be said to constitute a "black box". The investor 
should eventually be able to carry out its investments in a disaggregated manner, 
or "white box", in order to have control of the technology, put the package 
together in accordance with the real national needs and utilize fully intel- 
lectual and physical domestic inputs. To go from a "black box" situation to 
the domestic control of technology and inputs, or "white box", it is necessary 
to undergo a learning process which can rarely be accomplished in one step, so 
that it is necessary to proceed through a series of "grey boxes", gradually 
"whitening" the box in successive investment projects. A process of this 
nature, which implies a growing mastery of technology, is supported by the 
development of domestic C&E capabilities and their adequate utilization. 
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There are costs in developing the country's capabilities and in accepting 
for a period some relative inefficiency, as happens with "infant industries". 
Of those elements of cost that which has most deterred policy makers has 
been the risk to be assumed in entrusting national organizations with complex 
and exacting tasks. This element however has generally been exaggerated in 
the past on account of poor knowledge and underestimation of national 
capabilities as compared to foreign capabilities that have been assumed to 
be unexcelled.!/ To this is added the frequent attitude of decision makers 
in developing countries to look for an immediate effect of their decision and 
purchases. They just want to obtain what. they urgently need, to "get the job 
done". On adopting such a short-sighted approach they may lose important 
opportunities to improve the efficiency of their own organizations in future 
years and to produce significant long-run effects on development. 
There is therefore a good deal to be done in educating project-owners, 
banks, and governments regarding the key role of consulting and engineering 
for self-reliant development, and the need to support and promote this activity 
through national policies. Ways and means have to be found in every country to 
transmit this message to decision makers, planners and politicians, to industry, 
and often to the consultants themselves. 
1/ Foreign consultants have not infrequently made costly mistakes or 
recommended inadequate solutions which would have been easily perceived 
by a local consultant familiar with local conditions. On the other hand 
a local firm may contract foreign expertise as and when needed. A more 
balanced assessment of the worth of local consultancy and a change in 
risk-avoiding attitudes would be needed. 
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4. DEMAND FOR C&E SERVICES 
Consulting and engineering services are not products that feed final 
consumption in a society; they are inputs to other activities --investment 
principally-- and as such their demand largely dependes on the volume of 
those activities, which are themselves related to the extent of actual or 
planned changes in the country. 
One may make a distinction between "requirements" and "demand", meaning 
by the first term the volume that should ideally be demanded and by the 
second the actual volume demanded, which may be different and in a developing 
country would tend to be lower, since project preparation and design are often 
made with less depth than would be desirable. In the case of preinvestment 
services, this gap between demand and requirements would seem to become more 
acute. If such tendencies were verified, there would be reasons for adopting 
policies for increasing the demand for C&E services to an adequate level, 
through persuasion, a decrease in the price of C&E services, or other means. 
4.1. Sources of demand 
The principal sources of demand for C&E services in a developing country 
are: 
(a) large public sector investment projects carried out by ministries, 
public enterprises, development corporations, and other agencies. Such 
projects are usually included in national development plans. 
(b) Tasks required by financial institutions such as development banks, 
industrial banks, investment funds, institutions for the development of small 
and medium enterprises, etc.; 
(c) Industrial investment projects launched by private firms, local or 
foreign, for the installation of new production plants. The origin -af the 
capital would determine in most cases the nationality of the consultant to be 
used; subsidiaries and joint ventures of foreign corporations would tend to 
employ consultants from their home country. 
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(d) Smaller investment projects for extensions in existing enterprises. 
They would be directed to achieving a higher output, or adding on new 
product lines. 
(e) Introduction of new products, new process technology, or new 
manufacturing techniques in an existing company. 
(f) Rendering of services to small and medium enterprises, on the 
acquisition of machinery, the improvement of management practices, and 
numerous technical problems. 
In addition, CEDOs from a developing country may attend foreign demand 
originating in other countries (which would in general be developing countries), 
international financial institutions (World Bank, Inter-American Development 
Bank, Arab Funds, Asian Development Bank, etc.), international and regional 
agencies (UNDP, Organization of American States, Andean Pact, Organization 
of African Unity, etc.), and occasionally agencies of developed countries 
that extend bilateral aid usually preceded by extensive preparation work. 
The sources of demand may be classified according to the branch (civil 
works, mining, food industry, etc.), the type of technical service (building, 
power and light, water and gas, ventilation and air conditioning, drainage 
and sanitary, topography, etc.) and the stages of consulting and engineering 
services for projects (pre-feasibility, feasibility, techno-economic work, 
process design, detailed engineering, procurement, product design, project 
start up, project management, etc.). A series of matrices may be built according 
to these classifications in order-to give a detailed idea of the structure of 
demand. 
This demand may be attended partly by in-house capacity and partly by out- 
side CEDOs, and the complexity of demand --to a large extent depending on the 
country's level of development-- will call for more or less complexity in the 
structure of supply. The main interest in the case of semi-industrialized 
countries are multi-purpose CEDOs that may attend the needs in items (a), (b) 
and (c) above. In countries of incipient industrialization, or in those with 
a very large traditional sector, CEDOs attending the demand in (f) would be of 
prime importance. 
I/ 
1/ A network of consultancy institutions for small and medium enterprise has 
been established in India, in close liaison with financial institutions 
for the same sector. 
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Most of the demand for C&E services related to investment projects in 
the developing countries originates in the public sector. Any policy in 
favour of building up C&E capabilities and utilizing them adequately would 
therefore have to rely to a large extent on the behaviour of State investors, 
which should be influenced to adopt enlightened procedures in their invest- 
ment operations. 
4.2. Demand estimations 
It is not easy to estimate the demand for C&E services. It is probably 
better to employ as an indicator the volume of business (sales of C&E services) 
rather than physical indicators such as the number of drawings, manpower by 
categories of personnel, etc.; though estimations of the latter are always 
made in the case of specific jobs, they are not appropriate for overall 
estimates. 
The volume of C&E services may be roughly estimated as a percentage of 
the expected cost of investment. There is little data on this, but rules of 
thumb would indicate that the cost of preinvestment studies (consulting) 
would be around 3 per cent of the total project cost in large industry projects, 
and 1 to 1.5 per cent in large infrastructural investments. The cost of 
detailed engineering would be between 5 and 9 per cent according to the 
complexity of the project. This is much too rough for making reasonably 
accurate plans for the development and utilization of C&E capabilities, and 
a first research need comes out clearly; to find out from experience the 
value of such coefficients for different types and locations of investment 
projects. If information of this nature could be developed it would be 
possible for a country to estimate the requirements for C&E for its main 
sectors and hence to plan the expansion and use of its C&E capacity. 
Let us remark that in the case of preinvestment services it is probably 
more difficult to arrive at satisfactory estimates than in the case of 
.engineering and project implementation services. In practice, investment 
decisions by the State in a developing country are often taken on political 
grounds, using a few a-priori elements, and the feasibility study may then 
become a formal requisite to justify decisions already taken. In other cases, 
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investment decisions respond to one main factor, the availability of finance, 
and the study once again justifies a decision already taken. Preinvestment 
studies then largely become window-dressing. A similar thing may happen in 
the private sector. On the other hand, banking institutions and planning 
agencies are insisting more and more on the need to carry out careful 
feasibility assessments as a way to guarantee that good investment decisions 
will result. These two contending forces will define how complete and 
detailed a preinvestment study will result in practice. 
Estimates of demand for C&E services should contemplate areas in which 
such services are bound to be required in the future, and in which there is 
as yet little or no national C&E capacity. Long term projections should be 
useful for identifying such areas. The formation of C&E capacity in them 
should be undertaken early enough if complete dependence on foreign CEDOs is 
to be avoided. Estimates may be made by an official organ, such as the 
Planning Authority, or by institutions like the National Association of 
Consultants which can also study supply aspects in great detail. 
There have been a number of experiences in demand estimation which have 
underlined the difficulties of the exercise. Demand projections were carried 
out in Canada but the experience was not altogether favourable, it being 
concluded that only short-range predictions could be made since C&E activity 
is very much affected by the ups and downs of the economy to permit any 
reliable estimations in the medium or long term. This conclusion applies to 
a market economy, without explicit national planning; in a mixed economy with 
central planning, as is the case in many developing countries, it probably 
makes sense to devote efforts to estimate the future demand of C&E services 
several yearsahead as a basis for programming the development of C&E capabilities. 
In Algeria, for example, such estimates were made in order to programme 
the training of human resources. The principal industrial projects in the plan 
were taken, and a fixed ratio was applied to give the consulting and engineering 
input. This gave a good idea about the volume of studies and of detailed 
engineering which was needed, and from this figure the number of working hours 
was estimated by broad professional categories, such as engineers, technicians 
and designers. Thus it was possible to make rough estimates of the number of 
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people needed by area or specialization.1/ 
Demand should also be estimated at the level of the CEDO to help in 
stabilizing the work load and to permit the planning of CEDO development, 
particularly in the area of human resources. For this it is necessary to 
break down projects into areas and specialities, going to the level of unit 
operations.?/ This task will be simpler in CEDOs in charge of long-range 
investment programmes. 
4.3. Demand trends 
The demand for C&E services is already large in some of the developing 
countries and may be expected to grow significantly as major investment 
programmes are undertaken. UNIDO estimates that industrial investment in 
all developing countries is close to US$ 100 billion; if C&E services 
represent 5 to 6 percent, total annual demand would be in the order of US$ 5 
billion.!/ Opportunities for developing countries' CEDOs would seem to be 
large, particularly since many projects are to be undertaken by the public 
sector. In India, for instance, it was estimated that for the Fifth Five Year 
Plan some 25,000 professionals would be needed to handle all the engineering 
and plant design services, but only 6,000 were available at the beginning of 
the period. 
The upward trend is apparently caused by the improvement of the economic 
situation in some developing countries, the preparation of more ambitious 
plans, a more intensive process of programming and implementation, a greater 
awareness of the role of consulting and engineering, and reactions to previous 
1/ A first conclusion from the exercise was that there were not enough 
training possibilities in Algeria. Priorities had to be set out, both 
regarding the engineering field and the phase of the consulting and 
engineering process, and it was clear that full utilization should be made 
of the opportunities of repetitive projects. 
2/ It is likely that much useful quantitative information may be culled from 
reports about past projects in donor agencies and international banks. 
3/ Estimates of C&E services demand for Latin America reached US$ 15 billion 
for the period 1976-85. Decisions made through those services would be 
affecting US$ 200 billion of investment, and through it, a strong influence 
would take place on consumption, production and many aspects of life in 
the region. 
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mistakes that took place when there had not been sufficiently detailed studies. 
Another influence is the increase in the share of C&E within total project 
costs, in part because C&E costs become more visible as the purchase of turnkey 
projects diminishes, and also because of a tendency to spend more, in more 
comprehensive types of engineering services, in an attempt to save on the cost 
of project investment and implementation. 
It is likely that there will be a strong expansion in the demand for C&E 
services to small investments. Since organizations from the developed countries 
are not well equipped to do this, such services will have to be provided 
increasingly from the developing countries themselves, to respond to the needs 
of their important small and medium enterprise sectors. 
4.4. The demand for foreign C&E services 
In many developing countries there is a tendency for channeling the demand 
for C&E services towards foreign CEDOs from industrial countries. If national 
consulting and engineering capacity is to receive proper utilization and thereby 
produce the social benefits expected from its activities, it is important to 
identify the.reasons for such a preference and to lay down policy that will 
permit to redress the situation as far as convenient. Since the reasons and 
their relative importance may vary with the national situation, a clear research 
need comes out for the understanding of this behaviour. 
Among the causes that have been suggested we may mention: 
- The relative weakness of domestic CEDOs vis-a-vis foreign CEDOs which 
principally comes out of an "inherent inequality" between both stemming from 
less financial means and poorer credentials. Domestic CEDOs are often caught 
in a "vicious circle", from which it is very difficult to break. 
- Attitudes in public and private enterprises that lead to the disparaging 
of domestic skills, the use of foreign consulting firms and the turnkey 
solution. Such attitudes may take a long time to change until confidence 
develops in regard to local consulting activity. In addition, decision makers 
--particularly in the State-- may have an attitude towards risk that makes 
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them behave on the "safety-first principle", and this may constitute a very 
great obstacle to the demand for local C&E services. 
1/ 
- Lack of domestic financing for C&E services, the client then looking 
for a foreign CEDO that can provide its services with financing in easy terms. 
- Lack of local medium and long-term financing for investments, obliging 
both public and private investors to turn to foreign sources that finance the 
complete package of consulting, engineering, technology and equipment. This 
problem is dominant in certain countries which depend extensively on foreign 
aid and foreign investment, and the "untying of aid" has now become an issue 
in international forums. 
- The behaviour of international and regional financial agencies and 
development banks that, despite pronouncements to the contrary, are alleged 
to favour the use of established CEDOs from the industrial countries. 
- The behaviour of national financial organizations which tend to copy 
the "prudent" behaviour of the international banks and, just as the latter, 
are often in favour of "getting the job done" and not complicating things with 
relatively untried local CEDOs or local inputs of various types. 
There are strong arguments for building up a national capacity in 
consulting and engineering and to achieve "import substitution" in this field. 
A word of caution may however be in order. Too strong a nationalistic 
attitude may act as a barrier to the flow of technology; it may impose tasks 
on local CEDOs which they are not yet ready to discharge; or the policy may 
be negated in practice if weak local CEDOs are engaged which then take on 
foreign CEDOs as partners and leave to them the greater part of the substantive 
work and the decisions that go with it. 
The problem is to use foreign C&E in such a way as to maximize its 
positive features and minimize its negative effects. This means to employ it 
as a complement rather than as a substitute to local C&E capacity, to seek 
mechanisms of cooperation between both sources of supply in order to favour 
1/ According to an Indian study, no Government policy has been effective in 
forcing the Indian clients to use Indian engineering services or 
indigenously manufactured equipment. 
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the maximum utilization of local sources and to make full use of foreign C&E 
as a vehicle for technology transfer and the training of national C&E personnel. 
Some. people feel that the best solution may be to employ a local CEDO as the 
prime contractor and let it determine what foreign collaboration is needed and 
how the work should be divided, with the proviso that it should establish a 
"relationship between equals" rather than just offering its letterhead and its 
offices to the foreign CEDO. 
4.5. Fluctuation of demand 
An important characteristics of the demand for C&E services, particularly 
on the part of the State, is its fluctuating nature. Economic cycles, stop and 
go economic policies, political changes, lack of long-term and well-balanced 
government investment programmes, etc. are factors that lead to ups and downs 
in demand, perhaps more acutely than in the case of the capital goods industry 
and other activities connected with investment. This is a well-known 
characteristic that makes life difficult for local CEDOs, particularly in the 
smaller countries. There is a need for continuity if CEDOs are to work 
properly and to develop steadily. The drying up of demand has not infrequently 
meant the disbandment of human groups that had been built up with much effort, 
and this may sometimes imply a net social loss on account of the accumulated 
expertise that is lost and of the need to turn to foreign CEDOs when demand 
picks up again. On theoretical grounds (congestion theory) it may be shown 
that a certain long-term average level of idle capacity is socially beneficial 
in activities where the arrival of demand is not constant, on the one hand, 
and the length of services demanded is not uniform, on the other. Mechanisms 
must be found to support occasional idle capacity, and to avoid disbanding 
groups when there is no work. 
It is not easy to regulate State demand for C&E. In the first place 
something can be done through general regulations and a careful drafting of 
tenders and specifications. If regulations stipulate that local C&E are to be 
used whenever possible, demand will be more stable and is bound to incrase. 
Many influences act on State project-owners in this respect. On the one hand, 
they have to decide whether they want to pay more to the consultant or to the 
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equipment suppliers. In large package deals there is much C&E work which 
does not show; if packages are pulled apart, C&E costs increase but the total 
project cost may diminish. But many project-owners prefer to have one main 
engineering supplier to avoid complications and extra risks. On the other hand, 
engineering costs and fees are subjected to market conditions. In bad times it 
is wished to bring these costs down. Though it is generally accepted that C&E 
services should be bought by quality and not by price, sometimes the price 
aspects are more important than the quality aspects. 
Secondly, stabilization of demand would follow from an analysis of develop- 
ment plans, and from a coordination of the different agencies that carry out 
investments. This may be difficult when such agencies are jealous about their 
autonomy. Third, the government can adopt a counter-cyclical policy creating 
demand for CEDOs when their usual type of work as producers of services to 
investment projects has diminished, asking them to carry out certain projects 
and studies at those times of relative idleness. 
I/ 
Fourth, CEDOs themselves may try to adapt to these fluctuations. They 
can continue to work in spite of recessions by diversifying their services, 
working outside of the public sector, or exporting their services. In many 
developing countries consulting organizations have a small core of highly 
qualified managers and some stable technical personnel,and rely on a large 
network of specialists for specific projects. When the workload diminishes it 
is the outside collaborators who suffer, but the firms can continue to survive. 
4.6. Foreign demand 
We should finally refer to the foreign demand that is satisfied by exports 
of C&E services. Some CEDOs in developing countries have been able to sell 
their services to other developing countries, and this is bound to. happen 
1/ In Brazil, for instance, a Government funding agency, FINEP, finances the 
working capital of CEDOs and demands other types of services from them 
when there is little demand for their habitual type of work. FINEP 
considers that C&E capacity is an important national asset that must be 
preserved, and that a good way of doing this is to assure a stable work 
load even if this means that low-priority tasks are commissioned from 
CEDOs when they have little else to do. 
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increasingly in some fields since there are advantages in regard to CEDOs from 
developed countries: lower costs, an approach which is closer to the philosophy 
and way of being of the client, a greater awareness of local problems and local 
conditions which may not be too dissimilar to those the CEDO faces back home, 
the use of technological assets and solutions tried and tested in the CEDO's 
home country which are better adapted to the conditions of the receiving 
country. 
The export of C&E services is beneficial on several grounds. Foreign 
exchange is earned, national technology may be exported, and in some cases a 
CEDO may keep up its level of activity when local demand has momentarily 
dropped. It may be suggested therefore that national policies should consider 
promoting such exports through tax measures, the awarding of credit and other 
means. 
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5. SUPPLY OF CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING SERVICES 
There is a clear tendency in developing countries --as has been the 
case in developed countries-- towards the separation of the C&E function from 
other activities, as a consequence of the division of labour in increasingly 
complex societies. This has happened first through the activity of individual 
professionals and small organizations, and later through the formation of large 
CEDOs that are able to put together the various disciplines required, gather 
sufficient knowhow and experience, and build the necessary links with other 
institutions and activities so as to discharge their tasks successfully. 
5.1. Types of CEDOs 
A CEDO may belong to an enterprise (a "captive" CEDO, often known as a 
"project department" or similar denomination, in a productive firm, an equip- 
ment manufacturer, a large contractor), or it may be independent and produce 
services for various clients. Independent CEDOs may be State-owned or private, 
of local or foreign capital. The different producers of C&E services in a 
country compete with each other to a certain extent but there are also relations 
of complementarity, which a policy for their promotion should consider. 
Unless an enterprise or Government agency has a sufficiently steady flow 
of new investment projects, it does not pay for it to keep a relatively large 
staff for C&E activities and it becomes economical instead to contract them 
out to specialized organizations. This would appear to be socially beneficial 
on the other hand since it allows such units to become larger and acquire a 
great deal of experience, enabling them to render cheaper and better services. 
In many of the developing countries, important sectors are in the hands 
of the state, such as electricity, oil and petrochemicals, transport, etc. 
Here demand is correlated with population growth, and there is a need for an 
increase in capacity which is expressed in a succession of investment projects 
that can be planned well in advance. There is therefore a steady need for 
consulting and engineering services and these sectors tend to have their own 
C&E capacity, or they may rely on specialized State-owned CEDOs with which 
they contract according to their needs, for instance, in railways, iron and 
steel, etc. 
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In countries with a relatively small modern sector, some specialized 
public-sector institutions may be important suppliers of C&E services and can 
therefore be considered as CEDOs, for instance, engineering design centres, 
industrial research institutes, productivity centres, special consultancy units 
for small and medium-scale enterprise, and occasionally educational and training 
institutions. It is very important in such countries to employ whatever 
technical capacity is available for tasks of project formulation, design and 
technical assistance to Government and production, at rates which are.accessible 
to local clients. 
CEDOs in the private sector of developing countries are found in a wide 
spectrum, from very small groups with a high mortality rate to large, stable 
firms in some of the larger countries. 
In many developing countries there are numerous small CEDOs that carry 
out preinvestment services and a certain amount of engineering work. They face 
a large number of problems, among them the instability of demand, the lack of 
confidence in the effectiveness of their services, and the fact that their 
clients often are not exactly aware of what they want and may not be capable 
of controlling the different stages of execution of a project. 
Not infrequently these small CEDOs look for foreign collaboration to 
increase their chances of landing an assignment. Their role is sometimes that 
of a commercial and administrative agent, or a technical collaborator in 
pheripheral matters. In other cases they carry out a great deal of the work. 
They are often organized as a small permanent group of able professionals 
around which others join temporarily for a specific project. In the best 
firms of this type, those in the permanent staff have acquired a mastery of 
the "technology of consulting": methodologies and their use; utilization of 
outside expertise; forms of presenting results and recommendations for various 
users (client-investor, government, credit organizations, engineering firms, 
technology owners, equipment suppliers, etc.). They know well the local 
conditions (technical, economic, policy, legal, industrial situation, suppliers 
of local components, suppliers of engineering and other services, relative 
prices). They keep a dynamic system of contacts with various areas of 
expertise, R&D institutions, engineering firms, government officials and local 
and foreign sources of technology and equipment. The outside collaborators, 
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which are brought in as needed for limited periods of time, provide their 
expertise and their advice in different aspects: legal, economic, financial, 
negotiating, organizational, marketing, training, technical (in specific 
areas such as surveying, soil engineering, water treatment, geology, 
structural engineering, etc.).1/ 
Relatively large CEDOs are also found in the private sector of some 
developing countries; some of them have acquired good experience and are able 
to handle complex projects on their own. In some countries they also operate 
as contractors and can carry out turnkey contracts for their clients. They 
may be of local capital but often are subsidiaries or joint ventures of 
foreign CEDOs. This poses important policy questions to which we refer later. 
5.2. Structure of domestic supply of C&E services 
The origin of C&E services that are rendered to users in developing 
countries is extremely variable, according to the level of development, the 
political system and the historical circumstances of development. An important 
share usually comes from the industrial countries. We refer below to the 
issues related to the import of C&E services, and will deal in this section 
with their local production. 
In many countries of incipient industrialization, such as those in 
Africa, there is little development of what may be called a "C&E sector"; 
whatever capabilities exist are in production firms --mostly in those of 
foreign capital-- and in certain Government offices that handle preinvestment 
work. Sometimes industrial research institutes and other public sector 
institutions offer C&E services, as we have indicated above. The case of 
industrial research institutes would seem to be worthy of attention; there 
are several interesting examples (CARIRI in Trinidad, ICAITI in Central 
1/ We should perhaps stress the kep importance that the collaboration of 
an individual expert may assume for solving certain problems - for 
instance, search and choice of technology for a product which is new to 
the country. This specialist may come from different places, he may 
only-be used for a few weeks, but the knowledge he brings in is 
irreplaceable. 
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America, etc.) which deserve to be studied in detail not just as producers of 
new or adapted technology but principally as suppliers of C&E services, some- 
times around the technologies they have developed, in an environment where they 
may constitute the only feasible alternative to the import of such services. 
At the other side of the spectrum, a country like India shows a well 
developed C&E sector, in addition to strong in-house. capacity in the large State 
and private enterprises. This has been obtained as a result of a 30-year effort 
of developing C&E capabilities. It is interesting to mention some features to 
which A. Malhotra has drawn attention: 
- CEDOs may be classified in two groups in respect of their ability to 
provide project consultancy services. Most of the small organizations are in 
a position to offer only preinvestment or project planning services. It is 
only the larger organizations that are able to provide comprehensive project 
consultancy services. 
- The small consultancy organizations have been forced to face keen 
competition from equipment suppliers who provide free consultancy services to 
the potential investors. 
- A review of the activities of various consultancy organizations indicates 
that so far no specific pattern has emerged. While there are a few organizations 
e.g., MECONS, Dastur & Co., Engineers India Limited, National Industrial Develop- 
ment Corp., etc. which were originally established with the intention of 
specializing in particular industry areas, they have entered other fields as 
well. This may be due to difficulty in securing continuous business in their 
specific fields of specialization. But this diversification must necessarily 
reflect, the quality of specialization established in highly complex fields. 
- There are a fair number of reasonably well equipped organizations in 
respect of economic, project and management consultancy services in India. 
But not sufficient headway has been made in developing facilities in respect 
of process and technological consultancy services. As a result India still 
continues to depend heavily on external sources for the required process know- 
how and product-designing technology. 
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- The level of participation of consulting engineering firms in a sector 
varies according to the industrial sector to which they supply services. This 
varying participation, to a very large extent justified by the different 
rythms of technical progress observed in each sectors, is also determined, to a 
lesser extent, by factors such as the possibility of access to the sources of 
knowhow, the structure of the sectoral market, the links with groups in other 
sectors of the economy, and the links with capital goods producers and research 
institutes in the country. 
In the case of Latin America, data on the supply of C&E services are scarce 
and it is not easy to estimate the volume of services rendered in recent years, 
or the installed capacity in C&E. What is clear is that engineers and other 
professionals are abundant in many of the countries --there is a strong brain 
drain going on in many cases-- while organizations that produce C&E services 
are weak and show ad-hoc, fragmentary and individualistic characteristics. There 
is a proliferation of individual consultants and small CEDOs, a few large CEDOs, 
some, of them subsidiaries of foreign ones, and some State organizations that 
produce C&E services. Save in a few countries, most of the importat projects 
are prepared and executed by foreign CEDOs from the developed countries, with 
marginal participation by local people. The relatively recent emergence of such 
organizations, which did not exist before the early 60's in most cases, the 
indifference of Government until a few years ago and even today in regard to 
their promotion and use, the "vicious circle", the strong fluctuation of demand 
and the lack of financial means have been the main reasons for this situation. 
Studies undertaken by the Andean Pact Secretariat show that by 1972 there 
were about 180 independent firms in the Andean subregion, which gave permanent 
occupation to almost 1400 professionals (1300 of which were engineers, 4 per 
cent of the total stock in the subregion) and nearly the same amount of 
technicians. As we can see, the average size of a CEDO was rather small. 
Engineering and consulting services had been contracted in 1971 for some 53 
million dollars of which about one half had been supplied by local firms, the 
proportion varying according to the speciality and the country (the range went 
from 20 per cent in Ecuador to 76 per cent in Colombia). Most firms were small 
and were principally dedicated to physical-infrastructure projects (transport, 
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power, sanitary engineering, irrigation, telecommunications, urbanization, 
structures in general). In Chile, around 1974, about 15 per cent of the total 
national expenditure for engineering was derived to private firms, 25 to 
foreign firms and 60 to State organizations. In Venezuela about 3000 profes- 
sionals-were employed in "consulting engineering" but only a small proportion 
were organized in relatively important firms. Argentina counts with many small 
C&E firms, and a few large ones, which have had to cope with low fees, tardy 
payments and a very fluctuating demand. The situation is similar in most of 
the other countries of the region, perhpas with the exception of Brazil where 
there is a policy for the support of C&E organizations, and an organism, FINEP, 
to carry it out. 
Some other features of the Latin American situation should be noted. 
Local C&E capacity for services to industrial investment is much lower than 
for infrastructural investments. Local CEDOs often associate with CEDOs from 
industrial countries for a given job, but not infrequently there is no real 
collaboration between them, the local firm undertaking subsidiary responsibilities 
and sometimes acting as a mere agent. Some large CEDOs are subsidiaries of firms 
from developed countries, or joint ventures where the local associate is in fact 
a junior partner. The large C&E assignments in countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean are by and large entrusted to foreign CEDOs or to local CEDOs of 
foreign capital, while the locally owned CEDOs tend to be engaged in smaller 
projects, or to be subcontractors for the simpler tasks of large projects. 
There is an interesting example of a centrally planned country that has 
organized in a very complete way its C&E capacity, in line with its project 
formulation and execution system. Recent legislation in Cuba defines the 
procedures for preparing and carrying out investment projects, and establishes 
the CEDOs in charge of this. Some of these CEDOs are organization that existed 
before while others are presumably new organizations at the most important 
ministries. The mission and the functions of each are carefully defined; for 
instance, the CEDO at the Communications Ministry is to deal with all invest- 
ment projects in the Ministry but may supply to other Ministries consulting 
and engineering services related to the communications aspects of their projects.-/ 
1/ Time will tell whether the system works efficiently in practice, or whether 
bureaucracy will smother it. 
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5.3. Some issues in supply of C&E services 
(a) The import of C&E services from developed countries --------------------------------------------------- 
We have remarked that many large C&E assignments in the developing 
countries are entrusted to CEDOs from the developed countries, for a variety 
of reasons. 1/ 
While in some cases there is no alternative to the import of C&E services, 
and recognizing that there are certain advantages in such a course of action on 
account of speed, efficiency and reliability, the use of foreign CEDOs entails 
several drawbacks. One of them is their cost: fees per man-hour are larger, 
expenses on account of travel and subsistence of foreign professionals are 
sizeable. Other disadvantages may be summed up by the expression "dependence". 
Many important decisions would be made by foreigners, and this may have several 
unfavourable consequences, which are mentioned elsewhere in this paper. 
The problem is to use foreign C&E in such a way as to maximize its 
positive features and minimize its negative effects. This would mean the 
establishment of "rules of the game" and standard procedures that would place 
foreign C&E as a complement rather than as a substitute to local C&E, seeking 
mechanisms of cooperation between both sources of supply in order to favour the 
maximum utilization of local sources and make full use of foreign consulting 
as a vehicle for technology transfer and the training of national consulting 
personnel. Some people feel that the best solution is to employ a local CEDO 
as the "prime contractor" and let it determine what foreign collaboration is 
needed and how the work should be divided. 
The implementation of such a policy may find obstacles in the attitudes 
of State and private decision-makers, in the behaviours of international and 
national financial agencies, in the lack of capacity for a proper use of C&E 
services in the State and the private sector, and perhaps in the attitudes of 
local CEDOs themselves in so far as they have become accustomed to a subsidiary 
role in regard to foreign CEDOs. 
1/ Imports of C&E services from other developing countries are now starting 
to be-significant. Here is a field of great potential to which we refer 
in a later section. 
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(b) Participation of foreign capital in domestic CEDOs --------------- 
The issues here are similar to those which have been extensively 
debated in relation to foreign capital participation in manufacturing and other 
economic activities. Three are however certain peculiar aspects that have to 
do with the nature of C&E activities and the role they may fulfill in develop- 
ment: 
- The true indicator of the extent to which a local CEDO is dependent 
from a foreign one may be the origin of technological assets and 
certain specialized technological services it employs, as well as the 
origin of its key management and technical personnel, rather than the 
equity participation by the foreign CEDO. 
- CEDOswhich are subsidiaries or joint ventures of foreign CEDOs have 
a number of advantageson account of their ready access to the knowhow 
and expertise of the parent organization. This is probably favourable 
to the "private" efficiency of the projects they undertake. 
- From the social efficiency point of view, however, there may be 
disadvantages on account of a tendency to accept solutions suggested 
by the parent organization and to rely on foreign inputs without 
making a decided effort to use fully what may be procured domestically. 
This would mean that many of the favourable impacts of local C&E would 
not appear. 
1/ 
These topics have been debated in several places, particularly countries 
where successful native CEDOs have been taken over relatively cheaply by foreign 
organizations. They should be examined closely and reliable evidence should be 
procured to allow for an objective appreciation, as far as this is possible in 
issues so controversial. 
(c) The notion of "installed capacity" in C&E 
--------------------------------------- 
It is not easy to arrive at estimations of installed capacity for the 
production of C&E services. The problems are similar to those of estimating 
demand. It is important nevertheless to procure this information as a basis 
for programming the development of national C&E capacity and the training of 
human resources. 
1/ In fact, some people feel that subsidiary or joint-venture CEDOs are like 
Trojan horses which seduce by their external trappings but bring inside 
the hidden enemy. 
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In the recent OECD Seminar (Paris, October 1978) doubts were voiced 
regarding the usefulness of making detailed inventories of installed capacity 
in C&E on the basis of volume of sales or even human resources available. The 
importance was stressed of the type of knowhow that depends on the institutional 
organization; it was pointed out that skills, on the other hand, are tradeable 
among institutions. 
A suggestion made on that occasion is that installed capacity may be 
taken to be the total volume of human resources, economic resources and technical 
procedures of consulting and engineering which are available at a certain moment 
to carry out services; but these resources must be within certain types of 
organizations. Ten computers and 200 engineers are only meaningful if they are 
in an organization and have a methodology they can use to prepare a project and 
follow up its execution. C&E capacity would then only be significant if there 
is appropriate management capability (a similar thing may be said about 
contractors). The kind of estimation or inventory of installed capacity that 
should be had would therefore be strongly related to management. There are two 
roles for management: managing the organization itself, and managing projects. 
In developing countries, in the case of firms which are not too large, these 
two types of responsibilities are often taken up by the same person. Clients 
should examine very carefully the management capabilities of the CEDO and of 
the prospective project managers, before entrusting an assignment to them. 
On the other hand, in the case of organizations which give advice of a relatively 
simple nature to small and medium enterprise, one might say that engineering 
capacity is much more diffused and that the role of management is less important. 
(d) The specificity of CEDOs 
------------------------ 
An interesting question relates to the specifity of consulting and 
engineering organizations. Recent experience in Argentina has shown that CEDOs 
engaged in preinvestment studies for road building have not been successful on 
going into the field of hydroelectric projects, in which the large recent 
increase in demand for C&E services has been supplied by new CEDOs. The 
difficulty of switching fields would seem to be even larger on going from 
civil to industrial work. However, many CEDOs have been able to widen their 
field of action in a succession of assignments. 
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It would be important to ask in how a CEDOs specific to certain areas 
can be put to work in different areas. Would they have to recruit new people 
(or teams)? Can existing personnel be retrained in a short time? How can the 
new knowhow be procured efficiently and quickly? 
Knowledge about these questions would not only throw light on the chances 
for survival of a CEDO when demand dries up in its specific field, but would 
be helpful in debates about the establishment of a national C&E capacity when 
CEDOs have to be set up in several fields, since specific C&E resources may 
not be easily put to work in a different field from that in which it has 
specialized. 
(e) State-owned CEDOs and private CEDOs 
----------------------------------- 
Private CEDOs have showed great concern about the expansion of State 
C&E activities, which they feel are encroaching more and more in their market. 
We may suggest that it is an important question to maintain a balance between 
public interest and private initiative, and obtain a rational distribution of 
supply between private and State CEDOs, retaining the innovative virtues of 
the first and counteracting "bureaucratic" expansion of the latter. 
Some people feel very strongly against State consulting. They agree that 
the State should take over various activities, but they draw the line at 
consulting since they feel that State consulting has inherent shortcomings. 
They are not against Ministries and public agencies having their own departments 
for the preparation of general studies and projects, but object to the growth 
of institutions that "without being really consulting" absorb many resources 
destined to consulting. They feel that the proper role of State consulting 
lies in the promotion of expertise in new fields, which once developed should 
be set up as private CEDOs. They have doubts about the efficiency of State 
consulting, and point out that top personnel cannot be attracted to government 
employ since salaries are lower than in the private sector, that the pace of 
work in State organizations is much slower due to the characteristics of 
bureaucracy, that political influences are much more pervasive, and furthermore, 
that the best technical men move on to administrative posts. They add that 
private consulting does the job more cheaply, though this may be hidden from 
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view because a government organization does not include in its costs the full 
amount of overhead items-sometimes only direct costs are charged, raising the 
cry of "unfair competition" from private CEDOs. They point out that private 
CEDOs are strongly motivated to be efficient since their earnings, and indeed 
their. survival, depend crucially on their efficiency. State consulting 
organizations would lack such a motivation and would have to look to other 
types of motivation. Successful motivations in government work would greatly 
depend on the "spirit" of the working group and on the abilities and push of 
their leaders. These characteristics may be present at a certain moment but 
many examples may be shown when they ceased to exist, perhaps because of the 
disappearance of that leader. In such cases the organization may sink to a 
much lower level of efficiency, and due to the inbuilt inertia of bureaucratic 
organizations, continue to absorb work it does not discharge well. 
On the other side of the debate, arguments of various kinds are presented. 
It is said that the very profit-seeking nature of private C&E makes it vulnerable 
to ties with construction and equipment supplier firms, and with foreign CEDOs 
to which the main decisions are left; legal and administrative regulations, and 
ethical declarations of principle,would be largely unable to curb such 
tendencies. It is also said that the small size of many sectoral markets for 
C&E services induce the appearance of monopolistic situations, or of market- 
sharing and other restrictive trade practices among the few CEDOs in the sector, 
with obvious detriment to the clients (which often are public enterprises). 
Moreover, certain areas of C&E are held to be legitimate interests of the State: 
such would be the case of industrial sectors like steel, petrochemicals and 
mining where the State has a central interest, or even a monopoly; of new 
activities where there is as yet no installed capacity in C&E; of small and 
medium-scale industry which cannot meet the fees asked by private CEDOs. In 
the latter case, mention should be made of industrial research institutes that 
offer C&E services; these activities are a good means of connecting industrial 
R&D with industry, and if they were not carried out much of the research work 
would be left without a client and would not be transferred to the users. 
The issue of State vs. private C&E probably cannot be solved on rational 
grounds alone. Much depends on the political style of the country --whether 
private enterprise is favoured or not-- and other factors of the contextual type. 
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The discussion should rather try to identify the areas each type of actor is 
better qualified to deal with, which will naturally vary from country to 
country, and how State and private C&E may collaborate and complement each 
other. Some people think that the proper areas for the State would be those 
of policy, planning, programming and preliminary project conception --the 
strategical decisions-- leaving to the private CEDOs the detailed and 
specialized studies needed by such State activities, the preparation of pre- 
investment studies, and other activities leading to tactical decisions, as 
well as engineering design and other project implementation activities. But 
perhaps it would be advisable to develop strong in-house C&E capabilities, 
coupled to R&D activities, in some large public enterprisesoperating in modern 
branches where much investment is undertaken, since this may be the only way 
to acquire basic engineering capability that may permit full technological 
autonomy in those branches. 
(f) C&E statistics and the formal emergence of a C&E sector 
------------------------------------------------------- 
One of the reasons why national policy in many developing countries 
does not deal explicitly with C&E activities is that the latter do not have 
visible existence in the national system of statistics, and do not constitute 
a formal sector or branch. Even though the magnitude of these activities is 
not large, their importance as organizers and executors of investments, and as 
suppliers of many different services to production, would justify their 
constituting a visible aggregate of economic activity to which policy may be 
applied. 
It is possible, and indeed desirable, to measure the production, consumption, 
import and export of C&E services, classified according to various criteria, and 
to relate such data to other economic, educational and scientific indicators. 
Such information would help to diagnose the situation at different moments of 
time, and to lay out policies and plans related to C&E. 
While this should eventually be done within the general framework of 
economic statistcs, the characteristics of C&E activities and services are 
such that it would seem appropriate to start measuring them within the frame- 
work of science and technology statistics,. Most C&E activities would fall 
within the category "related scientific and technological activities" of the 
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UNESCO and OECD systems, and within that of "diffusion activities" of the 
OAS system. 
1/ 
The suggestion is therefore that within the system of "science and 
technology statistics" a subsystem "statisticsof consulting and engineering 
activities and services" may be developed and implemented operationally. This 
would require a serious effort for the drafting of definitions and classifica- 
tions conceptually valid and operationally useful, and for their testing 
through pilot surveys in various countries, until a recommendation for a 
standard practice may be put out and employed widely. Whilst this effort may 
be carried out by any country interested in it, it would seem that there are 
advantages to its being done by a regional or international organization as 
a natural extension of its work on science and technology statistics. 
While it is still too early to make any definite suggestions as to the 
shape of statistics in C&E, a general observation may be made. In science and 
technology statistics the emphasis has been on "activities" rather than on 
"products", due to the difficulty of measuring the latter in physical and 
economic terms. In the case of C&E, statistics should not only refer to the 
"C&E activity" --its different types, the human and financial inputs it uses, 
and other aspects usually contemplated in science statistics surveys-- but also 
to its product, "consulting and engineering services". This would mean a 
departure from current science statistics practice, but we feel that it is 
possible to measure C&E services in physical and economic terms, and to 
classify the results according to various criteria - type of C&E activity 
producing it, type of customer demanding it; local production, consumption, 
exports, imports; etc. 
1/ See: -OECD, "The measurement of scientific and technical activities: 
proposed standard practice for surveys of research and experimental 
development", DAS/SPR/74.63, Paris, October 1974. 
-UNESCO, "Manual for surveying national scientific and technological 
potential", Paris, 1969. 
-OEAS, Subcomisi6n de Estadisticas de la Ciencia y la Tecnologia, 
"Informe de la I sesi6n", Washington D.C., 1975. 
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6. TEE IMPACTS FROM EMPLOYING DOMESTIC C&E 
We have indicated in a previous section that the use of domestic C&E 
services may produce a number of positive impacts on development over and 
beyond the impacts that would take place if a foreign CEDO were employed. 
Most of the effects will need time to appear, as the processes set in 
motion are worked out, so that it will principally be a case of medium and 
long-term impacts. Some of them will be desirable and positive, others will 
be negative and constitute drawbacks to the use of local C&E services. The 
ultimate impact on development will be a resultant of the positive and negative 
effects. We may relate it to the social costs and arrive at an idea of the 
social efficiency of using a local CEDO. 
There are difficult problems in measuring these effects. First, we are 
interested in the differential or marginal consequences of applying certain 
ways of formulating and executing an investment project rather than other ways 
which were previously used. Second, these consequences will appear usually 
after some time and other influences will be at work. Third, some of the 
variables affected tend to be of a qualitative nature, such as "technical level", 
"learning" and "vulnerability". Quantification of the effects will not be 
simple and in some cases may be practically impossible. But it is worthwhile 
to analyze the different effects and to arrive, at least, at a general 
appreciation of their magnitude in a particular situation. This will perhaps 
be sufficient to provide a clear guidance for policy decisions if, as would 
appear from the limited evidence so far, positive effects are high for certain 
ways of carrying out the investment. 
6.1. How decisions in the project sequence are linked together 
It is often found that certain early decisions at the preinvestment stage 
set the ground for later decisions in the design and even the operation of the 
project, particularly when the project is large and complex. It is very 
important to make the early decisions in such a way that later decisions will 
be favourable to development objectives. Let us look at this matter more 
closely, examining the three phases of a project: preparation of the project 
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(preinvestment), execution of the project, and operation of the resulting 
installations. 
It is at the preinvestment stage that the principal characteristics of 
the investment project are considered, and a number of decisions are made which 
have strong implications regarding the characteristics and origin of the goods 
and services that are to be bought in the subsequent stages. 
When in a developing country a local organization participates in pre- 
investment work, or preferably takes charge as the "main contractor" to which 
outside consulting and engineering organizations may give collaboration, the 
project will probably be conceived with much more relevance to local needs and 
conditions than if a consultant from a foreign developed country is solely in 
charge. The local organization may be a project engineering group within the 
investing agency, or an outside local consulting and engineering firm retained 
by the agency. At this stage decisions are made about the principal parameters 
of the project, the sources of technology, the types of capital goods, the 
inputs to be employed at the production stage. The approach employed by the 
organization in charge of project preparation, and the implicit and explicit 
biases, will be reflected in the way purchases are distributed between local 
and foreign suppliers. 
The choice of who is in charge of project preparation, then, is vital for 
the choices that follow. 
During project preparation a number of alternatives will be studied, as 
the work proceeds from the project identification stage (where there may be a 
number of programming studies about the development of the industrial sector 
in general and of specific industrial branches), to a pre-feasibility stage 
(where a preliminary choice is made of the main project parameters, following 
from studies of markets, technology, location, etc.) and finally to the 
feasibility report in which more detailed market and location studies, 
preliminary engineering design and tentative negotiations with prospective 
suppliers will allow to develop alternative technological solutions, submit 
them to appraisal, and make recommendations to the project-owner. It is 
naturally the latter that will have to choose which alternative it prefers 
(and for this it needs a certain techno-economic capability of its own); but 
it is important to point out that the organization making the preinvestment 
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work will have already taken a large number of preliminary decisions, which 
are incorporated in the alternatives submitted to the project owner, so that 
these alternatives may be more or less appropriate to local conditions, or 
oriented towards the use of local inputs, according to the approach and biases 
of that organization. Experience would seem to show that when a local group 
is in charge of preinvestment work, a better technological choice may result 
and more local inputs are likely to be incorporated. 
Another important decision has to do with the way in which the invest- 
ment project will be financed. Experience also shows that the local content 
is highest when the investor uses its own funds and lowest when supplier 
credit is employed. 
Once a decision has been taken about carrying out the project according 
to one of the alternatives put forth in the preinvestment stage, and once 
financing arrangements, Government approval and other necessary preliminaries 
are ready, the project entersthe execution stage, and a number of decisions 
have to be taken regarding the supply of various inputs. The technological 
solution will have been chosen already, and this will generally mean that a 
supplier of the basic engineering design will also have been chosen, either 
the technology owner or a firm that has been licensed by it. In many modern 
industrial investments, technology and the basic engineering design that applies 
it are imported; there is room however for detaching certain "peripheral" 
technologies from the "core" process and getting them engineered locally. 
Also, it is sometimes necessary to conduct R&D work to adapt the process, or 
the product design, to local conditions, and it should be possible sometimes 
to have this R&D performed locally. The extent to which peripheral basic 
design and adaptive R&D work may be carried out locally will vary with the 
level of technical development of the recipient country, and with the attitude 
and the efforts of the project owner and his consultant organization. 
The next task is detailed engineering, in which the basic design is 
converted into a set of detailed drawings and instructions for the purchase 
and installation of equipment and for the construction activities. At this 
stage, a number of seemingly minor decisions take place which when added 
together may make up important differences regarding the characteristics and 
sources of-the inputs to be employed. The participation of a domestic 
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engineering group is important to assure that such decisions are made so that 
local inputs will be incorporated into investment and production as far as 
possible. 
An interesting case which happened in a Latin American country some 
years ago illustrates this. A number of simple industrial buildings had to 
be built. Some of them were designed by local engineers, and used 75% of 
domestically produced steel; others, designed by foreign engineers, imported 
75% of the steel required. The large difference did not result from different 
characteristics of the buildings, which were alike, but from the approach of 
the designers. Foreign engineers were not familiar with local steel and 
would only employ it when they were sure it would not endanger the structure. 
Local engineers knew well the local steel and employed it unless they were sure 
it would not be appropriate. The "safety-first" attitude of the foreigners, 
added to their imperfect knowledge of the local product, unnecessarily 
multiplied by three the steel imports. 
It is through a large number of decisions of this nature that a local 
engineering group can fulfill a socially important role in specifying inputs 
that can be produced by local suppliers. At the investment stage, this will 
affect the origins of different capital goods, technical services, construction 
materials, and construction services. At the operation stage, previous design 
engineering decisions will influence the nature and source of raw materials, 
basic inputs, components, parts, spares, technical services and administrative 
services, all "current" purchases on which decisions taken at the investment 
stage will exert some influence. 
We can easily see how important it is to have domestic control of the 
preinvestment and the design engineering activities if full use is to be made 
of potential domestic supply at the investment stage and also during the 
operating or production stage of the new installations. Consulting and 
engineering organizations in charge of those activities should be well aware 
of the possibilities of local supply in each of the items we have mentioned, 
and should have the right attitude regarding modifications in process and 
product design, specifications, standards and delivery dates. They should 
appraise the risks and the extra cost --if any-- in each local purchase, and 
advise the.project-owner regarding the decision that is best in the long run. 
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It may be useful to analyze past or on-going projects to appraise the 
performance of the CEDO and other actors that define the final results of a 
project. To do this use may consider the sequence of critical decisions, 
which form a "decisional chain", from the moment the project was identified 
until the resulting installations were operating to specifications. At each 
point in the decision chain various elements may be identified: the actors 
involved; the alternatives considered at the time of decision, and how they 
were identified and formulated; the alternatives not considered, and the 
reasons why; the decision methodology employed, explicit or not; the informa- 
tion used for decision making; and the principal influences at work --explicit 
and implicit policy, contextual factors, motivation and attitudes of the 
actors, characteristics of the production branch, etc.-- which have operated 
directly (i.e. through the information employed for decision making) or through 
the actors (i.e. affecting their behaviour). 
The resulting descriptions may be sumarized in a table which would permit 
fruitful discussions with the actors themselves (see model in following page). 
This description can help to understand the influence of successive decisions 
on the relative success or failure of the project to comply with private goals 
(getting the job done quickly and efficiently) and social objectives (keeping 
decision in national hands, using more adequate technology, maximizing 
favourable impacts on local production and engineering, increasing learning 
opportunities for the CEDO, its client and the latter's suppliers, giving 
opportunities to local R&D, etc.). 
At each point of the decisional chain two or more alternative decisions 
may be adopted. The set of all possible decisions may be said to make up a 
"decision tree". We start at the first point in the chain and identify 
alternative decisions that may be taken -those explicitly considered by the 
actors as well as those not considered but possible. At a second point in 
the chain, each previous outcome would branch out into two or more possibilities, 
and so on. 
The usefulness of this representation may be improved if we qualify 
alternatives according to the degree to which they are expected to enhance 
the social efficiency of the investment activity, and order then accordingly 
.in a listing or a graph.1/ 
1/ We leave aside here the very real possibility that the decisional sequence 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Degree of impact on the social 
efficiency of the investment 
activity. 
1 2 3 4 Critical decision points 
It would be possible to specify a "best" chain of decisions in the 
sense that at each point an alternative is chosen that will mean maximum 
social efficiency: 
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In practice such an optimal sequence may not be feasible and the outcome 
would look somewhat like the graph below. The reasons for not adopting the 
"best" decisions should be examined.- 
It is likely that it will be easier to achieve a higher overall efficiency 
of the complete investment project (once the decisional chain has been gone 
through) when the first few decisions are optimal. This is in line with the 
proposition in the literature that decisions taken during the preinvestment 
period largely set the stage for later decisions --the choice of a local 
consultant, for instance, would make it much more probable that the technology 
chosen will be more adequate, that local capital goods and other inputs are 
fully employed, etc. If this is correct, outcome (i) below is much more probable 
than outcome (ii). 
N 
11 
1/ Some people feel that one of the main influences behind a near-optimal 
decision sequence is the positive attitude of the main actors -principally 
client and CEDO- and that without a favourable philosophy on their part it is easy to fall on decisions that maximize private efficiency but not 
social efficiency. 
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At some decision points the outcome of certain alternatives may limit 
the choices in later decisions and be strongly negative for social efficiency. 
This would particularly be the case with the election of the source of finance. 
A decision to accept supplier credit, for instance, would throw our sequence 
into a tail-spin: 
6.2. Impacts on the actors that participate in a project 
There has been in the literature a tendency to emphasize the effects on 
suppliers and on the development process. The effects on the investor or 
project-owner may be far from negligible, and in fact they may constitute the 
principal motivation to embark into the cost and effort required by forward- 
looking procedures to carry out investment projects. 
(a) Effects-on-the-investor 
We may briefly indicate the following benefits to the investor: 
- A first benefit may be forthcoming already in the short run, through a 
reduction in the costs of purchases, as efforts are applied to certain 
activities that may have been disregarded before --for instance, better- 
thought specifications, choice of more appropriate standards, simplification 
of product design to enable local producers to supply parts for it, better 
quality control, the search for new sources of supply, more frequent 
contacts with suppliers. 
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By employing local consulting and engineering services, and by opening up 
the "technological package" in the case of an investment, the investor may 
be able to choose a better adapted technology, lower the cost of many items, 
supervise closely the construction of equipment and fixed installations, and 
decrease its vulnerability in future operations since it will be able to 
obtain locally spare parts, inputs and technical advice which it would other- 
wise have to import (with costly delays, possibly at a higher cost and with 
the risk of being left stranded if the foreign supplier has discontinued 
production, or if there is a balance-of-payments or political crisis). 
All this may mean a substantial saving in costs of investment and operation 
of the project in hand. The influence in this regard of a good technology 
choice and in general of an adequate process of technology transfer would be 
particularly important, as shown in Annex 2. 
Through the many efforts required, the investor and its local CEDO will undergo 
a learning process which is bound to increase the efficiency of production and 
maintenance operations, permit better investments to be made in the future, 
and help incorporate a stream of product and process improvements, some of 
which may originate locally. The cumulative effect of this learning process, 
and of a similar learning process in the investor's local suppliers, may be 
very important. 
The magnitude of these positive effects will depend, among other things, 
on the situation before the new practices are adopted. It would seem that in 
many developing countries there are numerous Government agencies and enterprises, 
as well as private firms, whose investment practices may be considerably improved. 
Hence there are good opportunities to apply better practices. 
There may be a number of drawbacks for the investor, principally higher 
prices and poorer quality of local supplies, the difficulties of financing 
local items, and the risk of technical failure and late deliveries. The latter 
stand behind the refusal of many State organizations to open up packages, rely 
on local engineering, and buy from local suppliers. It is likely that such 
risks have been exaggerated by public decision-makers in the past, resulting 
in the continuation of poor practices for too long. However, too sanguine an 
approach could backfire and should be avoided; there should be a careful and 
realistic appraisal of how far it is possible to proceed with forward-looking 
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practices at a given occasion, in the understanding that another step forward 
can be taken at a later date. By following a stepwise process of improvement 
the investor can build up solidly its technical competence and that of its 
CEDO, and develop a network of reliable suppliers. Some risks are however 
unavoidable, particularly when a certain supplier is given a chance to produce 
something it has not produced before. But risks are a part of economic life, 
and "he who does not risk does not gain". 
Costs to the investor would include, first, those of building up internal 
technical capabilities and a purchasing organization. These costs rightly 
belong to the capital account since they mean an addition to the investor's 
technical and human capacity, which can be repeatedly used in the future. 
Second, there may be costs in using those new capabilities, in accepting higher 
prices, lower quality and late deliveries from local suppliers (but such things 
need not take place), in helping the latter financially and technically, and 
perhaps in bearing higher production costs because of the use of less efficient 
(but possibly more "appropriate") domestic technologies. 
(b) Effects on suppliers 
-------------------- 
The positive effects on suppliers are rather obvious. They come, first, 
from an increase in demand for what they produce, particularly if the client 
switches from imports to local purchase. Second, from a more stable demand, 
that means a reduction in the fluctuation of the workload and a lower entre- 
preneurial uncertainty; such an effect would be felt particularly by suppliers 
of inputs at the production stage. This opens possibilities for applying 
resources and. efforts for technological improvement, productivity increase, 
personnel training, and expansion of plant. A purchasing programme for some 
time in the future can sharply diminish uncertainty and can lower the level of 
idle capacity in the long run; these would be important effects on the 
efficiency of certain capital goods manufacturers that are usually subjected 
to violent ups and downs in their activity. Third, from tighter specifications 
that require a higher level of accomplishment and are key inducements for 
learning and technical progress. This is particularly the case when a supplier 
is asked to produce something it has not produced before. Fourth; from the 
support measures extended by the investor, and possibly by the central Govern- 
ment, principally. credit and technical assistance. 
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One of the results may be that the supplier undergoes a learning process 
which leads to better technological levels and an enlarged market on account 
of being able to widen its range of products. Such a consequence is well 
known in developed countries, where a large number of technical innovations 
developed in relation with Government work in aerospace, defence and other 
areas have found their way into civilian applications. The supplier acquires 
a certain knowhow with the Government footing the bill, but is allowed and 
even encouraged to apply this knowhow to new products in other markets. In 
the developing countries the industrial branches involved will be much less 
sophisticated, and the knowhow will not usually come from original R&D but 
rather from technology imports, personnel training, engineering efforts and 
a sequence of minor changes and innovations. But the phenomenon is essentially 
similar. It can be clearly observed in mechanical industries supplying parts 
to manufacturers of automobiles, ships and other complex products, which have 
shown remarkable technical progress. It is possible through adequate purchasing 
policies to accelerate and orient this learning process; a good example is the 
role that French Government enterprises played through their procurement 
policies in developing the capital goods industry in France in the early 
postwar. 
The effect on R&D institutions may also be significant. When an investment 
is made with strong local participation in the preinvestment and engineering 
stages, a number of requests for R&D work may be made to deal with various 
problems regarding the adaptation and improvement of technology. Other research 
needs may be identified in relation to production problems. If a local 
institution is engaged to carry out R&D on these problems, the institution 
will be getting involved with practical problems, a very welcome thing in 
developing countries where research institutions are notoriously isolated from 
production problems. 
Suppliers may encounter a number of drawbacks in purchasing policies that 
are aimed at them, such as the possibility of very stiff conditions on the part 
of the purchasing organization (leading to low profits and even losses, 
"sweated labour", etc.), the strategically weak position of being principally, 
if not wholly, dependent on just one or a few customers, and the ever-present 
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possibility of a sudden drop or cancellation of orders on account of a change 
in policy, a not infrequent oc,curence in some developing countries in the case 
of Government organizations. 
(c) Effects on other actors and institutions 
-------------------------------------- 
When purchases are made from local suppliers they may produce effects 
on other parts of the economic system through market and non-market mechanisms. 
A rise in the output of suppliers will produce demand increases elsewhere 
through the multiplier mechanism, and if there is not enough idle capacity in 
manpower and equipment to allow a corresponding increase in output, new invest- 
ments may be carried out. All this would mean an increase in economic activity, 
employment and investment, to analyze which it would be necessary to count with 
an appropriate macro-economic model. A second type of effect, probably much 
more difficult to analyze, has to do with linkage effects, what the French 
call "effets d'entrainement", through which important changes in the industrial 
structure of the country may result in the long run. 
The magnitude of the multiplier, accelerator and linkage effects would 
result from the orientation and magnitude of the investor's demand, at the 
investment and operation stages, and could achieve significant values when large 
investments are carried out, such as happened last century with railways and is 
today happening in oil-producing countries that have ambitious plans for develop- 
ing their petrochemical industry. The opportunities for an enlightened policy 
about investments can easily be seen in such cases. 
The above effects are in principle quantifiable. There are other effects, 
or externalities, not transmitted through the market, where quantification may 
not be possible, but which may prove to be even more important for industrial 
development in the long run. They should be explicitly considered and their 
mangitude should be appraised, if only by means of qualitative judgements, when 
investment programmes are being formulated. Among them we may mention: 
- The favourable psychological impact of successfully employing local consulting 
engineers, disaggregating complex investments, relying on local technological 
developments, and utilizing local capital goods and other inputs in investment 
and production. This "demonstration effect" is potentially so important that 
a strategy for building up C&E capabilities and utilizing them for maximum 
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impacts on development should carefully select its initial activities so 
as to maximize the chances of success, and should devote efforts to 
propagandize the achievements. 
- A number of technological effects may occur as human resources are trained, 
researchers' attitudes are improved, technical knowledge is diffused, and 
capabilities for problem-solving and for the improvement and generation of 
technology are reinforced throughout the industrial system. All this means 
a learning process sparked by investment activities, which may have important 
implications for an increase in technological levels, the use of more 
appropriate technology and in general a strengthening of technological 
self-reliance. A CEDO may fulfill a crucial role in this process by applying 
to different clients what it learns from its local activities, its foreign 
associates and. its different contacts with technology owners, R&D centres 
equipment makers and information systems. In this sense an independent CEDO 
may help in the "socialization" of knowledge otherwise locked up within an 
enterprise. 
6.3. Impacts on development 
We have reviewed a number of effects that the appropriate use of domestic 
C&E capabilities may have on the investor,its suppliers and other actors, and 
ultimately on the pattern, rate and characteristics of development. 
Impacts may be concentrated on certain activities where suppliers already 
abound, or can be set up, and this may promote the development of branches such 
as building materials, machine tools, mechanical components, etc. They can be 
directed to certain types of producers, according to the products that are 
bought, for instance medium or small enterprises in a certain region. Such 
decisions may be oriented by the overall industrial development policy. 
Generally there has been a bias in Government policy favouring the 
importation of capital goods, through lower tariffs, cheap credits, etc. 
Economies of scale, however,,are not too large in many different types of 
capital goods, or in certain products which may be efficiently put out by 
small-scale producers such as transformers, metal structures, certain building 
materials,-and items requiring a large amount of manpower for assembly. The 
purchasing power resulting from a number of investments could be used to create 
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a demand for products where the'economies of scale are not large and demand 
may be enough to achieve an efficient scale of operation, particularly if 
labour is an important input. It is also in these products that appropriate 
technologies may be developed and applied, lowering the scale of production 
and using more labour. 
The effects on industrial development to which we have just referred 
impinge on certain branches, types of producers, and geographical regions 
where purchases may be concentrated. Other effects will be transmitted throughout 
the industrial spectrum by market and non-market mechanisms. Here we wish to 
underline the importance of the learning process, and suggest that to a con- 
siderable extent investment projects should be designed and conducted so as to 
have strong effects on it. 
The outcome of learning is the increase in productive efficiency, the 
reduction of costs and the technological progress that will allow to develop 
new productive activities and eventually modify comparative advantages. Its 
influence on the characteristics of development is therefore very important. 
In developing countries emphasis should be put on the improvement and diffusion 
of technology, rather than on the generation of new sophisticated technologies 
as in some developed countries. Technology diffusion is an essential ingredient 
of industrial development policy, and the way investment projects are undertaken 
may be instrumental in fostering it in key branches of production. Research is 
needed on the ways in which this can better be accomplished. 
Impacts on the activity of R&D, and on the utilization of R&D results, can 
also be very important. In fact, the results of R&D activity carried out in 
specialized institutions have little chance of being employed in practice ,if 
C&E activities are not applied to evaluating such results, finding possible 
uses, identifying clients and users, developing product and process designs 
that can be applied commercially, and in general carrying out the wide array of 
activities needed to transform a technical advance into a commercially successful 
innovation. Some R&D institutions have their own C&E departments, which may go 
under the denomination of "techno-economic services", "sales", "consultancy", 
etc., whose job is to link R&D activities with prospective users. In other 
cases the task may be done by an independent CEDO. In some large public enter- 
prises in developing countries (oil, iron and steel, power) in-house R&D and 
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engineering departments work hand in hand to develop and apply new technology, 
and may enable new investment projects to be made with basic engineering of 
their own. At this stage a very high degree of mastery of technology will 
have been obtained. 
The final impacts on development will be expressed in a change of 
structures and a modification in the values of macro variables such as employ- 
ment, productivity, imports, qualified personnel, etc. Other influences will 
be at work so that the contribution of local C&E in investment projects may 
not be easy to ascertain. The stage of development of the country may be an 
important influence. In countries of incipient industrialization there may 
be few opportunities, while in semi-industrialized countries the scope will be 
much larger. Let us look at this more closely. 
In several semi-industrialized countries the process of import 
substitution has go to a point where further industrial development is being 
blocked by a variety of reasons. The country does not utilize properly its 
industrial sector on account of high prices, late deliveries, quality defects, 
etc., which may be adscribed among other things to a process of industrializa- 
tion that has not allowed a complete development of the engineering design 
and capital goods branches. It is frequently observed that much demand is 
diverted away from domestic industry because of the absence of an efficient 
capital market, lack of national standards, little confidence and little know- 
ledge about the abilities of industry, and other structural and institutional 
reasons. At the same time industry carries out little innovation of its own, 
tending instead to import process technology and product designs. 
It may be possible to help overcome such a blocking of industrial 
development through substantial and sustained purchases of industrial 
products from the enterprises that are more receptive to innovation and more 
able to profit from it. Such an impact may result from a conscious effort 
of managing investment projects in such a way that demand is generated for 
those enterprises, purchase specifications are carefully drafted, adequate 
prices are agreed, flexible contracts are signed, financial and technical 
support is provided. In such a case the positive effects will not only come 
from the increase in demand and its repercussions throughout the economy, but 
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will also derive from the technical progress that suppliers will be induced 
to make in order to respond to increasing technological requirements, from the 
widespread learning process that such technical progress will cause in other 
parts of the industrial system, and from the restructuring of relations between 
public enterprises, foreign and national private enterprises, R&D, financing 
organizations, and the Government. 
We have referred so far to the positive impacts that may result from 
adopting forward-looking procedures in investment preparation and design, which 
hinge on the development of domestic C&E capabilities and their proper utiliza- 
tion. On the other side of the ledger, there may appear a number of drawbacks 
and costs in following this approach. 
We have already indicated those that fall on investors, suppliers and 
other actors; in addition these are others which would amount to definite 
social costs: 
- Monopoly situations may have to be accepted in certain C&E areas and in certain 
types of products, since the domestic market may be too small. 
- Inefficiencies may result because of the virtual protection'awarded in some 
cases, and the low productivity of favoured small enterprises, regional 
activities, and suppliers employing technical solutions that end up costing 
more or simply failing. 
Conflicts may appear between different Government agencies, enterprises and 
departments; for instance, when a Government enterprise invokes reasons of 
urgency to avoid regulations in favour of local supplies. Such conflicts 
can be damaging to the parties involved. 
- There may be retaliation by other countries that see their exports go down 
when Government decides to rely on local suppliers. This, however, would 
not seem to be a grave danger as it is in the case of straightforward 
protection. 
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6.4. Procedures and decision models 
The achievement of maximum impacts from investment expenditure would 
require a programming of purchases in the medium and long term, after a careful 
disaggregation of the projects and a study of local supply possibilities, 
including new products that were not manufactured before. Negotiations may be 
conducted with the primer contractor and the local subcontractors in order to 
arrive at supply programmes that are progressive but feasible, particularly if 
there is a succession of investments in which the proportion of local inputs 
is constantly being increased. If impacts are to be maximized on suppliers, 
consideration should be given to the demand of other public and private investors 
on the same goods. To achieve best results the planning of purchases should be 
made in concert with the supplier branches. 
As a working method, it is possible to apply a distinction adopted by 
Argentina's Atomic Energy Commission. The required supplies can be classified 
under three headings: positive list (the items- are already being produced with 
the required quality at acceptable prices), negative list (it is not possible 
to produce them locally) and probable list (production may take place if several 
problems are overcome, such as small local market, quality, safety). Efforts 
will be principally devoted to the probable list, and will require a decided 
action of supplier development. It is also possible to apply the concept of 
supplier development to the case of technological inputs; action would be taken 
not on productive firms but on consulting and engineering organizations, 
research institutes and other organizations of the science and technology 
system. 
Similar procedures may be used in the stage of operation of already installed 
capacity. But the difficulties will increase since the project-owner, now a 
functioning enterprise, will be dealing with many supplier units, especially 
if the latter are small or medium-size. There must be a development of adequate 
administrative procedures to construct effective purchasing system, through 
which the enterprise may carry out a truly active purchasing policy including 
technical, financial and training assistance to its suppliers. 
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In relation to models and rules for deciding about local procurement, 
little is found in the literature. In principle the investor should make a 
long-run evaluation and attempt to get its private maximum return, or ideally 
a maximum social return if it wishes to go beyond the limit of its investment 
or production activities. It is not easy to implement this in practice. 
There have been in France some interesting attempts at constructing 
formulas for the pricing of local inputs under different conditions, and it 
would be useful to analyze such solutions in detail. 
In relation with the installation of the second atomic power plant in 
Argentina, G. Gargiulo has analyzed the acceptability of higher local prices 
(as compared to imports) for components that may be locally manufactured. 
Local purchasing induces the expansion of productive capacity, a higher quality, 
more diversification of production. Local production of components has micro- 
economic, macroeconomic, social and technological effects that should be 
identified and quantified. If the component is already being produced locally, 
with sufficient quality, the purchasing decision is based on a comparison of 
the local and the import costs, with due regard to existing incentives and 
protective tariffs for local production. If the component is made locally but with 
not enough quality, or if it is not yet made but could be manufactured, the 
indirect benefits brought about by local production should be taken into account. 
If local manufacture is to take place, an increase is needed in the technical 
capabilities of the supplier - in equipment, technology, training. This 
produces benefits to the firm (over and beyond those that come from an increase 
in output) and may be estimated by comparing the benefits the firm would obtain 
if its technical capability increased according to the historical rate and those 
resulting from the much faster increase, during the time needed for the first 
to catch up with the second. On the other hand, in addition to the costs of 
producing the component there are costs occasioned by the sudden increase in 
technical capability, from which should be deduced the discounted costs that 
would have been necessary to reach this level of technical capability if the 
historically defined path were followed. The author adds that the valuation 
of costs and benefits requires the definition of quantifiable indicators and 
the solution of the price system that should be applied. He lists several 
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indicators referred to the above costs and benefits, and concludes that it 
should be possible to develop and use a system for evaluating what extra 
prices may be paid for the local supply of an item required by the investment 
project. 
We still know far too little about the practical aspects of heightening 
and transmitting the impacts of investment activity. Many positive experiences 
have taken place in developing countries and no doubt the practices currently 
employed in some industrial countries may also be valuable as examples. There 
is here a.clear research need to identify and analyze successful cases and 
evaluate the procedures and decision rules employed, from which guidelines 
may be prepared for the benefit of developing countries. 
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7. THE EFFICIENCY OF INVESTMENT ACTIVITY 
Let us suppose that an investment project is being carried out and that 
we may assign a certain index of efficiency, which will somehow relate costs 
and benefits, to the way this is done. Leaving aside extraneous influences, 
such as graft and political factors, we may expect the investor to attempt to 
maximize the efficiency of its investment activity, i.e. obtain what it needs 
at minimum cost, good quality, etc. The question to be asked is whether in 
practice this is achieved. 
If we examine an actual instance in a developing country, we may conclude 
that this is not the case. The way the investment is conducted may respond to 
very limited short-run objectives of the organization and may be up against 
various limitations and constraints -for instance, unwillingness to assume 
risks, lack of qualified technical advice, very imperfect information about 
alternatives, restrictions imposed by outside finance, etc.- so that a foreign 
CEDO is employed and the project is carried out in a turnkey manner. 
It is likely that if a long-term outlook is adopted, internal limitations 
are eased or removed, and a certain amount of effort is applied --in other words, 
if improved procedures are employed for project formulation, design and 
execution, involving a domestic CEDO at all stages in a responsible role-- a 
better efficiency may be attained through the positive effects we have reviewed 
in the previous section. 
Extra efforts applied by the investor and its CEDO to the investment 
activity will produce an increase in the private efficiency of the activity, 
that is, on the relation of the benefit reaped by the organization itself to 
the extra costs it must bear. The efforts will have a more than proportional 
return until an optimal point is reached, where more efforts do not pay. The 
investor may get to a new optimum in a reasonably short period of time, by 
acting on aspects that can be modified rather quickly, to which we have referred 
already. If given a longer period to build up internal capability, undergo a 
learning process, improve its purchasing procedures, set up a network of 
reliable suppliers, etc., and particularly if during this period there is an 
adequate development of one or more domestic CEDOs on which the investor may 
rely, a further improvement may take place as a succession of investments are 
carried out. 
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These situations may be represented in a graph in which efficiency is 
plotted against the effort spent by the investor and its CEDO on investment 
activities. (See Graph 1). To start with the investor is applying a 
moderate effort and obtaining an efficiency (private) which it regards as 
maximal (point A), feeling that extra efforts are not warranted and may even 
be strongly counterproductive. This would be the turn key or "black box" 
situation. But changes in attitutdes, a more long-term view, the increasing 
use of local CEDOs and improved purchasing procedures may allow it to reach 
a higher maximum of efficiency in a relatively short time (point B) and an 
even higher maximum in the long run (point C). The successive maximal 
positions between points B and C will be attained gradually along time in 
successive investments,as learning proceeds and various effects are worked 
out. The process is that of going from "black box" to "white box" through 
a succession of "grey boxes", each of a lighter shade than the previous one. 
Point C would be the optimum from the private point of view in the case 
of an investor that makes his decisions according to long-run considerations. 
But an additional increase in efficiency may result if efforts are joined with 
other investors --this is a distinct possibility in the case of public enter- 
prises-- so that CEDOs can accelerate their learning process, specifications 
are unified (particularly in the design of peripheral installations), product 
varieties reduced and larger consolidated purchases carried out at lower 
prices. In this way the optimum may move to D (Graph 2), though in practice 
it does not appear easy to coordinate activities and unify criteria and 
purchasing mechanisms. 
Up to this point we have been referring to the efficiency within the 
investing organization, that is, its private efficiency. Meanwhile, what is 
happening to social efficiency? In a developing country there is the likeli- 
hood that due to the divergences between social and private costs, and to the 
effects produced on the suppliers and on other actors via the market and the 
positive externalities, social efficiency may be higher than private efficiency. 





























































































































































































































































































































practices" are actively followed in investment activities, so that it would 
be desirable to proceed further with the efforts until a social optimum E is 
reached, where social efficiency would be highest. This may require incentive 
mechanisms of various types, so that the extra costs of going beyond the 
private optimum will be borne by the community at large rather than by the 
investor. 
The model of analysis we are suggesting is conceptual and qualitative, 
and it would not be easy to express it in quantitative terms. The graphs 
therefore have a heuristic character; but they suggest a number of things. 
We may expect that in a developed industrial country investors will 
have already learned to invest well, and that social efficiency is very close 
if not equal to private efficiency. In such case, points A, C and E will more 
or less coincide. Ideally, organizations in these countries would not need 
any additional efforts to improve their investment practices. 
But this is not so in developing countries; and it is important to ask 
in a specific situation questions like: How far is the private maximum (point 
C) from the original situation (point A)? How many steps would it take to 
reach it, and what is the optimum path (through the stages indicated by points 
B, B1, B2, etc.)? How higher is social efficiency than private efficiency at 
point C (represented by the distance .D in the graph)? How higher-is social 
efficiency at its maximum point (point E)?. 
A first observation that has strong policy implications is that the 
point of maximum private efficiency may be reached by the investing organiza- 
tion without any other incentive than its self-interest. It pays the organiza 
tion to increase its efforts up to that point. From the policy point of view, 
there appears a need to teach investors how to improve their ways to achieve 
this goals. 
Now, if the increase in social efficiency from the original position to 
that corresponding to point C is very high, this would mean that a great deal 
could be accomplished without having to oblige the investor to follow certain 
compulsory practices, or appealing to its social or patriotic spirit; it would 
be enough to show that it stands to profit from following certain enlightened 
practices. Further social benefits could result from accompanying Government 
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measures to help suppliers through training, credit schemes, a measure of 
protection, etc., so that the social optimum could be approached quite a bit 
without having to ask the investor to go out of its way and do something 
contre-coeur. 
To get to its point of maximum efficiency, the investor would have to: 
- Modify its previous attitudes, plan its strategy for carrying out its future 
investments, study the possibility of using local technology, engineering, 
capital goods and inputs; 
- Improve its technical and management structures to make them able to carry 
out the expanded tasks involved in opening up the "package",dealing with 
local CEDOs, perhaps developing its own project formulation and engineering 
departments ("captive" CEDO) and R&D groups. 
- Develop and adopt adequate methods of analysis and decision rules to deal 
with the various activities involved in an investment project, particularly 
in regard to purchasing decisions. 
- Externally, it should assist its domestic suppliers financially and technically, 
so that their efficiency and technical level may increase; it should also 
schedule its purchases far in advance and make this known so that suppliers 
will have firm expectations regarding the type of purchases and their timing, 
a fact that will reduce uncertainty and induce them to invest in physical 
facilities, training, technological improvements, new technology, etc. 
The maximum private efficiency that can be reached would partly depend 
on internal factors --for instance, the technical and managerial level, the 
correct appraisal of real risks-- and partly on factors of the environment, 
among them, coherence of policy, stability, etc. Countries which are well 
organized, and stable organizations, will reach higher levels of private 
efficiency in investment activities. The same will happen in the public sector 
in so far as all Government organizations are managed as a whole, with a 
general rationality rather than a scatter of partial rationalities. In a market 
economy with relatively autonomous decision centers more efforts will be needed, 
and incentives will be required to compensate extra costs in each organization 
that is being influenced. 
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Care must be taken not to rush things too much without adequate prepara- 
tion, trying to achieve too soon a high level of incorporation of domestic 
technological assets and services, or of domestic purchases, since the 
organization may find itself in the descending part of the curve (point B2). 
It is necessary to understand the limitations that exist; time must be given 
for the learning process to produce results that are incorporated in successive 
investment projects, so that progress is achieved by stages. An important 
question is how far to go in each stage -for instance, what percentage of local 
participation may be sought in successive investment projects. 
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8. THE CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING DESIGN ORGANIZATION 
This section examinessome issues that have to do with the characteristics 
of a CEDO in its "mature" state and the process through which it arrives at 
that state. 
CEDOs can be very different and it is not easy to make general statements 
about them. They differ in the way they originate, which may affect significantly 
their later development and characteristics, 
1/ 
and in many other things. What 
makes them comparable is that they have to carry out certain activities concerned 
with the organization and application of knowledge, and that they must acquire 
the resources and abilities to perform those activities in an efficient way. 
We suggest that a CEDO, like other institutions, develops in time until 
it reaches a situation of maturity, or "steady state", in which it is reasonably 
well equipped with human, physical and intellectual assets, has achieved 
sufficient size that allows it to perform efficiently, has stable relationships 
with its environment --clients, suppliers, Government, Banks, other CEDOs local 
and foreign and as a result of this is able to fulfill efficiently its social 
role. 
The problematique of a mature CEDO is somewhat different from that of a 
CEDO in its developing stage, since one of the main imperatives of the latter 
will be to achieve the mature stage and this may need special measures of 
support by the public authorities. Hence our considering separately both stages. 
When a macro view is adopted, policy issues will be different in sectors where 
there exist mature CEDOs than in those where CEDOs are developing, and the same 
may be said of countries as a whole. International cooperation between CEDOs 
will also acquire different characteristics according to the "maturity" of the 
weaker partly. 
Let us now make a brief exploration of the above points. 
1/ This was discussed extensively at the Corfu meeting in 1976, where a 
typology of "emergency patterns" was considered ranging from professionals 
getting=together and looking for clients, to a building firm that branches 
into C&E services, to the carefully planned creation of a large C&E 
department by a large production enterprise. 
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8.1. The CEDO in its mature state 
Graph 3 presents in outline the elements that should be examined when 
styding the mature CEDO. 
We suggest that the performance of a CEDO should be measured by its 
social efficiency. We may define this parameter as the impact on national 
development in regard to the resources employed. 1/ It is not easy to measure 
SE in a cardinal scale unless simplifying assumptions are adopted, so that it 
may be necessary to employ an ordinal scale, as happens with other complex 
social variables. 
An observation here is that one should be careful with the indicators 
of "success" that are sometimes used, since they may not adequately reflect 
SE; for instance, the fact that a CEDO is profitable, or shows a good rate of 
growth, is a good measure of its commercial success but only a partial 
indicator of its social efficiency.?/ 
What influences social efficiency? We suggest that SE depends on the 
adequate performance of CEDO activities, which we group into three main 
categories: determination of the products to be produced; production; distribu- 
tion. In these activities we will seek, respectively,a maximum social utility 
of the products, a maximum productive efficiency, and a maximum distribution 
efficiency. The better a CEDO performs in these respects, the better its SE. 
These activities will themselves be influenced by internal factors that 
come out of the characteristics of the CEDO. Some of these characteristics 
may have evolved in response to needs posed by the activities carried out by 
the CEDO. 
The characteristics of the milieu or environment in which the CEDO exists 
influence the structure and characteristics of the CEDO, and its activities. 
CEDOs sometimes try to change external conditions so that they are more 
favourable to them; for this they unite in associations of a national or 
1/ The, concept is related to, but different from, that of social efficiency 
of the expenditure on an investment project to which we have referred 
in the previous section. 
2/ To give extreme examples, the Red Cross probably has a large SE but is 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































international scope. They also may carry out a dialogue with national 
authorities and with international agencies. 
Let us now briefly examine these aspects. 
(a) Determination of products to be produced ---------------------------------------- 
Here the rule would be that, within its field of work, the demands 
of its clientele, and its production possibilities, the CEDO should aim at 
selecting its products, and "designing" them, in such a way that their social 
utility is highest. 
A CEDO produces consulting and engineering services that have a value 
for the client, but the utility for society may be different, since the set 
of prices that is relevant socially may be different from that which is 
relevant privately, and other costs and benefits may appear elsewhere in 
society on account of the impacts and externalities associated with the 
rendering of C&E services and their use by the client. 
Such discrepancy is probably not too large in a country with a well- 
functioning market mechanism and a high level of industrial development, but 
the situation may be very different in a developing country where externalities 
are likely to be an important part of social utility. This is a hypothesis 
that would need to be carefully tested, but there seems to be much evidence 
already in its favour. 
We have already referred to the role of a CEDO in a developing country 
for preparing and implementing good projects and thereby promoting technical 
development, the expansion of the capital goods industry, the circulation of 
information, the use of research results, etc. The CEDO should not only do a 
good technical job, but should carry it out in such a way as to produce long- 
run favourable impacts on the investor and also on other social actors so that 
maximum social benefits are derived from the task. The aim should not merely 
be "to get the job done". Hence, we suggest, the "design" of the product 
includes two parts: consulting and engineering services as regards the strict 
needs of the project, and long-run impacts on the client and on other actors. 
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The problem, of course, is that the extra costs and risks of designing 
for maximum social impacts are to be borne by the client, while the benefit 
brought about by those impacts may be capitalized by him only in part. It 
may then be necessary to provide incentives that will induce a socially 
desirable course of action. This may range from a strong motivation on the 
part of the principal actors, the CEDO and its client, to pressures by Govern- 
ment (which can be expressed in legislation, such as some countries have 
adopted in relation to their public enterprises) and monetary inducements. 
The obstacles from risk-averting attitudes, lack of confidence in domestic 
inputs, and other reasons, may be very strong and this may need a reinforcement 
of such incentives. Clients of CEDOs should be studied before policies are 
designed for influencing them. 
A number of issues may be brought up in regard to the social utility 
of the CEDO products. The first one is how to measure this variable, and here 
our comments above for the case of social efficiency are relevant. What 
weight shall we give to long-term impacts vis a-vis short term ones? It is 
likely that this whole matter can only be discussed properly within the frame- 
work of a development plan. 
Other issues have a more operative content. Can we suggest certain 
practices that may be applied for maximizing expected social utility? What 
guidelines may be derived from the experience of the CEDOs in the developing 
countries? What internal characteristics (for instance, national or foreign 
ownership of CEDO) help or hinder a high social utility? What policy 
instruments are best to promote maximum social utility? Research is needed 
to answer these and other questions. 
(b) Production 
The CEDO should attain maximum production efficiency; the "production" 
programme resulting from the previous point should be executed in minimum time 
and cost, with adequate quality and reliability. This is obviously an important 
objective for a CEDO, and is a necessary though not sufficient condition for 
maximum SE. 
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There is much diffused knowledge about CEDO production but not too much 
has been written about it, and even less in the case of developing country 
CEDOs. Here is an important field for research, which goes well beyond the 
usual "management" problem on account of the peculiarities of a CEDO. One of 
these peculiarities is the nature of the principal inputs used by a CEDO: 
(a) high-level human resources, and (b) knowledge, technical know how, informa- 
tion of many kinds. The management of these resources is not simple; the 
current management literature is of limited value here. This is particularly 
so in the case of a developing country where problems are more acute. 
The questions we may want to ask about the procurement and management of 
human and knowledge resources would make up a very long list. For instance, 
in the case of highly qualified personnel: what sort of professionals should a 
CEDO recruit? What training should they be given and where? How to make an 
efficient team out of a collection of individuals? How fast can this team 
grow by incorporating new members with little disruption of the efficiency? 
How far can the CEDO meet on its own the challenge of developing a new team? 
When is it better to rely on an association with another more experienced 
CEDO;,etc. 
It is on questions of productive efficiency that the experience of the 
CEDOs of industrial countries, and the literature from these countries, is 
more pertinent. This is to be contrasted with questions about the determina- 
tion of products, and about their distribution, where the peculiar conditions 
in developing countries and the nature of the role of their CEDOs would seem 
to call for fresh approaches. While in the industrial countries the well- 
structured socioeconomic context largely reduces the problem of a CEDO to that 
of attending the expressed needs of the client and attaining a high productive 
efficiency, in a developing country the situation is much more complex and the 
optimum social efficiency cannot be reached by acting only on production. The 
two other groups of activities require much attention, and often the CEDO will 
have to surmount adverse characteristics of the milieu. 
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(c) Distribution 
It is not enough for the CEDO to produce efficiently products which 
possess a high social utility. It is necessary that those products should 
reach their users at the appropriate moment, in a form that will respond to 
their needs, and that they should be presented appropriately so that they may 
be employed by them. In this way the CEDO makes sure that the results of its 
production activity will receive proper utilization and hence that the 
promised social utility will indeed materialize. This is the problem to be 
considered by the activity of distribution. 
In a highly industrialized country the problem is not acute. Clients 
are able to state very precisely their needs for C&E services, and have their 
own technical structures to absorb efficiently what the consultants give them; 
the market mechanism takes care of most if not all of the impacts on development 
of C&E services, true externalities being probably of small magnitude. 
Instead, in a developing country there is a danger that the client will 
not ask for the type of C&E services he needs, that he will not absorb well 
the C&E services for want of a technical capability of his own, and that the 
potential externalities of the CEDO's work will not completely materialize if 
the actors that might benefit are not aware of opportunities or are not capable 
of seizing them. 
To avoid such outcomes, a good "delivery system" is needed. This requires 
the CEDO to forge good links and play an active role in regard to clients and 
to receivers of impacts. 
With respect to clients, the CEDO may carry out an activity of marketing 
its services, and will have to overcome barriers such as unfavourable client 
attitudes, lack of a common language, lack of economic incentives for inducing 
the client to contract with a local CEDO and utilize a high proportion of local 
inputs, etc. The CEDO may have to educate the client and help him to 
consolidate a technical group of his own. 
Regarding other actors in society that may receive benefits from the 
CEDO's activities, the CEDO should ideally go beyond its strict duty of 
providing C&E services and engage itself in a larger task of identifying those 
actors and of convincing and educating them so that they may profit from the 
opportunities opened up by C&E activities. For instance, the CEDO may look 
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for research centres and capital goods firms that may supply certain inputs 
specified in the project report, show them the opportunities they have, talk 
them into presenting a bid, pass onto them relevant information and in 
general help and even push them along. 
In this way the CEDO may round out its social task. The problem is in 
how far are CEDOs prepared to do such things on their owti, obeying their own 
motivation, since this activity is costly and time consuming. 
We have suggested that the CEDO should aim at a maximum efficiency of 
distribution, and a first issue here is how to measure this parameter. Other 
issues come up on the theoretical and the practical planes. What are the best 
ways of assuring the "distribution" of impacts and externalities? What 
inducements can be given to the CEDO? How does a CEDO learn to carry out an 
efficient distribution? Can the client, correctly motivated, help significantly 
in this? 
(d) Characteristics of the environment 
---------------------------------- 
The characteristics of the national and international environments 
in which the CEDO and its clients exist and operate will affect significantly 
the CEDO's internal characteristics as well as its activities. 
The list of such external factors may be very long, and their relative 
importance will vary with the country and the moment of time. We may 
classify them as follows: 
(i) National environment 
- Legislation, policies and actions of the central Government and Government 
agencies (particularly those that finance development projects) which may 
affect the way in which the CEDO performs its task, the demand for CEDO 
services, and the utilization of the latter. We may distinguish explicit 
policies, which are expressly designed to affect CEDOs and their activities, 
and implicit policies which are directed to other institutions and 
activities. Among the problems encountered by CEDOs that hinder their 
work are the instability of demand, the lack of financial strength and the 
competition from foreign CEDOs; if conditions are to be improved, implicit 
policies may have to be changed and explicit policies formulated and 
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implemented. For instance, regarding demand instability, the implicit 
policies contained in the growth and pattern of public investment should 
be examined since slight changes in timing may mean the survival of certain 
CEDOs; on the other hand, it is possible to set up a fund with which a 
countercyclical policy is carried out by awarding contracts to CEDOs for 
performing long-term studies when there is not enough work stemming from 
investments. 
Contextual factors that affect or limit the performance of CEDOs. While 
the factors dealt with in the previous point may be changed by modifying 
legislation, policy, procedures or decision rules, contextual factors are 
not changed by ukases but through processes that may take a relatively long 
time, and therefore they are to be assumed as fixed in the short run though 
some of them are modifiable in the medium term. Among them we should high- 
light the attitude of clients, principally the public sector, towards the 
use of domestic C&E services, technology, capital goods and inputs. Perhaps 
the most serious obstacle to CEDO development resides in the cautious, risk- 
averting attitudes of decision-makers which make them opt for foreign 
suppliers. Other contextual factors relate to the administrative practices 
in Government procurement, which are often heavy and cumbersome; the technical 
capabilities of clients, often low; the understanding in Government and 
political circles of the importance of having strong domestic and engineering 
capacity and using it, which is frequently missing; the quality of University 
graduates which a CEDO recruits, which may attain a not too satisfactory level 
in some countries, etc. 
- CEDOs need not accept with resignation the limitations and negative influences 
resulting from such causes. They may carry out a steady and tenacious action 
to modify conditions in their favour, influencing their national environment 
in different ways. Such action may be directed towards Government, seeking 
changes in legislation and practices, suggesting new measures, building up a 
favourable image; towards clients, even to the point of helping them to 
create an internal technical capability of their own; towards universities, 
research centres, industry and the public. Some of these actions may be done 
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individually by a CEDO, others through associations of CEDOs at a national 
or even international level. It would be important to make an empirical 
study of these actions in order to find out about their nature and 
effectiveness. Ideally they should not just be means to make life easier, 
obtain protection and augment profits, but should constitute part of an 
ample dialogue with Government, clients and other institutions with the aim 
of improving the environment so that the CEDOs may fulfill their potential 
social rule. 
(ii) International environment 
- Non--national organizations may affect the performance of CEDOs by influencing 
their internal characteristics, behaviour, choice of roles, determination 
of products, production activity, distribution activity: 
Foreign CEDOs may be strong competitors in the national market, and the 
local CEDOs, by virtue of the usual selection procedures applied by clients, 
may find themselves unable to break a vicious circle in which lack of 
previous experience precludes them from getting contracts that may give 
them experience. This subject properly belongs to the developmental and 
not the mature stage of a CEDO; but even in this last stage it is likely 
that a certain measure of protection should be given to most CEDOs in LDCs 
since foreign CEDOs may have strong advantages from the financial backing 
and export subsidies of their countries, and from their proximity and 
familiarity to owners of technology and producers of capital goods. On 
the other hand, a foreign CEDO often associates with local CEDOs for 
certain assignments. In such cases, there is the danger of the local CEDO 
becoming the junior partner, without participating in the main decisions. 
This should be avoided and, furthermore, associations with foreign CEDOs 
should be employed for gaining experience, training staff and obtaining 
information; this may be amenable to regulation by the receiving country. 
. Regional and international development Banks and financial agencies may 
be important funders of large development projects and as such their 
policies and practices have an influence on domestic CEDOs. The record 
shows that these agencies have principally wanted to "get the job done" 
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though recently some of them have shown interest in using their loan 
operations as an opportunity for fostering the development of national 
C&E capabilities, a trend that should be encouraged by LDCs through 
their policies and by concerted action at international forums. The 
behaviour of international development banks is often imitated by domestic 
banks and this gives more urgency to the redressing measures that can be 
taken. 
Other foreign entities may be the source of important inputs; for instance, 
R&D centres, information systems, capital goods manufacturers, manufacturing 
firms, etc. The CEDO should maintain a network of relationships in order to 
have "on tap" information, experts and other critical inputs. 
- Some large CEDOs in certain developing countries are already exporting their 
services to other developing countries, and sometimes they cooperate with 
CEDOs in the latter for sale of their services abroad. These markets may 
expand. significantly in the future by reason of lower costs,.more appropriate 
technical solutions, a better understanding of conditions in the receiving 
countries, etc. One of the principal issues here is whether it is possible 
to keep such operations of technology commerce free from the drawbacks that 
similar operations between developed and developing countries have had in 
the past, and furthermore, whether such operations may be endowed with certain 
characteristics that would give them positive social impacts in the receiving 
country by creating domestic demands for goods and services, contributing to 
the domestic development of skills and technical capabilities, and other 
desirable effects. This would fall under the subject-matter of "technical 
cooperation among developing countries" (TCDC) and may require positive 
guidelines expressed in international agreements, and incentives for 
operations that comply with them. 
(e) Characteristics of the CEDO 
------------------------- 
A mature CEDO would be expected to have acquired a mastery of the 
technology of consulting and engineering, and a reasonable degree of competence 
in the technology of the area or areas it-attends, which can comprise a wide 
range.from intimate knowledge about equipment suppliers to the possession of 
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knowhow with which basic engineering designs may be prepared. For this it 
should have acquired a certain size, good management procedures, organizational 
knowhow and other characteristics that will allow it to perform its role as 
best as possible and maximize its social efficiency, given the products it 
will put out, the way in which it will produce and distribute them, and the 
influences to which it is subjected by its environment. These questions do 
not have univocal answers, but it is likely that some general patterns will 
be identified through a study of mature CEDOs in different sectors and 
countries.l/ Such patterns will probably be somewhat different from those 
that obtain in developed countries' CEDOs. 
The characteristics of a CEDO will be influenced by several groups of 
factors: its ownerships; whether it is captive or independent; the environment 
in which it grew and operates; its past history, starting from the original 
objectives and circumstances at birth and culminating in the most recent 
events; its activities and the sector or sectors it attends, which contribute 
in moulding the internal characteristics and in their turn are affected by the 
latter; and finally the policies and practices adopted by managers and senior 
staff members, volitional factors that find expression in the choice of the 
role, structure, strategies, etc. 
The CEDO will try to further consolidate itself in human capacity, 
physical installations, knowledge resources, etc. and at the same time will 
attempt to better its relations with the environment, even to the point of 
acting on the latter to improve in its favour certain characteristics that 
will allow it a higher productive efficiency. Both efforts will take place 
concurrently, or in an iterative process in which the sequence will be dictated 
by circumstances and opportunities. 
In regard to the modification of aspects under the CEDO's control, we 
may ask: how the adequate orientation is reached given the peculiar character- 
istics of the envirnoment; how is a good human team consolidated; how is the 
1/ Successful CEDOs in India show characteristics such as: good management; 
tendency to recruit the best people and pay them well; acceptance of 
risks; good marketing; support from Government or political sectors to 
obtain key contracts during their first few years of life; flexibility 
and willingness to go into new fields; agreements with foreign CEDOs; 
disaggregation of C&E services until only basic engineering is purchased 
outside; offer to the local investor of a complete package from conception 
to startup as well as technical services at the operating stage. 
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work organized to create a climate of productivity, responsibility and 
participation; what forms of motivation may be used for creating and maintain- 
ing positive attitudes in the staff; what administrative organization is best 
for the role and objectives; how are technical and financial results to be 
appraised. 
In the case of characteristics strongly influenced by external factors, 
the CEDO may do much to modify those factors or moderate their influence. This 
action directed towards the "manipulation of the environment" is possibly an 
important difference between CEDOs of developing countries, which must modify 
a hostile environment, and CEDOs of developed countries which find a favourable 
It is worthwhile to ask what perception does t e environment 
or at the worse a neutral environment nave about the CEDO and viceversa; how 
are stable and useful links forged with the various social actors; what role 
can the CEDO have in the formulation of sectorial development plans; what 
minimum size should the CEDO have, in general as well as in its various 
technical areas, for adequate efficiency, given the type of work it will be 
doing which itself will depend on the development of the sector or sectors it 
attends; what structures should it have to withstand the ups and downs of 
demand so common for C&E work in developing countries (for instance, a relatively 
small stable staff and an ample roster of collaborators that can be drawn into 
projects as and when necessary). 
8.2. The development of a CEDO 
A CEDO may emerge in many different ways, and its development along time 
until it hopefully reaches maturity may show very different characteristics 
according to its origin, ownership, captivity and sector of activity. There 
are however a number of aspects and issues which would seem to be relevant for 
many differente types of CEDO, and which it is worthwhile to examine. 
(a) The development process and the obstacles to it 
----------------------------------------------- 
The process of development of a CEDO until it acquires maturity is 
bound to be gradual and may ideally be represented by a "logistic" curve as 
that shown.in the following graph, which shows the increase in social efficiency 















































































































































































































































































































































The final goal of this process is the achievement of a mature state (or 
steady state) in which the CEDO will function at a reasonable level of social 
efficiency. In this situation, the CEDO will have its own strength and 
impulse so as to face future challenges, undergo change, and continue its 
expansion, its action being guided by long-term objectives, with the support 
of stable Government policies. 
During the developing stage the CEDO will principally guide its actions 
according to concrete, short-term objectives, the main purpose being to get to 
the mature state. Ad-hoc Government policies may be required for the promotion 
and support of this process. The time needed to complete the process and reach 
maturity will be variable and will much depend on the support received by the 
CEDO and on the characteristics of its environmental situation. Important 
questions for research are whether some indications may be obtained regarding 
the length of the maturation period for different types of CEDO s and national 
situations, and in how far this time may be shortened through adequate 
measures.l/ 
The development of an independent CEDO in a developing country finds many 
obstacles, due to the nature of its activities and to the environment in which 
it acts. Consulting appeals to people who like to work independently, a 
characteristic that may not help the formation of large CEDOs. Finance is hard 
to come by; equity capital is scarce for C&E activities, and financing tends to 
be expensive. Tardy payments when a job is done for the State puts a strain 
in CEDO finances; competition and downturns in demand mean a high death rate. 
A small CEDO may be caught in a vicious circle: it cannot get the large 
assignments it needs to grow because it cannot show qualifications since it 
Some CEDOs will never get there and will remain at a low level of social 
efficiency, or will eventually disappear. This may not be disastrous 
from the social point of view since the principal assets of a small CEDO 
are its human resources, which are bound to find new employment in other 
CEDOs or elsewhere. 
It may be otherwise with a mature CEDO which has important intangible 
assets in its organizational know-how and experience, contacts, clientele, 
access to technology and information, etc., much of which will be lost 
if the CEDO disappears. 
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has not had large assignment before. Even when experience has been acquired, 
for instance by working for some time as a subcontractor to a large local or 
foreign CEDO, other obstacles persist in the shape of legal and administrative 
requirements such as the need for offering financial guarantees. 
No wonder then that some important CEDOs in certain developing countries 
are subsidiaries or joint ventures of foreign CEDOs. However good this may be 
from the point of view of survival and of productive efficiency, it is probably 
not the best from the point of view of social efficiency. A country cannot 
leave permanently in foreign hands the greater part of the work involved in 
organizing and carrying out investment projects, and sooner or later will have 
to develop its own C&E capabilities around efficient domestic CEDOs. 
State support is required for this. In some countries there will be a 
tendency towards public-sector CEDOs, in others towards independent CEDOs. 
The principal role of the State regarding the development of a CEDO is to assure 
it an expanding and stable demand, with prices and contract conditions that will 
mean an incentive for technical development in the CEDO; to provide credits for 
working capital, guarantees and other needs; to extend to it a measure of 
protection; to help it in acquiring technology, experience and a good human 
team. 
(b) Carrying out the process 
------------------------ 
If the development of a CEDO is to be carried out efficiently and in 
not too long a time, clear ideas should be had about the characteristics of the 
mature state which is the objective of the process. They will vary with the 
country, the sector served, the type of services offered, the ownership, etc., 
so that no general rules may be laid down, though a study of CEDOs in developing 
countries may show some useful patterns that may guide the design of this 
"desired situation". Let us only remark here that care should be had regarding 
the uncritical adoption of CEDO models that are more appropriate for a 
developed country; careful research should be conducted on optimal CEDO models 
for the developing countries - their characteristics, their management, their 
"technology". To this we have already referred in the previous section. 
81 
There is not a unique model for CEDO development. The way the organization 
develops will depend on the specific circumstances. Paths and strategies will be 
dictated by the concrete objectives to be achieved, but it would seem that the 
process should be gradual and should rely on the acquisition of expertise and 
credibility in successive stages. The experience of successful CEDOs in 
developing countries should be examined in this respect. I/ 
Based on the considerable experience attained in India and other countries 
participating in the STPI project, Malhotra has suggested a number of alternative 
development strategies for CEDOs which we summarize in Annex 4. 
CEDO development should pay attention to a number of aspects, some of which 
have to do with the internal functioning of the CEDO and others with its 
relations with clients and other actors. Let us mention the following: 
- Paths of development. The areas in which the CEDO is to work will come up 
-------------------- 
as a result of an interplay between immediate market opportunities and long- 
term objectives. There is a danger of growing along an "easy" line, as market 
opportunities appear and clients "overburden" the CEDO, making for imbalances, 
too much specialization and possibly shallow technical development. Thus the 
CEDO may find itself expanding greatly its economic analysis capabilities, or 
1/ This is one of the objectives of the case studies being conducted at 
present (December 1978) in Argentina, Brazil, Korea and the Philippines. 
Unfortunately only partial results from the first two countries were 
available at the time this paper was written. On the other hand, there 
is a wealth of experience about CEDO development in the industrial countries 
that may have some relevance for developing countries. For instance, the 
OECD studies have indicated that in the USA, CEDOs showed no established 
historical pattern of growth, many of them having started as boiler makers, 
mechanical or electrical designers, civil engineering contractors or even 
construction material suppliers; that continuity of demand was extremely 
important; that there was diversification by accomodating a diverse range 
of tasks along the specialities that made them leaders in particular 
fields. 
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its structural design activity, while subcontracting other areas of work. 
Or the CEDO may diversify too much through accepting all customers, stunting 
its technological capabilities. The CEDO should lay out its long-term 
objectives, and develop fully one or two technological areas which show good 
promise; once a mastery has been acquired it may be the moment to start a 
new area. 
- Acquisition-of knowhow and expertise. This is the key aspect of CEDO develop- 
-------------- 
ment. It may be said to comprise three inter-related aspects. human resources 
development, technology acquisition and the development of management capabilitie; 
We take these matters up in the following section. 
- Development of Clients. As the CEDO develops it will reach a widening circle 
---------------------- 
of prospective clients and may have to help them in acquiring sufficient 
capabilities to deal efficiently with tasks such as the preparation of terms 
of reference, the drafting of tenders, the evaluation of bids, the control of 
progress, etc. This requires the client or user to develop its own techno- 
economic capabilities and to set up procedures that will guide its dealings 
with CEDOs and other suppliers. Government policy should help in this, 
particularly in the case of State investors. 
- Type of contract. Some types of contract are more favourable for CEDO develop- 
--------------- 
ment. Lump-sum contracts are usually preferred by the client, but CEDOs prefer 
cost-plus-fees, since they often find it difficult to make accurate cost 
estimates because of unstable conditions in a developing country. A small 
CEDO may not be able to absorb the losses of a single contract, so this is a 
critical point. 
- Pricing policy. Many prospective C&E clients in a developing country, 
-------------- 
.principally the medium and small scale enterprises, are not in a position to 
pay fully for the services they need. Sometimes such services are provided 
at a loss by special State institutions. At the other end of the scale, large 
State investors may give opportunities to developing CEDOs to bid for a certain 
C&E task. If this is large, the CEDO may have to charge more than usual 
because it has very high indirect costs; it has to employ new management 
resources because its own resources have to be kep at least partially free 
for other activities in order to provide continuity for the firm. This could 
83 
perhaps be interpreted economically as a firm working on the rising part of 
its cost curve. The State client would be footing part of the costs of 
CEDO development; if it did not accept this, it is possible that the CEDO 
would be deprived of an opportunity to expand and to acquire more knowhow. 
Network of contacts. The developing CEDO will need to devote efforts to ------------------- 
develop a network of contacts internationally so that it may have good and 
prompt access to information, technology, equipment makers and other suppliers 
of inputs for its work. If should also build up its relations to local 
research institutions and manufacturers, which should be close enough to 
permit it to discharge a socially important role as an intermediary between 
domestic producers and users of technology and capital goods. 
(c) The acquisition of knowhow and exEertise 
------------------------------- 
This depends on the building up of a good human team, the acquisition 
of technological knowledge and the development of management capabilities. The 
three aspects are interrelated. The development of human resources cannot be 
separated from the acquisition of knowhow; and in particular the development 
of management requires that key knowledge be absorbed by it so that it can be 
used for best effects. Concrete objectives should be adopted by the CEDO and 
actions undertaken to fulfill them. 
The development of human resources should be in step with demand, or 
possibly somewhat ahead of it, in order to tailor them to the types of work 
to be carried out. Ideally the CEDO should formulate a manpower development 
programme. The recruitment and training of stable personnel are two factors 
that interplay. What type of recruits should be had and what training should 
be given them will very much depend on circumstances and opportunities there 
seems to be no agreed procedure, and practices differ from firm to firm. 
Recruits may be fresh graduates, persons with three of four years' experience 
in technical work, or experienced professionals. In regard to training, two 
important elements are academic training at home or overseas, and on-the-job 
training while assignments are carried out, particularly when this is done in 
association with a more experienced CEDO.-V It is important to use the training 
1/ To give one example of a training procedure, a large State-owned CEDO hires 
fresh graduates, keeps them for two years as trainces, and then encourages 
them to go into industry, hoping to hire them baak in a few years. 
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opportunities when there is collaboration with a foreign CEDO, but this may 
not be easy if the latter believes that it will raise costs or lengthen the 
job, or if it is wary of helping the development of a potential competitor. 
These are aspects where explicit policy may help by inducing the local CEDO 
to maximize the use of training opportunities and the foreign CEDO to conduct 
the training. 
The efficient operation of a CEDO requires the use of modern management 
techniques, and needs the acquisition of expertise in handling complex tasks 
that are carried out by persons from different backgrounds. In organizing its 
programme of work the CEDO will have to pay particular attention to the 
allocation of its resources to the best effect. It should operate in a business- 
like manner, if it is to become cost-conscious and efficient; this should apply 
too in public sector CEDOs. In this sense a cost-plus type of contract would 
be less effective. Attention should be paid to the setting of standards for 
executing consultancy projects, the control of costs, schedules and the quality 
of work, etc. All this may be embodied in standard procedures, for preparing 
which the experience of other developing country CEDOs may be of much use. 
We now come to the acquisition of technology and expertise by the CEDO, 
which implies a lengthy learning process about which little hard data exists 
so far. In the first place, the technology of consulting and engineering should 
be mastered, including techniques such as demand analysis, project evaluation, 
mathematical model-making, electronic data processing, scheduling, design routines, 
drafting techniques, preparation of reports, etc. which should be acquired and 
put to good use. 
Secondly, the technology of the sector to which services are rendered must 
also be mastered, and this poses very interesting issues on which research would 
be needed: 
- This technology should not only be in the minds of the CEDO's staff but should 
somehow be incorporated in the organization itself, through specialized 
routines, computer programmes, technical files, lists of technology and 
equipment suppliers, etc. This "firm-embodied" knowhow may reinforce the 
aggregate knowledge of the staff, improve their efficiency and allow to replace 
a departing staff member by a new recruit with little disruption. 
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- Technology acquisition may reach different levels of depth and complexity. 
The mastery of basic engineering design would be an appropriate goal in the 
long run; other more accessible goals may be formulated for different 
moments of time as a guide to the CEDO's technical development. 
Among the forms of technology acquisition and learning we may mention the 
recruitment of experienced personnel; the repetition work that may be carried 
out for successive clients; the establishment of feedbacks from clients once 
assignments are over, possibly through follow-up visits and meetings; the 
close interaction with R&D institutions, technology owners and equipment 
makers; the further training of staff members through special programmes; the 
formation of a special group to master a certain technology (it can be a 
"process group" which can carry out development and pilot plant work); and 
very importantly the association, permanent or temporary, with an experienced 
foreign CEDO. This last point deserves a special paragraph. 
It may be desirable for the CEDO to establish links, or even associate itself, 
with a foreign CEDO, either in a stable manner or for the duration of a 
project. In the best of cases this may mean a quick way to acquire knowhow; 
but there is a danger of remaining a junior partner. Experience shows that 
the local CEDO usually has problems to have access to crucial data, obtain 
-manuals and operating instructions, and in general procure written documents 
that collect and summarize years of experience. The CEDO should negotiate 
so as to obtain access to that information, 
I/ 
which is vitally needed if there 
is to be an effective transfer of corporate knowledge. Government policy 
should support it in this sense, for instance by requiring that the local 
CEDO should lead the project with the foreign firm helping to carry it out: 
the 'project director can then have direct access to the top personnel at the 
foreign CEDO's headquarters, instead of having to go through the foreign 
personnel who happen to work on the spot. Training may also become one of the 
items of cost in a contract between a Government and a foreign CEDO. There are 
several interesting experiences in the developing countries that it would be 
worth analyzing to find out the types of agreements and the operating procedures 
that may be best for technology transfer from a foreign to a local CEDO. 
For instance, through a "full disclosure" clause in an agreement for 
collaboration on a specific project. 
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9. BUILDING UP A NATIONAL CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING CAPACITY 
We have argued that developing countries need to build up a national C&E 
capacity and put it to good use if they are to have control of decisions which 
are important for their development, employ well their intellectual resources, 
carry out optimal investments projects, and achieve a harmonious growth of 
their industrial sector. 
The growth of C&E capacity for the supply of services to different user 
areas in the economy will not easily take place in a spontaneous manner, but 
will require promotion policies from the Government if the end result is to be 
a set of CEDOs able to provide those services with efficiency and reliability. 
Ideally, a "C&E sector" should be formed and the infant industry argument may 
be applied to it as it is applied to other incipient sectors. The long-run 
benefits accruing to the whole country are expected to be significantly larger 
than those being received by the user of the services, and therefore it would 
seem logical that the costs of developing C&E should be shared by the country 
as a whole through appropriate Government action. 
9.1. Obstacles 
A number of obstacles are found for developing a domestic C&E capacity 
and using it efficiently. Some of them are a result of the characteristics of 
investors, CEDOs and other actors at a given moment; others of the local or 
the international environment. A study of them may suggest the type of 
policies that should be adopted in a certain national situation. 
Internal characteristics of clients, CEDOs and other actors may change 
in time as development proceeds and learning takes place. In the national 
environment, implicit policies may be changed once identified. !_/ But many 
By implicit policy we understand the effect on C&E and its utilization 
of Government policies, measures and actions which are designed to 
operate in other fields. The effects are usually unintended and there 
may be little awareness on the part of those that implement the policy. 
A better knowledge of them may enable policy-makers to lessen their negative 
influence or heighten their positive implications, and eventually to 
transform implicit policies into purposeful "indirect" policies for the 
promotion and utilization of C&E services. 
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contextual factors are difficult to modify save in a very long time; some of 
them may be overcome through persuasion and strong incentives, others will 
have to be accepted as part of the environment of policies in favour of C&E. 
Regarding the obstacles that originate in foreign actors, the country may adopt 
defensive policies and also join other developing countires in a united front 
to provoke changes in the international environment. 
Let us now make a brief review of some of the principal obstacles. The 
exercise should be carried out in each country where C&E capacity is to be 
built up, as a prelude to the design of policies. 
Few countries have shown a political will strong enough to produce significant 
changes in their technological situation. There are subtle but strong foreign 
interests which originate pressures for maintaining the present state of 
affairs; these outside interests frequently find internal allies, such as 
lobbies and pressure groups wishing to maintain certain privileges (i.e. 
imports), which makes it more difficult to carry out changes. 
- Policy makers in many countries have not yet understood properly the key role 
of C&E in carrying out better investments and contributing to self-reliant 
development. There is a need to educate them so that they will suport measures 
in favour of these activities. 
- Political instability and lack of continuity are common:in many developing 
countries making life difficult for institutions that are vulnerable to changes 
of Ministers, viewpoints, and economic situations, and diluting the effect of 
policy decisions. 
- Some countries are too small to acquire C&E capacity save in a few areas. 
- In most developing countries there is a limited technical capability in the 
public and the private sectors, not only to negotiate technology purchases but 
also to identify clearly production problems and the technological requirements 
they pose. This is not too helpful for achieving an efficient technology 
transfer and efficient investments. 
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- Government organizations in general are pressed by their users and clients, 
and by the public, to comply with their avowed objectives of supplying 
certain goods and services. This may make them disregard an ampler role 
they could play in respect of other desirable social goals such as we have 
explored here, and induces them to look for "efficiency" in the short term, 
to "get the job done", putting aside any complications that may imply extra 
costs and delays. 
- A very serious obstacle is found in the cautious, risk-averting attitudes of 
decision makers, which may make them opt for foreign suppliers, frequently 
through turnkey operations, for fear that domestic C&E and other goods and 
services may turn out to be inferior. 
- The system of selection and contracting of State suppliers established by law 
or by traditional administrative practices has often, been designed for 
protection against bad commercial practices, and is not appropriate for the 
promotion of technical competence and creativity. This does not favour local 
CEDOs and other local suppliers.which have to fight much red tape and find 
little support for tasks that go beyond immediate requirements. It becomes 
difficult to set up contractual agreements of sufficient flexibility to permit 
an adequate concentration of efforts by suppliers so as to produce significant 
technical developments. 
- Supplier financing and tied loans reduce very much the investor's scope of 
decision. In many large purchases outside financing is sought, which usually 
involves the use of foreign consultants and the purchase of foreign technology, 
engineering and equipment. Many countries find it almost impossible to untie 
a package of "finance-technology-equipment" and yet are forced to accept this 
way of conducting large investments since they have no alternative.l/ The 
1/ In Colombia, hospitals have been equipped totally by one supplier country 
which extended the necessary credit. There are "English", "American" and 
"Czech" hospitals. In addition to having lost the opportunity of including 
national inputs, there appear serious problems in operation and maintenance 
because of the diversity of the equipment and instruments. 
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situation is less critical in projects financed by the World Bank and other 
international and regional financial agencies, but insistence in these agencies 
about "getting the job done" puts the focus on short-term efficiency aspects 
rather than the long-term ones we have treated in this paper. Domestic invest- 
ment Banks tend to behave like international Banks and may not be too willing 
to take what they consider high risks. Self-financing allows the highest 
latitude for choice of CEDO, technology and equipment. But investors, 
particularly those in the public sector, can rarely generate sufficient funds 
of their own to finance large investment programmes. In the case of State 
enterprises it may be asked whether they should sometimes be allowed to make 
higher profits so that they may generate their own investment funds, this 
being justified by the additional impacts new investments would have. 
- Domestic CEDOs face strong competition from industrial countries' CEDOs on 
account of an inherent inequality between them. The latter may show much more 
impressive credentials, promise better guarantees and provide more favourable 
financial terms (sometimes preinvestment services have been offered practically 
free). Such circumstances, added on to the subjective factors we have 
discussed, often lead to the choice of a CEDO firm from an industrial country 
either on the part of the ultimate client---principally Government agencies-- 
or of local CEDOs that are scouting for a partner that will make them win the 
bid or land the job. Many Governments wish to promote the development of a 
local C&E capacity, but faced with the choice, real or subjective, between 
delays, uncertainty and few guarantees, on the one hand, and speed and 
efficiency, on the other, they frequently select a foreign CEDO. Short term 
considerations prevail, and long term ones, which might help in the reduction 
of technological dependence, are not considered. 
C&E capacity is incipient and little developed in many countries; foreign 
capital CEDOs predominate in some key branches; thereis a tendency in CEDO 
professionals to adopt foreign models and patterns in their work. Such 
characteristics, together with users' tendencies not to employ indigenous 
CEDOs, make up a situation that is not conducive to CEDO development if a 
laissez-faire attitude is adopted. Domestic CEDOs find themselves in a 
vicious circle, with the danger that up--to-date knowhow in many important 
fields will never be achieved. 
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9.2. Strategy aspects 
(a) Policies from the top and policies from the bottom -------------------------------------------------- 
Technological policies in many developing countries have tended to 
rely principally on laws, regulations and other rules of the game which have 
been administered by high-level institutions. These "top-downwards" policies 
have not been altogether successful in accomplishing the purpose for which 
they were designed. They are sometimes disregarded by the different actors 
that are supposed to apply them. This is particularly grave in the case of 
public sector investors with an attitude of "getting the job done" that makes 
them look for total safety and devote far too few efforts of their own to their 
investment activity, so that packages are not disaggregated, few chances are 
given to local CEDOs and orders are not placed with suppliers that are not 
considered absolutely reliable. 
A different approach would be to elicit actions from the actors of the 
technological development process themselves, through which may be put in 
motion a cumulative and expanding process that will overcome obstacles, change 
attitudes and bring about CEDO development and utilization as a consequence of 
the interest and efforts of those involved. These actions would be formulated 
and carried out by people who believe in their usefulness, and therefore the 
resulting "bottom-upwards" policy would tend to be highly effective. 
It would seem that the correct strategy for building up C&E capacity and 
using it efficiently is to combine both approaches. It is not so much a 
question of drafting ambitious legislation and writing perfect standard pro- 
cedures, but of motivating people and institutions, and multiplying initiatives. 
There should be an effort to coordinate and orient the latter towards the 
achievement of certain desirable goals, and to complement them with adequate 
policy measures at the right moments. Persuasion, the diffusion of experiences 
from home and abroad, and the training of responsible officials in investor 
enterprises are general measures that can be taken at a early period. As the 
process gets going, a number of, general or sectoral policies may be adopted 
to support it and at the same time existing policies may be revised when they 
have a negative influence on the development and use of C&E capacity. 
91 
A main element is the presence of a general policy that recognizes C&E 
as an important activity to be promoted. This gives a framework for applying 
specific measures in favour of CEDO development over a period of time, so that 
there is some assurance that things are not going to stop in a year or two. 
Within a general strategy such as we have indicated, many specific 
actions may be carried out, from the top and from the bottom. Which, and in 
what order, will depend on the context, the opportunities and the interest 
and eagerness of the actors. It is possible, for instance, that major advances 
in the process can only take place when there is a tight balance of payments, 
and investors --particularly public enterprises-- have to turn, faute de mieux, 
to local CEDOs and local suppliers. If things are done well the terrain that 
has been gained may be kept in a subsequent phase of easy imports. Perhaps it 
is a process with this sort of "ratchet effect" that may prove to be best, 
rather than the smooth evolution so beloved by planners. For the process cannot 
be planned in detail; it is rather a case of the "disjointed incrementalism" 
approach suggested by Lindblom and Hirschman, the pursuit of an objective when 
there is only a general idea of where it lies and little knowledge of the 
obstacles, like crossing a minefield with the help of a mine detector. 
(b) Objectives; policy alternatives 
------------------------------- 
No general suggestion may be validly put forth about the best way to 
organize national C&E capacity. The solution may be different for different 
countries, and for different main fields where C&E services are needed. In 
principle, strong and mature CEDOs should be had in the principal productive 
sectors. However, it is possible to point out to many complementarities between 
the various producers of C&E services, so that the question is not to develop 
one type of producer to the exclusion of the rest but rather to find the 
adequate combination which, taking into account both the current situation 
and the political "style" of the country, will assure a maximum social efficiency 
of the set of CEDOs that make up the sector's or the country's C&E capacity. 
The objective pursued, and the probabilities of achieving them, will 
depend on many things. Developing countries can be very different; the goals 
of developing the C&E sector in Brazil and in Paraguay cannot be the same. 
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Sectors differ in their size, the size of their production units, their 
technology. Political conditions, historical situations, national objectives 
differ. Choices have to be made in several instances so as to define concrete 
objectives that will guide policy making and action. 
Let us review some of the main aspects on which options have to be 
made: 
- There is a problem of priorities regarding the type of service and the 
industrial branch on which first to construct C&E capacity. This is because 
resources are limited in availability, in particular human resources with 
sufficient abilities and experience. In has been suggested that priority 
should be given to preinvestment studies in the first place, since these 
set up the framework within which important investment projects are carried 
out."/ After preinvestment, a second line of priority would be detailed 
engineering, an activity which allows the linkage with the capital goods 
industry. 
- In regard to branches, priority should probably be given to those in which 
there are possibilities of repetitive investments which will maintain a 
demand and allow experience to be gained in successive similar tasks. 
Repetition possibilities for engineering are also present in peripheral 
technologies used by many different investment projects; to make use of them 
it is necessary to disaggregate investment packages and parcel out contracts. 
1/ M.Kamenetzky suggests that it is easier to train manpower in project 
preparation, since "the knowledge required may be transferred through 
formally teaching how to select and evaluate technologies and how to 
conduct financial analysis. The corresponding methodologies may be 
exercised through paper work in which fictional or real cases are recreated. 
All this is much easier than transferring the skills required for engineering 
production facilities or the ability needed for handling them... A sound 
petrochemical project may be organized by a consulting team with no 
previous experience in that field, provided its members adequately sense 
the context of the project and look for proper specialized advice at the 
right time. However, the design of the facilities by an engineering team 
calls for the latter to include people having previously designed a 
petrochemical plant and thus having acquired skill in the use of the 
related specific knowledge." 
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- Options about the type of CEDOs that are wanted would need the debate, at 
the level of the branch, of alternatives such as 
. Private or State-owned independt CEDOs. Which should be favoured? Each 
type shows its own advantages and disadvantages, as we have seen above. 
Much will depend on the prevailing opinion and the "style" of the country 
concerned. 
1/ State CEDOs however would seem to be a neccessity to serve 
small and medium industry, which cannot pay fully for the services it 
requires. 
Captive or independent CEDOs. The answer here cannot be clear cut. 
Independent CEDOs may sometimes offer advantages both from the private and 
social points of view: clients would not be saddled with project offices 
which are active only part of the time, and such CEDOs probably have a 
stronger impact on the diffusion of knowledge by virtue of the many clients 
for which they perform assignments. But large enterprises may prefer to 
have their own captive capacity, which may allow them a high degree of 
mastery of the technology in their branch, particularly if R&D activities 
are also carried out. 
Specialized or multi-purpose CEDOs. Is it better to count with CEDOs 
specialized by sector and type of service, or CEDOs able to provide a wide 
range of services for different sectors? The latter solution would diminish 
the problems associated with demand fluctuations but it tends to disperse 
efforts, particularly on the part of key management personnel of the CEDO. 
However, in small countries it may be unavoidable to rely on diversified 
CEDOs. 
1/ There is a country where the National Development Bank has created technical 
groups in certain new areas like forestry and has made them private after 
some time, continuing with its support in the shape of assignments and 
credit. In Indian the Government has tended to build up its own C&E 
capacity. Government CEDOs act as prime contractors in large projects 
and subcontract certain parts to private CEDOs. 
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Should CEDOs be totally independent from ties to technology owners, 
contractors, capital goods producers and other commercial interests? This 
issue has been debated for a long time in various forums.Associations of 
C&E firms, national and international, have maintained that the client can 
only get proper and unbiased advice if the organization he retains is not 
tied to any other interests, and have incorporated this principle in their 
codes of conduct. However, international Banks allow CEDOs related to such 
interests to participate in the formulation, engineering and supervision of 
investment projects provided that their associates do not supply any inputs. 
In a developing country there are reasons why the principle should not be 
absolutely upheld: (i) a captive organization belonging to a contractor, 
for instance, may sometimes represent the best domestic source of C&E for 
a certain client; (ii) the volume of business and particularly the profits 
will be much larger when the CEDO is integrated within a larger commercial 
operation, such as a contractor, significantly increasing the chances of 
development of the CEDO. This is an important argument from the point of 
view of developing an indigenous CEDO capacity; (iii) in any case, many 
developing country CEDOs have originated in civil constructors and other 
contractors that established an engineering department which became large 
and gave services to other customers. In certain sectors of some countries 
C&E capacity is already tied up to a large extent to commercial interests.1/ 
- The organization of CEDOs nationally and sectorally would require a discussion 
of topics like the following: 
In some areas the expected workload may not justify more than one or two 
large CEDOs; the danger would be that there would exist strong competition 
and a high death rate among many small CEDOs, none of which could aspire to 
become large enough to carry out an efficient task, so that foreign CEDOs 
would keep on being employed indefinitely in key assignments. Hence a 
monopolistic situation would have to be accepted, and some sort of 
contracting and pricing procedures should be agreed to avoid the possible 
drawbaks. 
1/ This happens in Argentina and Mexico with CEDOs in the process engineering 
branch. 
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. A position should be taken regarding the place of foreign-controlled and 
joint venture CEDOs. We have already touched on this issue. 
- The support awarded to developing CEDOs is essential if they are to reach 
maturity. Questions should be posed regarding the extent of this support 
and the means by which it will be extended: 
How much direct support to private CEDOs, through loans, scholarships, 
fiscal incentives, and other means. 
How much support to private CEDOs through contracts for which relatively 
high rates are paid. I/ In principle the extra cost here would be footed 
by the investor organization unless arrangements are made otherwise. 
. How much may be spent in installing a new State-owned CEDO and paying for 
its development costs. 
How much may be spent to support the running costs of CEDOs aimed at small 
and medium enterprise, project departments of industrial research institutes, 
and mechanical and industrial design centres. 
9.3. Policy measures; actions 
We have suggested that the development of C&E capabilities and their 
appropriate use should come about as a result of measures and actions by the 
actors themselves --the users and the producers of C&E services- and policy 
measures adopted by the Government to promote and regulate demand, help the 
expansion of supply and improve the social efficiency of C&E and the activities 
it serves. 
1/ High rates may result because of high costs of operation of because of 
extra costs of training personnel academically or on-the-job (for 
instance, if a foreign,CEDO is given a plus to allow locals to be trained). 
Sometimes the public sector should "make a bet" on a certain CEDO, awarding 
to it a large contract through which it can gain experience, train its 
personnel and acquire a higher technological level. 
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Studies of C&E requirements by sector and type of services should be 
carried out in order to provide an overall guidance to this process, which 
is not linear and evolutionary but incremental and disjointed. A principal 
problem is to break the "vicious circle" in the main user branches. Here the 
role of the State would seem to be essential, and should be expressed by a 
well defined policy at the top level and most importantly by pragmatic actions 
at the operational level of public agencies and enterprises. The opportunities 
stemming from major investment programmes should be seized, in order to build 
and use C&E capabilities, and extra costs should be accepted as necessary. 
At the same time, foreign capabilities should be made to contribute to the 
process by making the best use of them. 
We now make a brief review of measures, actions and policies without 
attempting a comprehensive survey. 
(a) Measures and actions by the users of C&E services 
------------------------------------------------- 
We shall speak mainly of public sector users, which are the principal 
demanders of C&E services in a developing country. Their policies and actions 
will be instrumental in the growth of C&E capability. 
- The selection of a CEDO should depend on a careful appraisal of expected 
performance. It should not be influenced by price considerations; or by 
financial facilities, risk avoiding attitudes, too much reliance on the sheer 
weight of a foreign CEDO's credentials, and other factors that have nothing 
to do with quality. Improved methods of selection should be developed that 
will give domestic CEDOs the possibility to overcome the "inherent inequality" 
they suffer in regard to foreign CEDOs. 
- Investment projects should be prepared and carried out with improved, 
"enlightened" practices such as we have discussed in a previous section. 
Unpackaging of investments is a most important instrument. Local CEDOs should 
be given significant responsibilities as well as opportunities to train their 
personnel and acquire knowhow even though this may signify a cost. 
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- Users should develop their own technical cadres. A minimal capacity should 
exist to deal with suppliers, and it will often be convenient to build up 
a true technical and engineering capability. The process of creating this 
internal capability is not simple; it is not merely a question of hiring 
professionals, but also of transforming them into a team. This takes time 
and resources. During the building up period the energies of the group will 
be principally devoted to its own development and consolidation, a fact that 
should be taken into account on programming the group's activities. To a 
large extent there will be "learning by doing", perhaps using opportunities 
to collaborate with outside groups in project preparation and execution. 
- Relations with CEDOs should be handled carefully. Terms of reference should 
be precise but flexible. The user, if it is large, should have a register 
and a permanent evaluation system to qualify CEDOs. It should control 
carefully the work of CEDOs and other suppliers. It should integrate'its 
own personnel into the CEDO's technical teams for better overseeing of the 
work and as a means to train people who will later be engaged in operation 
and maintenance. It should provide the necessary feedback information to 
allow the CEDO to learn from its past work. 
(b) Measures and actions by CEDOs 
----------------------------- 
CEDOs in developing countries can exercise a strong effort on their 
own account to achieve progress both in the quality and the scope of their 
activities. 
- They should attempt to utilize fully the resources and skills available in 
the country establishing stronger ties with various institutions --Universities, 
research institutes, development agencies, banks, equipment makers-- and at 
the same time creating links between them for the benefit of an integrated 
industrial development. 
- They should programme their development, establishing concrete objectives along 
time and marshalling the means to achieve them. We have touched on these 
questions in a previous section. 
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- They may pool resources to carry out large assignments. This does not exclude 
foreign inputs through joint ventures or individual consultants to carryout 
specialized tasks. 
- The formation or strengthening of professional associations of consultancy 
organizations can be useful in raising professional standards through 
registration, establishment of codes of conduct, exchange of experience, and 
improved communications channels. Such associations can also help Government 
to formulate and implement policies for the strengthening of national 
consulting and engineering capacity. 
- Quality assurance mechanisms should be developed if a solid and reliable 
structure of C&E services is to be created. In developed countries, the 
profession of consulting engineer usually has a self-policing mechanism, such 
as the periodic renewal of a qualification, which gives the user some guarantee 
as to quality. In addition large CEDOs continuously check the quality of the 
work in their various projects and can change the project manager and his 
professional staff is necessary. But CEDOs in developing countries may have 
just one or two projects that are managed by the principals of the firm. This 
would point to the need for a central organization, possibly set up by a CEDO 
association, that will supply reliable information to prospective clients, 
help in drafting guarantee and bonding clauses, and carry out a control of 
the quality of services rendered. 
(c) Government policies 
------------------- 
Governments should ideally define a long term programme for the 
development of C&E capacity at national and sectoral levels. This would require 
the formulation of clear objectives regarding the different aspects where choices 
have to be made. It should take into account the efforts that are to be under- 
taken by the user's and by the CEDOs themselves. Specific policy measures should 
be taken and implemented at the appropriate moments of time. Among the latter 
we may mention:l" 
if We refer to policies that will help the development of CEDOs; some of 
them may be applied too in branches with mature CEDOs which it is wished 
to keep on supporting. Some of the policies would be applied throughout 
the different branches, others would be specific to a branch. 
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- Policies an the demand of C&E services 
Political support and the right attitudes are of great importance. They 
may vary from branch to branch --for instance, atomic power development 
in'Argentina and India relied from the beginning on domestic C&E efforts, 
disaggregation of packages, increasing local inputs, etc., while steel 
and other industries in those countries relied on turnkey projects for too 
long. Government may influence attitudes and behaviours through persuasion 
and other means. 
The Government can often award contracts directly to local CEDOs. It can 
establish a legal code for the user of local (in preference to foreign) 
C&E in public investments. This however may not be all that simple; 
experience shows that public enterprises and agencies may invoke urgency, 
safety and other reasons, and use all possible loopholes to avoid taking 
the trouble and risks of following such a course of action. Hence a 
preference system for local C&E would also be needed. 
The protection of domestic C&E production needs the establishment of a 
system of preference. C&E however is a peculiar activity and the usual 
tariff mechanisms do not appear to be effective. C&E services are bought 
--or should be bought-.- on grounds of quality rather than price, and there 
usually is a bias towards what comes from an industrial country; price 
signals are largely inoperative since the customer prefers to pay more 
--anyhow this is only a small part of the investment cost-- and use "more 
reliable" and "better quality" services. The application of common 
regimens for the control of technology imports, foreign investment and 
industrial property rights, while helping to reduce costs of technology 
imports, does not provide enough inducement to select local C&E services. 
There are many factors in technology choice that escape those regimens; 
some of them are subjective, other depend on how activities that demand 
technology are organized, who takes the decisions, what decision rules are 
applied. To act on those factors and favour the contracting of domestic 
C&E services we may suggest the use of preference systems of a qualitative 
nature. Domestic CEDOs face stiff competition from foreign firms, and are 
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at a disadvantage on account of an inherent inequality stemming from less 
financial means and poorer credentials; they are often caught in a 
"vicious circle" from which it is very difficult to break. To eliminate 
this disadvantage, and further, to tip the balance in favour of local 
CEDOs, at least two things are needed. First, to devise financial 
mechanisms that would grant adequate credits to CEDOs (for their capital 
requirements and the preparation of proposals) and to their clients (so 
that consulting and engineering services may be had on favourable terms). 
Second, to devise a method of selection on the part of the client in which 
the sheer volume of background experience and the renown of professionals 
listed do not automatically determine who is to be awarded the bid. Such 
a method would probably include two main aspects: (a) standard procedures 
for the assessment of quality of a firm and of its proposal without undue 
emphasis on the volume of background experience, and (b) the award of 
extra points in a point system if the firm is local. 
. Demand from the public sector should be regulated so that CEDOs are not 
exposed to great fluctuations in the workload. We have discussed this 
point already. 
Government should promote the exports of C&E services through measures like 
identification of likely foreign customers, help to local CEDOs through 
embassies and missions overseas, tax rebates and subsidies for the export 
of C&E services, etc. In some countries a special trading company has 
been jointly founded by the Government and exporters of technological 
services. 
- Policies on the suppl of C&E services 
Direct establishment of State CEDOs in certain areas of the economy. In 
some cases these-may be captive groups that are pulled outside their parent 
organizations and given a wider role. 
Preferential tax treatment to CEDOs for some of their activities, such as 
the export of services. 
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. Credit facilities for working capital, training, research, technology 
acquisition and other needs. 
. Support to the establishment and functioning of consultants' associations. 
- Policies on the activities of CEDOs 
----------------------------- 
The purpose here would be to improve the social efficiency of CEDOs and the 
investments they serve. 
. Support should be given to improved, enlightened practices that will mean 
high social efficiency. This may be done through persuasion, and by 
teaching such practices to investors and CEDOs. 
Legislation may be adopted for the compulsory use of domestic CEDOs and 
local inputs on a certain percentage basis. This type of action has been 
very effective in the case of inputs for automobile production, where 
local subsidiaries have been forced to "integrate" their production. In the 
case of C&E services success is less likely. Experience in Argentina and 
other countries show that such legislation is frequently bypassed by public 
enterprises. It is possible however to establish a mechanism --such as the 
NAI,in Brazil or the "ancillaries policy" in India-- to fight for the 
compliance to such legal measures in every possible instance. 
Regulations may be adopted for the best use of foreign CEDOs in favour of 
technology transfer and training. Such regulations may be implemented for 
instance by a Technology Registry that has to approve all technology 
agreements. We have already referred to the principles that may be followed. 
. Relations should be promoted between CEDOs on the one hand and R&D organiza- 
tions, equipment makers and input suppliers on the other. The Government 
may play an important part in this through its financial, administrative 
and technical units, acting in accordance to a central policy. 
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9.4. Actions at the international level 
We have taken up so far the question of national efforts to develop 
C&E capabilities and thus augment the power of technical decision in national 
hands. On an international level, two main areas should additionally be 
cultivated as an important complement: 
(a) Cooperation efforts among developincountries in technical matters. 
------------- ------------------ 
This may take place through traditional channels (programmes set up bilaterally 
by Governments, programmes of multilateral agencies such as those in the UN 
system) and through commercial channels (operations of technology commerce 
between a supplier in one developing country anda client in another). Technical 
cooperation through commercial channels offers a great promise of expansion. 
The operations may be of benefit to the exporter in terms of a greater mobiliza- 
tion of its C&E potential and the expansion of markets for its CEDOs. The 
receiving country may benefit through lower costs, the possibilities of 
obtaining more appropriate technologies, 1/ and the likelihood that such 
transactions will create much weaker links of dependence and may be endowed 
with characteristics that make them socially useful for the receiving country, 
helping the latter to build up its own C&E capacity. Cooperation of this sort 
may lead to the creation of large technology markets, the establishment of 
joint programmes and joint institutions in certain fields, and eventually the 
achievement of technological integration between two or more countries. As we 
have suggested above, a small country may not find it easy to develop independent 
C&E capacity in certain fields and cooperation with other countries may be the 
1/ Two points may be made in this respect. First, a large part of the 
technologies needed by developing countries are already usedand mastered 
by other developing countries; the "technology gap" between developing 
and developed countries as a whole is significant only in certain areas 
and branches mainly of the "science-based" type. Second, adaptive efforts, 
innovations and cumulative. production experience have produced "appropriate" 
technical solutions in many fields. Such solutions. constitute "technological 
assets" that in many cases are implicit in existing plant and operating 
practices. To transfer such technological assets it is necessary to make 
them explicit, i.e. to derive a "conceptual engineering" from existing 
practice. This needs technical efforts of the "reverse engineering" type 
which may be forthcoming if there is market for such technological assets. 
With the "conceptual engineering" in hand a proposal may be prepared 
incorporating the "basic engineering" of a project that fits the client's 
needs and contemplates the local conditions under which he operates. 
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only way to count with a C&E capacity that responds to its interests. 
Examples may be found in the Andean, the Central American and the Caribbean 
subregions in the American hemisphere. 
'(b) Actions on foreign and international institutions 
----------------------------------------------- 
The developing countries should cooperate among themselves for improving the 
conditions under which take place operations of technology transfer, direct 
foreign investment and others that may influence their technological develop- 
ment. The negotiations being carried on in UNCTAD and other international fo- 
rums, particularly those on "codes of conduct" for technology transfer and 
multinational corporations, should be continued with energy and it would be 
convenient to start other actions to change the behaviours of various actors 
such as international and regional development banks, and the productive 
enterprises, CEDOs,donor agencies, and Governments themselves of the industrial 
countries. To carry out this "technological diplomacy" with a high probability 
of success, efforts should be put on the analysis of the problems that have 
appeared, the characteristics and attitudes of the actors, and many other 
aspects that deserve examination. 
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10. -:.,SEARCH SUGGESTIONS 
Whope to have shown in this paper that a_country should have a consulting 
and en neering capability of its own as a key element of its self-reliant r 
development. 
There is no need to review once again the arguments we have already 
presented, save to suggest that it is this type of capability that permits a 
country to have the capacity to transform itself according to its self-imposed 
objectives, starting from a situation where most if not all the knowhow and 
technological services for its modern sector are being imported. Developing 
countries will continue to import knowhow, but it is largely through their 
C&E capabilities that they may improve the procurement and absorption of this 
factor and use increasingly their own science and technology resources. 
Two main questions should be asked: How to build up an adequate consulting 
and engineering capacity? How to use this capacity in the best way? These two 
questions, which are related, give rise to further questions at the conceptual, 
policy and operative levels. 
There is much scattered knowledge on some of these matters but there is 
also much ignorance. It seems desirable to gather and analyze information that 
may be of use to policy makers, and to the actors themselves, for planning and 
carrying out actions that may improve the current situation in developing 
countries. 
The present author feels that a major comparative research effort on the 
building up and utilization of C&l:'capabilities in developing countries, such 
.as envisaged by the IDRC "CEDO Project'',11 is desirable at the present moment 
1/ The CEDO Project is a collaborative research effort promoted by the IDRC 
with the participation of research teams from several developing countries. 
The aim is to study the development of consulting and engineering design 
capabilities in those countries, centering the analysis on consulting 
and engineering design organizations, or CEDOs, so that policies may be.. 
designed and instrumented to promote their growth and make them effective 
tools of national development. It should be noted that several inter- 
national organizations are also keenly interested in the subject and would 
probably collaborate in a project of this type. 
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on account of its likely impact on policy making and practice in the participating 
count s, and of the contribution to the advancement of knowledge in the geral 
field technological and industrial development. 
As section will examine briefly the type of research work that may bf 
carried out, and will point to some of the main themes to which attention may 
be devoted, as they come out of the analysis carried out in this paper. 
Discussion of these suggestions, in the light of the results of the case studies 
now being conducted, and of the needs and interests of the national teams 
already involved in the CEDO Project, will permit an adequate design of a 
programme of work for this project. 
10.1. Nature of research work 
There are some aspects that do not make it a simple matter to carry out 
research in consulting and engineering in developing countries. The subject 
is vast and complex; its limits are not easy to define, and there is a large 
variety of problems at the micro and macro level in which our knowledge is not 
yet very advanced. Basic concepts have not crystallized sufficiently so that 
significant conceptual efforts are still to be made, on the basis of which 
agreements on definitions and categories may be reached among different research 
groups, nations and international agencies. 
There is a definite need to structure properly the field of work, and this 
paper has been an attempt in that direction. This would seem to call for a 
great deal of further exploratory work, and for comparisons between national 
and sectoral experiences which may clearly show those aspects which are specific 
to certain sectors and countries, and those which are of a more universal 
interest. 
The need for further mapping, exploration, characterization and concep- 
tualizing should not come as a surprise in view of the relative novelty of this 
field .- s a focus of research. Such a situation has appeared quite often in 
other areas of the social sciences, 1/ and even in recent cases of the physical 
1/ 1b give just one example. A group sponsored by UNESCO undertook to cafry 
out research on the productivity of scientific organizations. Work started 
in 1970. Although the units to be studied were easily identifiable (much 
106 
sciences. 
L/ These efforts may take some time but seem to be needed before 
making meaningful effort of theory, a formulation of detailed hypotheses, 
11 




As does not mean that some important issues and problem-areas cannot 
be fruitfully explored at this stage. But this would have to rely mainly on 
inductive methods, which gather a large amount of information and extract 
conclusions on a sort of "weight of evidence" approach. Statistical testing 
of hypotheses would not seem to be a feasible procedure at this early stage of 
research, except perhaps in a few well defined situations; it would mainly be 
a question of carrying out case studies, collecting information from a variety 
of sources, interviewing people and arriving at conclusions through an inductive 
process. Case studies, in particular, are useful ways of starting research in 
complex situations where many variables and decision centres are present, as 
happens in many aspects of C&E development and utilization. Case studies 
incorporate this complexity on describing and analyzing in detail individual 
situations. Since they require the use of an inductive methodological approach, 
and do not imply the collection of data for testing conjectures and hypotheses, 
they cannot give conclusions of a general validity. But the analysis of all the 
elements of a situation and their interrelations permits the identification of 
aspects of the phenomenon which otherwise would not be clearly perceived. Case 
studies performed in different sectors and countries on the same situation or 
.... more so than CEDOs), a good amount of research had been done in the past 
by many distinguished social scientists, and much lore existed in the 
scientific world on which to construct approaches and put forth hypotheses, 
the group --which included social scientists from half a dozen European 
countries-- took almost four years to formulate a viable research design. 
In this period many ideas were formulated, examined and scrapped; there 
took place an important exploration of the field. Only in 1978 were 
results ready for the original participating countries, and at this 
moment there are plans to extend the research to a number of other countries, 
among them some developing ones. 
1/ A"wcase in point is the development of radioastronomy since the end of tie' 
war. For more than 15 years radioastronomy refined its observational 
equipment and put it to work in mapping the skies and identifying totally 
new and unexpected phenomena. Theorizing mainly followed after this 
lengthy exploratory period. 
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issue- for instance, training of C&E personnel through association with a 
foreig CEDO in an investment project), if done with a similar design as 
regard-the main questions asked and the type of information collected and 
examiner may allow a certain degree of comparison of results and make it 
possible to formulate conceptual interpretations and hypotheses that may later 
be submitted to further corrobation, perhaps by statistical evidence. 
Let us examine briefly some problems that are found for research on C&E 
in developing countries, beyond those associated with the still incipient 
development of this general research area, on which we have just commented. 
The CEDOs we may take as units of analysis are sometimes difficult to 
define (for instance, when does a technical group in a productive firm become 
a CEDO? What part of an industrial research institute should be considered as 
a CEDO?). They vary widely in their characteristics; their behaviour tends to 
be strongly idiosyncratic; there are few of them in a given country and sector; 
they are probably not close to being in a steady state where their behaviour 
exhibits some stability; an important focus of research would consist of the 
processes through which they grow, develop and mature, processes which may 
exhibit enormous variations from case to case.1/ 
Another problem in studying processes of this kind is that whatever factors 
have been important influences in a given situation some time ago may no longer 
be valid on account of the time that has passed and the change in circumstances, 
and may therefore be of little use for making predictions or as a guide to 
action. Are conclusions about certain experiences transmissible to another 
moment in time, even within the same country and the same sector? If a CEDO 
has used a certain strategy successfully in the past, would this be also 
successful for a similar CEDO today? 
1/ We may take as an example the study of technology acquisition by a CEDO, 
in some of the most important branches. It is likely that very few CEDOs 
will be found in a certain branch and country for which it makes sense to 
study this characteristic, so the universe is small. On the other hand,., 
each CEDO in a certain way is unique: technology acquisition would seem 
to be a highly idiosyncratic process where personal and chance factors 
play an important role. Anthropological approaches would probsbly be 
more adequate here than sociological ones. To simplify things as to be 
able to apply the latter may mean that the very richness and diversity 
of the process under study is largely lost. 
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W should also touch on the practical problems of having access to 
informs on. Even with a great deal of openness and good will on the part ofd 
the CEDE` it may be difficult to carry out the necessary series of interviews,, 
with kepersonnel which is scarce of time and always in the run, or to obtai 
information from documents and files which may be in disarray, if they exist 
at all, since many CEDOs in developing countries are rather small and devote 
litte time to housekeeping chores. 
These difficulties may be even greater when the unit of analysis is the 
investment project, or the consultancy assignment. Here it may be difficult 
to contact all the principal actors, particularly if the task has been carried 
out long ago; and there is the danger that research efforts may stay only in a 
descriptive level because there is no time or opportunity to deepen the analysis. 
Besides, projects tend to be very different and subjected to widely divergent 
influences, so that comparability and the formulation of generalizable 
conclusions are not easy. 
Another unit of analysis may be the policy instrument, and here the 
conclusions of the STPI project would seem to be relevant: the evaluation of 
policy measures in favour of certain objectives is something very complex; 
there are limits to the possibilities of experimental verification, and to 
attempts of explaining clearly causal relations between measures and effects. 
On the face of such limitations STPI was not able to give a definitive reply to 
the questions originally posed, but it was able to develop explanatory hypotheses, 
which were confirmed to a certain degree, that were able to reduce the 
uncertainty born from ignorance and be of help in connecting knowledge and 
action.!/ Research on C&E may obtain a similar result. 
To sum up. The subject is still to be thoroughly mapped and requires 
further exploratory work. A number of important problem-areas and issues can 
be identified and may be explored principally through inductive approaches that 
need the gathering of ample evidence, although deductive methods may find use 
in some specific cases. The results would undoubtedly lower the coefficient 
tft 
of ignorance of policy makers and actors so that better measures may be envisaged 
1/ F.$agasti, Science and Technology for Development: Comparative Report for 
the STPI/Project. IDRC, Ottawa, 1978. 
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to de p domestic C&E capabilities and apply them efficiently in a given 
countr This would seem to be very desirable in view of the importance of. 
C&E as factor in self-reliant development. 
44 suggest that research efforts should be of an "action-oriented" typ'i,1/ 
aiming not only at producing intellectual results but also a number of practical 
results, principally a change of attitudes, a learning process in those 
participating in the work or being in close touch with it, and the collection 
and analysis of much useful information thorough the study and comparison of 
experiences, the discussion of results, and the gathering of data in general. 
In action-oriented research the objective should be to generate useful 
knowledge for policy making, decision making and planning. This calls for a 
different attitude than in academic social science research. 
A characteristic of action-oriented research is to avoid simplifying too 
much a problem but rather to look at it in all its complexity. The temptation 
should be resisted to fragment it too much and introduce simplifying assumptions 
that would allow the use of more conventional research approaches. There should 
be an effort to understand the nature of conflicts, the value premises, the 
attitudes of different actors. The collaboration of researchers from different 
disciplinary backgrounds would seem to be important in order to look at issues 
from different viewpoints and avoid the straight application of approaches 
stemming from just one discipline. 
Another characteristic is the involvement of policy makers and actors 
in the research process. This close interaction may bring about important 
practical results, as a consequence of the collective learning exercise. 
10.2. Areas for research 
A number of issues and problems about C&E have been suggested at different 
times, notably by Araoz and Politzer, Malhotra, and the participants at the 
recent OECD Seminar. 
Action-oriented research is treated at length by Sagasti in his STPI 
Project Report. 
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e have identified in this paper several areas where research efforts* 
may bapplied, having based ourselves on the above refererfces and other 
source. At this stage it may be convenient to make a summary of such area#, 
classifying them under three headings: conceptual, policy and operative.l/ 
There are evident connections between the work that may be carried out under 
each heading, so that the following list should not be interpreted as an 
attempt to split up research efforts in three separate categories. Conceptual 
research would improve the quality and impact of work on policy areas and 
operative aspects. Research on policy questions should be considered as the 
heart of this project. Work on operative areas would have as a purpose the 
development of useful procedures, guidelines and methods of immediate practical 
use. 
We shall be referring principally to semi-industrialized developing 
countries, in which some significant experience already exists and which can 
profit from the analysis of their experience and that of other countries. 
(a) Research on conceptual areas 
---------------------------- 
- Definitions, terminology and classification of C&E activities, services and 
organizations (p.4)?/ 
Nature of C&E links with productive units, capital goods production, R&D 
and other activities. Systemic relations. Type of flows. Decisions. 
Information and its handling.'-Fe dbacks (pp.12, 16). 
- Demand estimations. Methods. Coef f icients (p.17). 
- Mechanisms through which a CEDO may counteract the effects of fluctuating 
demand, such as internal organization, diversification, exports, scheduling, 
price policies, etc. (p.24) 
1/ Qur purpose is not to suggest concrete "issues", or to formulate hypof?Ceses. 
This is a later stage which would have to be tackled by each national 
team, since the way a proposition is drafted and worded will be very 
dependent on the national situation, though of course in many cases 
v ry similar formulations will exist among countries. .00 
2/ Page numbers in this and subsequent entries indicate the place in this 
paper where reference is made to the research area and the various issues 
within it. 
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- The 'Totion of "installed capacity" in C&E (p.32). 
- Development of a system of statistics on C&E (p.36). 
(b) Research on policy areas 
------------------------ 
We start from a number of general propositions that come out of the 
analysis made in this paper: 
- It is extremely important for a country to build up and use efficiently 
a domestic C&E capability. A first step should be to acquire capacity 
in preinvestment work on account of its importance in technology transfer 
and the proper use of local resources. 
- Regarding C&E capabilities in branches where medium and large investments 
are carried out: 
C&E should be considered as an "infant industry" and CEDOs should be 
helped in their development; support should continue to be extended to 
mature CEDOs if they are to compensate their inherent inequality with 
CEDOs from developed countries (p.14). 
The role of the State is crucial as policy maker and especially as owner 
of important investments in many branches (p.13). 
Actions and measures taken by the actors themselves, principally State 
investors and CEDOs, would appear to be more effective than general 
policies from the top, though the latter will be needed as the process 
of building up C&E capacity gathers strength (p.90). 
It pays for an investor to adopt enlightened investment practices, including 
especially the use of a domestic CEDO, since it may increase its private 
efficiency.in the long run. This will also be beneficial for the social 
efficiency of investment activity (p.62). 
- Adeg4,ate C&E capabilities should also be created to serve the investment 
and production needs of small and medium industry. This may sometimes be 
done within industrial technology institutions or other existing organiza- 
., tion.e. 
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These propositions represent wide policy areas on which research may 
concentrate. A number of more specific areas will now be listed as a guide s 
4 
to theormulation of a research programme: 
- Demand of C&E services: 
---------------------- 
Principal sources of demand (p.15). 
Needs of small scale industry (p.16). 
Behaviour of investors, particularly in the public sector. Reasons for 
demanding foreign C&E services (pp.16, 20). 
. Use of demand estimations for policy purposes (p.18). 
Relations with foreign CEDOs (p.21). 
Fluctuations of demand and their regulation (p.22). 
Exports of C&E services and their promotion (p.24). 
- Supply of C&E services: 
Participation of foreign capital in local CEDOs (p.32). 
Specificity of CEDOs (p.33). 
Pros and cons of public sector CEDOs (p.34). 
Policy implications of C&E statistics and the formal emergence of a 
"C&E Sector" (p.36). 
Impacts from using domestic C&E_: 
------------------------------ 
Optimal sequence of decisions in an investment project (p.42). 
. "Learning" as an important effect on investor, suppliers and other 
actors (pp.49, 51, 52). 
. Role of C&E as a link between R&D and the productive sector (p.52). 
Overcoming the blocking of industrial development through the purchases 
set in motion by forward-looking investment practices (p.53). 




T1 process of increasing efficiency. Characteristics and steps (p.59)., 
Tt gap between private and social efficiency. Possibility of reaching 
a maximum social efficiency. Measures needed for this (p.60). 
The mature CEDO: 
Social efficiency of a CEDO. Influences on it (p.66). 
Selection of "products" (p.68). 
Productive efficiency. Management of a CEDO in the environment and 
conditions of a developing country (pp. 70 and 76). 
"Delivery system" of a CEDO; efficiency of distribution (p.71). 
Influence of the environment on a CEDO, Implicit and explicit policies. 
Contextual factors. Influence of foreign and international actors (p.72). 
Models of CEDOs in the mature state. Differences with CEDOs from the 
developed countries (p.76). 
- Development of a CEDO: 
--------------------= 
Paths of development (p.81). 
Types of contracts. Pricing policies (p.82). 
Acquisition of knowhow and human resources. Organizational knowhow (p.83). 
Strategies of CEDO development (Annex 4). 
- Building up of a national C&E capacity: -------------------- 
Obstacles to growth of C&E capacity (p.86). 
Policies from above and from below (p.90). 
Policy alternatives in the development of C&E capacity (p.91). 
. Measures by users of C&E services (p.96). 
Measures by CEDOs (p.97). 
. Government policies: protection, regulation of demand; increase of supply; 
increase of social efficiency (p.98). 
Policies for technical cooperation with other developing countries and 
for a common action in international issues (p.102). 
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(c) Development work in operative areas 
- Ways id means for educating project owners, banks, Governments and other 
actors about the role of C&E in development (p.14). 
- Procedures for estimating the demand for C&E services (p.19). 
- Guidelines and procedures for using foreign C&E in the best possible way. 
Types of contracts that may be adopted (p.21). 
- Elements of the "technology" of C&E in a developing country. Manuals and 
guidelines-may be prepared in different aspects, such as CEDO management, 
technology search and choice, appraisal methods, engineering design pro- 
cedures, etc. (p.26). 
- Guidelines for the development of suppliers by project owners (p.49). 
- Guidelines for carrying out forward-looking, enlightened investment practices 
that will maximize social efficiency. A related area is the development of 
guidelines for operations of technology commerce among developing countries 
so that full benefits accrue to the recipient country-(p.57). 
- Models of adequate contracts between project owners and CEDOs (p.82). 
10.3. The shape of an international comparative project 
------------------------------------------------- 
An international comparative project on C&E would centre its attention 
on a number of main areas and issues, which may be selected among those we have 
listed above. It should cover preferably the same sectors or branches in the 
participating countries and employ very similar methodological tools (question- 
naires; interview schedules, outlines for case studies, etc.) in order to allow 
for a certain degree of comparability. 
The selection of areas and issues should follow from ample discussions 
among the different national teams participating so that.a maximum amount of 
information and results may be obtained from the effort. It is possible that 
some of the topics under (a) and (c) abovemay be treated initially by just one 
of the teams, or even by an outside consultant, in order to avoid too much 
duplication of efforts. This would have to be carefully considered. 
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We suggest that the project should concentrate on three important types 
of CEs: 
(a) *EDOs that principally carry out preinvestment consulting, which abound 
in mag& developing countries. They tend to be in the private sector and to 
serve a wide variety of customers. They are usually small and share a number 
of problems. 
(b) CEDOs that provide a wide range of C&E services to small and medium 
industry. They may be part of an institution like a technology institute, 
information centre, productivity organization; some countries have developed 
special consultancy institutions for the small scale sector. These CEDOs are 
mostly in the public sector, attend'a very large variety of customers and may 
charge only nominal fees for their services. Once again, they share many 
similar problems which are worth studying. In particular, the case of 
technology institutes may constitute a worthwhile focus for research efforts. 
(c) CEDOs serving modern infrastructure or industrial sectors that carry out 
important investment projects, where the main agents are public enterprises 
and agencies. Such CEDOs may be captive or independent, public or private; 
and it is probably here that a country wishing self-reliant development should 
put its main efforts regarding CEDO development and use. It is suggested that 
three branches should be studied in each of the participating countries, of 
which at least one should be the same as in other countries. 
_L/ 
In addition to the studies of CEDOs and their activities under the three 
headings above, national teams should carry out certain studies at the country 
level. A survey of the evolution of C&E activities in the country should be 
made, with a historical perspective, and should be related to the characteristics 
1/ As candidates we may mention the following branches: 
- infrastructure (buildings and civil works, roads; ports, airports, water 
and sewage systems, transport systems, communications systems); 
- energy (oil and gas extraction; generation of thermal, hydro and 
nuclear energy; electrical transmission lines); 
- mining (coal, iron, copper, tin, etc.); 
basic metallurgy (iron and steel,_aluminium, copper, etc.); 
chemicals, petrochemicals and in general process industries; 
mechanical and electrical industries. 
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of industrial development and science and technology development in the past. 
This w ld serve as a framework to the detailed sector studies and would i 
illust to the factors that have influenced past development and utilization 
of C&E capability. A second general aspect to be examined is the national 
enviroeent within which CEDOs operate at the present moment -policies, 
legislation, contextual factors. This would permit a more adequate discussion 
of possible action in the policy areas under study. Finally, some attention 
should be put on the possibilities of cooperation with other developing 
countries to improve the external constraints to the domestic development and 
utilization of C&E capabilities. 
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ANNEX 1 
CEDO Rearch in Development Agencies 
laterest in consulting and engineering activities, and in the organiza 
tions that carry them out, has been on the increase during the last few years 
in different institutions concerned with development. 
The OECD Development Centre has conducted studies on CEDOs of industrial 
countries and their activities in developing countries, and has supported six 
case studies (in Cameroon, Colombia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Peru and Thailand) 
which were reviewed at a Seminar in Paris, October 1978. The Seminar under- 
lined the importance of CEDO development and identified several areas where 
further research would be required to better understand the problems involved 
and the policy options. One of the important findings of OECD research was 
that CEDOs of developed countries ar. not much aware of the conditions and 
needs of the developing countries for which they design investment projects, 
or about the question of "appropriate technology" and tend to transplant their 
own solutions to an environment where they may not be fully adequate. Such 
solutions tend to favour the purchase of technology, equipment and production 
inputs from the country in which the CEDO resides; the possible supply by 
entities of the recipient country is not fully taken into account. If 
behaviours of this nature were verified in practice, they would point out to 
certain disfunctional characteristics of imported consulting and engineering 
services that should be curhed.by:.pational policy. 
UNIDO has been looking at the question for several years and has con- 
tributed to the creation of consulting and engineering capabilities in several 
developing countries, within industrial research centres or as separate 
institutions. In June 1978 it convened a meeting in Ljubljana to discuss 
the problems faced by CEDOs in developing countries and to appraise the 
possibilities of cooperation among them. The report of this meeting was later 
submitted to the UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing 
Countries (Buenos Aires, August 1978). An important conclusion of the meeting 
was that "industrial consultancy should be recognized as a basic essential 
service and as a vital instrument to achieve the Lima target. It is a key 
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element of industrialization programmes since it contributes directly to 
evolving appropriate technical and economic solutions in harmony with nationl 
socio-nomic objectives, securing improved terms in technology acquisition 
and achieving technical and managerial self-reliance through. a more effective 
use of national resources. Consultancy is the "software" equivalent of 
capita goods, which is the essential "hardware" input for industrialization. 
The United Nations Development Programme has been keenly aware of the 
importance of consulting and engineering for the formulation of appropriate 
development projects and has tried to enhance the participation of CEDOs from 
developing countries in the projects it promotes. In 1975 it sponsored a 
meeting on "Consulting Services in Latin America and the Caribbean", which took 
place in Mexico, with the participation of several hundred consultants from 
that region. As a result the CODELCA Group was founded with the participation 
of UNDP, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Federation of Latin American 
Consultants and National Financiers (the Development Bank of Mexico), with the 
purpose of analyzing the problems of consultancy in Latin America and the 
Caribbean and of promoting its development. In its first meeting of November 
1975 the CODELCA Group approved the preparation of a Directory of Consultancy 
Organizations in the region and commissioned a paper on "Cooperation in 
Consulting and Engineering in Latin America and the Caribbean", which was 
submitted at the Regional Preparatory Meeting of the UN Conference on Technical 
Cooperation among Developing Countries, Lima, May 1976. Unfortunately the Group 
has not met again and it is not known whether it will be revived in the future. 
On the other hand, the subject of "cooperation in consulting and engineering" 
was included in the agenda of'the UN TCDC Conference and recommendations were 
included in the final report. It is very likely that the UNDP will take it up 
again in the future in one way or the other. 
Consulting and engineering activities have also been the subject of concern 
in some international financial agencies. The Inter-American Development Bank 
created several "Preinvestment Funds" in.Latin American countries since the mid- 
60's with the purpose of improving project preparation in the public sector; 
such Funds became explicit supporters of national consulting and engineering,' 
and have recently inaugurated a programme of collaboration among themselves 
in which this support will be further enhanced. The IDB also sponsored the 
A-7 
Mexico eeting in 1975 and was one of the participants in the CODELCA Group,_- 
as we have seen.-- In the World Bank careful studies were carried out 
regarding the use of Bank-funded projects for building up local technical and 
projec`capabilities, and the results have allowed to draft improved procedures 
which have recently been incorporated as operative suggestions in the Bank's 
manual of operations. But it is not yet clear whether activities of this 
nature have had a significant impact upon the operations of the two Banks: 
the attitudes and the practices of personnel in charge of operations --both 
from the Bank as from the client-- are not changed overnight. 
The International Development Research Centre has sponsored work on 
consulting and engineering since 1974, when it commissioned M. Kamenetzky to 
carry out a study of the evolution of process engineering in Mexico and 
Argentina. Several case studies were carried out by national teams within 
the framework of the Science and Technology Policy Instruments (STPI) Project, 
and a technical meeting took place in Caracas, Venezuela, in October 1975, 
where papers were submitted by the teams from Argentina, Brazil, India,'Korea, 
Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Observers fromUNDP, the World Bank, 
the OECD and the IDB-ECLA research group were also present and referred to 
the work carried out in their respective organizations. One of the conclusions 
of the meeting was that the subject was of great importance and that it was 
ripe for research. 
After the Caracas meeting the IDRC commissioned Dr. A. Malhotra to prepare 
a paper on the subject which-could. be used as a basis to formulate a research 
project in which several national teams could take part. A meeting took place 
in Corfu in late 1976 and a preliminary proposal was drafted. It was later 
felt that further preparatory work should be undertaken and the present author 
was asked to draft guidelines for case studies in several countries, and to 
review the whole subject and make concrete proposals for further research. 
1/ Iii addition, work on engineering firms has been carried out by F.Sercovich 
within the research project sponsored by the IBD and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America. 
11 
A-8 
A first paper was prepared in December 1977, with a conceptual framework 
and guelines for a case study. Four case studies were undertaken in Argen- 
tina, Btazil, Korea and the Philippines during the second half of 1978. 
PartiaA&,results are already on hand for the first.two. 
The present paper is an attempt to examine the subject-matter, identify 
some important issues and suggest what may be done in the way of further 
research. This paper and the results of the case studies are to be considered 
at a meeting early in 1979, as a result of which, it is hoped, a full-fledged 




The role of CEDOs in the transfer of technology 
4i the developing countries the main source of new technologies is the 
process of technology transfer from the industrial countries. This situation 
is bound to persist in the future and could even become more acute, since as 
a country makes progress in its economic development it needs to introduce 
new technologies but its own technology-generating efforts usually lag behind 
such needs. 
It is therefore important to understand the process of technology transfer 
in order to guide it according to criteria that agree with national conditions 
and national development objectives. We shall examine the principal aspects, 
placing emphasis on the role that domestic CEDOs may play in it so that results 
are best for the recipient country. 
Nature of technology transfer 
Technology transfer operations may be said to consist in the transfer 
of elements of technical knowledge needed for the conception, design, 
construction and operation of units that produce goods and services, including 
the performance of activities such as natural resources surveys, education, 
health, public administration, the solution of social problems, etc. The 
transfer of these elements of technical knowledge may take place through 
(i) the transfer of technological assets, and (ii) the rendering of 
technological services: consulting, engineering, and other technical services. 
Technological assets comprise knowledge about products, processes, 
organizations, methods and systems. They may be protected by industrial 
property rights. They constitute the nucleus of the "technology" which is 
subjected to practical applications. Their origin may be empiricism, trial 
and error, scientific and technological research.; they may also originate 
in a previously imported technology which has been subjected to change and 
improvement to adapt it better to local conditions and to improve its 
technical and economic characteristics. 
11 
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We have already referred to consulting and engineering services. 
"Tech cal services" cover a wide array of activities that usually accompany 
the tnsfer of technological assets and the rendering of consulting and 
engineering services. They go from personnel training to quality control 
serviW , and from analysis and tests in laboratory and pilot plants to 
advice on production or management problems. 
Technology transfer comprises operations through which the supplier unit 
(which may be an enterprise, engineering firm, R&D institute, etc.) gives the 
receiving unit access to the use and exploitation of technological assets, 
and may also supply the technological services needed for their economic 
utilization, given the particular conditions in which they will be used. The 
content of such operations frequently constitutes a "package" made to measure 
for the client. The supplier unit organizes the package around the "core" 
technological assets, central to the process, to which it adds the "peripheral" 
technological assets, which may be common to different projects, obtaining the 
elements from various sources in its own country, in that of the client or in 
a third country, and adapting their specifications to the peculiar conditions 
of the project it is preparing. Such packages may be taken to constitute 
intangible capital goods made to order. 
Consulting and engineering activities are crucial for the choice of the 
technological assets, their adaptation to the conditions of the project, the 
detailed design of the latter and other related tasks. C&E activities may be 
performed by one organization, "captive" or external, or else they may be 
shared among several organizations-and groups, with one of them in charge of 
coordination and general supervision of project design. 
The magnitude, complexity and contractual form of technology transfer 
operation may be very variable, as specific actors and circumstances vary. 
It may be a large investment project; a medium size investment; a significant 
change in the conditions of production, which only needs the introduction of 
a new product design with little additional investment. The first case is 
that of the so-called "development projects", usually undertaken by the State- 
or by large private investors, employing special credit lines which are often 
of international origin. However, the general characteristics of the 
technology transfer process are similar in all these cases and the stages of 
solution are the same. 
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In the simplest cases, certain services will be rendered or certain 
technolIgical assets will be licensed. In other cases a more or less complete 
project will be prepared and technological assets will be lincesed. The most 
complex situation is that of a "turnkey" agreement in which the supplier 
undertakes to provide all services and inputs needed to deliver a productive 
unit in full working conditions. The supplier need not necessarily supply by 
itself all the technological and physical inputs required; many of them may 
be procured from other sources through the supplier's intermediation. One of 
the characteristics of a turnkey agreement is that the supplier give guarantees 
about the efficiency and the safety of the installations; another is that the 
supplier is in charge of their start-up or commissioning. A turnkey investment 
project frequently incorporates process knowhow, or product designs, covered by 
industrial property rights. These technological assets are not necessarily 
controlled by the supplier; they may be procured from a third party by means 
of licensing. 
What may be done to improve technology transfer 
It is common for a developing country to buy and implant technology with 
little previous study and following the recommendations of foreign equipment 
manufacturers or foreign constultants. In such cases a badly known package is 
imported. This should be contrasted with the importation of elements of 
technical knowledge which are not locally obtainable, preceded by a careful 
search, selection and evaluation'on the part of a local CEDO and infused with 
a will and effort to import only those intangible and physical inputs which 
cannot be obtained locally at adequate price and quality. In the first case 
several unfavourable characteristics from the social point of view may be 
present, particularly the long-run effects of depending on foreign suppliers 
of technology. 
The characteristics of these two extreme models, and the reasons to 
undertake actions that will create favourable conditions to approach the secof'd 
one, have been trated by many authors in much detail. It is evident that in 
many cases it will not be possible to proceed according to the second model 
and that, even though this may technically be feasible, the task is not simple 
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for countries with small scientific and technical capabilities. In such a 
case ore limited objectives may be adopted, putting efforts on those parts 
of the"'process of technology transfer in which it is possibie to obtain in 
the short run certain significant achievements which may cumulatively 
contritute to the possibility of pursuing more complex objectives in the long 
run. But it is important to point out the crucial role of captive or 
independent CEDOs in tasks of such importance for an efficient and autonomous 
development. 
Many of the problems in technology transfer to developing countries 
originate largely for internal causes, such as the attitudes and behaviour 
of decision-makers and the lack of technical capabilities needed to conceive 
and carry out investment projects, identify technological alternatives, choose 
the more appropriate ones, negotiate with suppliers of technology, services 
and physical inputs, prepare bid documents, etc. To this should be added 
other factors like the scarcity of local investment funding which makes it 
necessary to rely on international credit or supplier financing. All this 
favours the dependence on foreign consultants and suppliers for recommendations 
and even decisions which should truly remain in the domestic sphere, while at 
the same time little confidence is shown on local personnel of industry, science 
and engineering. This finds expression in "safe" and "efficient" patterns of 
behaviour, frequently translated in the purchase of technological package and 
turnkey plants. Curiously, this search for safety which moves to place total 
confidence on the foreign supplier of the package has not always produced the 
hoped-for results in terms of costs, efficiency and delivery dates. There 
have sometimes been delays, design or construction errors, failures in the 
operation of imported equipment, etc., which have caused serious problems. 
Sometimes this may be attributed to the introduction of technologies which are 
still experimental so that the recipient country is functioning as a test bench 
for the supplier's new process or product 
To diminish these problems in technology transfer, "defensive" policies 
may be applied to regulate the characteristics and the terms of technology 
imports and foreign investment. Many developing countries have legislation 
of this type. But this is not enough. An "active" policy is also needed, which 
will work on many fronts, developing and using domestic technical capabilities 
A-13 
in conaplting, engineering and research, with which it may be possible to 
carry out an efficient management of imported technology and the generation 
of local technology. In the long run emphasis should be put on these active 
or offaftsive aspects if it is wished to get to manage the technological 
variable and through this acquire a measure of self-determination in technical 
matters and therefore on the process of development. 
In large investment projects, which are the most important users of 
foreign technology, the main problem is to progress from a "turnkey" situation 
to another in which the projects are conceived and managed domestically and 
incorporate as much domestic technology, engineering and phsysical inputs as 
possible. It may be suggested that a turnkey import whose internal structure 
is not known is truly a "back box". The investor should eventually carry out 
its investments in a disaggregated manner, as a "white box", making by itself 
or through a local CEDO the feasilibity study and the construction of the 
package according to local conditions and using maximally physical and 
intellectual inputs of local origin. To go from white box to white box a 
learning process is required which usually cannot be accomplished in one jump, 
so that it will be necessary to go through a succession of "grey boxes" which 
gradually incorporate more local contributions and inputs, so that the box is 
"whitened" in successive investment projects. 
A process of this nature, which implies the growing mastery of technology, 
finds a number of obstacles which must be overcome. Perhaps the most serious 
one is the cautious, risk-averting.,at,titude, which may induce those responsible 
for the investment to purchase what they need outside the country, often through 
a turnkey purchase, for fear that the locally supplied goods and services should 
be of an inferior quality. We have already suggested that this caution does not 
always give good results. Another important obstacle in public investments is 
the system of selection and contracting of suppliers legally imposed in certain 
countries, and the accompanying administrative practices. When it is a question 
of developing new products and processes, industrial countries frequently resort 
to direct contracting, establishing a programme of work jointly with the supplier 
in which payment is in the cost plus system. This modality is not contemplated 
in many developing countries where purchasing systems'are designed to protect 
the State against dishonest commercial practices but not to utilize as well as 
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possible the scarce technical, human and financial resources that are 
availab'J.e. 
Serious obstacles still persist even when the investor has a positive 
attitude. The most significant derives from the frequent need to look for 
foreign financing, which often implies the use of foreign CEDOs and the import 
of technology, engineering and equipment. Countries like Pakistan and the 
Philippines, to name only two, with few capital resources and little negotiating 
strength, are trapped in this situation and find it very difficult or impossible 
to untie the "finance-technology-equipment" package. Another obstacle is the 
absence of technical capabilities in the investor, which may then find it 
impossible to take up responsibilities about specifications, unpackaging of 
technology, choice and negotiation of goods and services to be procured, and 
other activities that need a strong technical backing, and cannot find help in 
domestic CEDOs in the area of its interest because they do not exist or are 
still weak. 
From the preceding description, the role of consulting and engineering 
activities in technology transfer and industrial and technological development 
clearly emerges. These activities appear as organizers and implementors of 
projects, and as such they constitute crucial links between the availability 
of financial resources and their materialization in efficient investments; 
between the production of knowledge in R&D institutions and the incorporation 
of such knowledge in the productive system; between the capital goods industry 
and the users of capital goods. The action of CEDOs may be carried out with 
more or less "private efficiency";'i:e. that which is directly relevant to the 
investor and its project; but the key location of these organizations in a 
network of relations between finance, capital goods, research and investment 
permits them to generate impacts on socio-economic development that go much 
farther than the project walls, so that there is an important influence on 
the "social efficiency" of the investment activity. 
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ANNEX 3 
Consulting and Engineering in an Investment Project 
To appreciate in detail the role of C&E activities in technology transfer 
and capital formation we will examine the case of a large, complex investment 
project. We shall refer to the process industry but the description can be 
applied with few changes to projects in other branches. 
The investor --private firm, State agency or enterprise-- makes a point 
for project formulation, a task that will be in charge of a CEDO frequently 
external to the investor. Through a series of successive approximations the 
CEDO helps the investor to define its specific objectives and from them it 
prepares a pre-project that may be submitted to economic and financial 
analysis. This is employed as a basis for negotiations with the Government 
and the financial institutions, and serves as a starting point for the 
engineering design of the project. 
The CEDO will attempt to identify the available technological alternatives 
and will develop preliminary designs around them. This will require detailed 
conversations with suppliers on the price of technology and equipment, so 
that investment and operating costs may be estimated. At this stage the CEDO 
may have to reach an advanced stage of negotiation, and will undoubtedly need 
competent personnel. 
On carrying out a technology search overseas, the CEDO should consider 
whether the technological alternatives it identifies are adequate for local 
conditions both from the point of view of private efficiency (technical and 
economic aspects of the project) and social efficiency (social, ecological and 
other impacts). A number of technical analyses and preliminary adaptation 
work are frequently required until a satisfactory solution is reached that 
may be expressed in an appropriate "basic engineering" design. This may offer 
good opportunities to local scientific institutions, and the tasks asked from 
them represent a first impact of the local CEDO on domestic science and 
technology development. Sometimes it may be preferable to have a local R&D 
institution working in collaboration with the foreign technology supplier or 
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R&D :.restitution. Here the CEDO should help establish the international 
contacts needed by the local institution. The CEDO should participate closely 
in the organization of these tasks and the evaluation of their results, 
helping in this way the incorporation of local technology into the basic 
engineering design. 
At this point there will be enough information to allow a first evalua- 
tion of the technological alternatives, which needs a preliminary estimation 
of investment and production costs, and of profitability in private and social 
terms. 
To estimate investment costs, the CEDO cannot be guided by approximate 
data given by the supplier nor can it simply use data from the technical 
literature. These sources would only be acceptable in a very preliminary 
stage of preinvestment work, the so-called pre-feasilibity study. For a 
precise estimation, the CEDO should have a list of the main pieces of equipment, 
with their dimensions, and of the prices quoted by vendors. The CEDO would 
therefore be asking for firm quotations from the manufacturers of the main 
components. To do this the CEDO should know well the international market. 
The CEDO should also know well the domestic market, in order to analyze 
possible purchases of local inputs. In this respect a passive attitude may 
be taken, buying locally what is already being produced at adequate price and 
quality; or a positive attitude may be adopted, inducing the local manufacture 
of goods which were not produced previously but may now be made if the 
prospective suppliers are granted financial and technical support. Public 
sector investment should adopt the active approach if they are to become a 
positive factor for industrial and technological development. 
With the list of the main items and their quotations, the CEDO should 
estimate the cost of the whole project, using various estimating methods and 
criteria. The calculation will be redone later on, once the technology is 
chosen and the detailed engineering has been made 
The next stage consists in estimating the costs of production, using 
supplier information about the necessary inputs (materials, energy, manpower, 
etc.). It should be noted that "technical" values of yield may be different 
from "guaranteed" values. Factors that depend on p inject location should be 
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considered, such as the consumption of energy, water and other central services 
which may vary considerably according to the way detailed engineering is made, 
the characteristics of local raw materials, etc. 
By now the CEDO will have prepared the basic elements of a feasibility 
study, having identified several technological alternatives and prepared around 
each of them alternative preliminary projects which include physical and 
intangible inputs of local origin. In other words, the CEDO has "aggregated" 
or put together its own "technological packages"; it has carried out the 
''preliminary engineering" of the alternative pre-projects. It may happen 
however that a local CEDO cannot put the package together if the project is 
exceedingly complex, or for other reasons. In such a case the technological 
alternatives would lead to alternative packages prepared by foreign CEDOs or 
suppliers, though the local CEDO may have some participation in the task. 
Whatever the case, it is now necessary to make an appraisal of the 
alternatives. In public sector projects it is usual to carry out a social 
cost-benefit appraisal. 
The report to be prepared by the CEDO --the feasibility report-- should 
generally cover the following points: (a) market: present, projections, 
possible exports, how should output grow, and what are the implications for 
installed capacity; (b) available technologies; (c) investment alternatives 
and their costs; (d) production costs alternatives; (e) appraisal; 
(f) recommendations on technology and plant location. Some additional items 
may be suggested: (g) impacts of-the project on local science and technology 
development; (h) sources of imported items; (i) sources of local items. 
On the basis of this report, the investor and the CEDO may prepare 
strategies to carry out the purchase of technology, trying to strengthen 
their bargaining power through the support of Government and of local legisla 
tion, and particularly through an active search of technical, economic and 
commercial information that may be used in such negotiations. 
Throughout all this process of project preparation, the investor has to 
keep a running dialogue with the CEDO and should be able to appraise the 
CEDO's work. To do this it should have a techno-economic group able to 
maintain a close and fruitful contact. This need is probably more urgent 
if the CEDO is foreign, in order to take care of aspects where the previous 
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experience of the foreign CEDO, its natural tendency towards "safety" and the 
established links with equipment suppliers of its own country may make it 
recommend, consciously or unconsciously, solutions not entirely appropriate 
to local conditions or the achievement of national goals. 
The following steps in the project have to do with looking for financing, 
obtaining the benefits of promotional legislation, preparing documentation for 
tenders or price competition, and evaluating offers. In all this the CEDO may 
give the investor a very valuable contribution. 
Detailed engineering is the next step with important implications for 
technology transfer. The investor must select the CEDO or CEDOs to which it 
will entrust this task. The CEDO that has worked during the preinvestment stage 
would be the logical candidate if it has experience and trained personnel; it 
can naturally bring in other local or foreign CEDOs. It is advisable that 
detailed engineering should be under the responsibility of a local CEDO, in 
order that the design will be adapted as much as possible to local conditions 
and needs, and that opportunities are used to incorporate local inputs. Each 
of the many decisions taken in the process of design may be small but the 
cumulative effect may be important (as was shown in the case of design of 
buildings in Chile which is described in the main text of this paper), and often 
it is only the participation of alert and experienced local personnel that may 
endow these decisions with maximum social utility for the recipient country. 
As we have already suggested the positive impact on the development of 
local industry and its technological progress may be even higher if inputs or 
equipment that had not been manufactured locally before are now ordered because 
it is felt that they may be successfully produced if opportunity is given to 
the manufacturers. This approach has been applied by different organizations 
in developing countries, producing a gradual increase of local content in each 
successive investment. It requires a careful study of local manufacturing 
possibilities, and may need extended negotiations with foreign suppliers to 
open up packages and incorporate local inputs. 
It also needs the development of suppliers of capital goods and other inputs 
for the investment and operation phases. A dynamic action of supplier develop- 
ment may be very important to improve quality, lower costs, adapt designs to 
local conditions, promote new designs and in general carry out a progressive 
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substitution of imports of complex goods. This requires many decisions about 
the physical, chemical and operating characteristics of the goods to be 
purchased. Designs, specifications, standards, and quality controls set up 
by important purchasers may favour the progress of production activities on 
requi'ring an incrase in the quality of products, promoting the adoption of 
new processes, demanding better management practices and making it necessary 
to train managers, technicians and workers, all of which are key aspects of 
technical progress in the supplier enterprises. It is convenient, especially 
in public sector purchases, to define needs, several years ahead and establish 
purchasing plans in concert with the supplier branches, to which on the other 
hand technical and financial support should be extended to allow them to comply 
with ever tightening technical requisites. In this way it is also possible 
to help the expansion of markets for small and medium enterprise, and to 
develop industry in certain regions where demand may be focused. Positive 
impacts on development result over and beyond the contribution of the project 
itself. 
The following stages of the project have to do with its materialization. 
The CEDO may contribute in many of these stages, taking on tasks related to 
supervision, inspection, procurement, training, etc. Training should be 
carefully planned on account of its importance as a channel of technology 
transfer both for the CEDO and for the investor which will later operate and 
maintain the plant. 
The case of investments by small and medium enterprise 
These investments often consist of machinery purchase to be added to 
existing plant or to replace obsolete machines. The industrialist generally 
does not look for information in a systematic manner. He gathers it from 
other industrialists, from machinery sellers, brochures, visits, fairs. He 
rarely carries out a wide search of technical alternatives or worries about 
getting technical advice beyond opinions from colleagues or acquaintances. 
It is common to find an industrialist buying a machine after visiting a fair 
or making a quick trip overseas. 
11 
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Small and medium enterprises generally cannot form their own technical 
team or ask advice from a large CEDO regarding a proposed investment. But 
they will certainly need advice if they are not to buy theit machines or 
their small projects from the first salesman. The stages to be followed are 
similar to those of large investment projects; what will be different are 
the actors and the time taken. Assistance will be requested from an organiza- 
tion that renders services to numerous small enterprises within a branch; 
this may be a technological institute, a small engineering group established 
by a branch, a productivity centre, or a technical assistance service for 
small and medium enterprise. Since it is a matter of largely repetitive 
situations such as the purchase of more or less standard machinery for the 
production of not too complex goods, it seems reasonable to expect that 
economies of scale will exist as the institution gives advice to many small 
firms. Many branches are apt for such a treatment:leather, food, certain 
agroindustries, non-ferrous metallurgy, etc. Several countries such as India 
and Mexico have developed a sizeable consulting capacity for producers in 
these branches. 
A similar approach may be adopted in situations where technology refers 
principally to the design of a product. It is beneficial for a country to count 
with industrial design bureaus or workshops that can give advice and perform 
design work for a large variety of clients. There are experiences in several 
developing countries (Chile, Argentina, Egypt, India) that show the important 
role of institutions of this type; particularly when they are closely related 




Alternative strategies for development of CEDOs in developing countries, 
according to A. Malhotra1/ 
CEDO development can follow a number of different paths. Malhotra suggests 
that successful paths will result from following one or the other of the 
following strategies: 
1. The "Project Engineering" Strategy 
The total package of services required by a project is disaggregated; the 
CEDO performs some but assumes overall responsibilities for execution. This 
usually means buying process packages and basic engineering, and doing the 
detailed engineering and project management services locally with only marginal 
assistance from outside. The approach seems to work in the process industries 
where projects are large and local technology usually unvailable. It permits a 
greater utilization of local inputs. The attempt would be to absorb the 
imported technology and simultaneously, in collaboration with local R&D 
institutes, to develop technology for future projects. 
The successful CEDO here will be a large CEDO, State-owned or a subsidiary 
of a foreign CEDO, focusing on detailed engineering and project execution 
services. Appropriate policies for its development and growth would be 
restricting the award of turnkey-contracts; use of local CEDO as prime consultant 
in all major projects; fiscal incentives to local CEDOs for use of local 
equipment and goods; incentives to investors if they use local CEDOs; easing 
the import of equipment needed by the local CEDO; support of purchase of knowhow 
by lump sum with possibility of re-use; insistence on use of local codes and 
standards. 
2. The "Specialized Services" Strategy 
The emphasis is on developing only one type of C&E services, such as 
preinvestment services, operation and maintenance services, or inspection 
services, on which the CEDO would specialize. 
1/ We summarize in this Annex Section V.5 of Malhotra's paper. 
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In the case of consultancy or preinvestment services, the CEDO would be 
of medium size. It would have an interdisciplinary group with a heavy 
emphasis on market, economic and financial analysis, covering a wide range of 
products in different sectors. It can be a part of a Government financial 
institution, or a part of a private manufacturing unit which is making the 
investment. 
Among the policies leading to its development are: a public sector 
requirement of a detailed project report for funding of major projects; a 
stipulation by financial institutions that no loans will be given without an 
independent techno-economic study; the development of Project Investment 
Manuals; permission to employ foreign consultants or CEDOs to check conclusions 
of local CEDOs; strengthening contractual and negotiating components in CEDO; 
allowing turnkey contracts after completion of project report by the CEDO if 
no local group has capability to provide services or goods; support training 
of CEDO personnel and visits to overseas plants; incentives to CEDO for 
developing of regular maintenance and trouble-shooting groups; requirement 
that local consultants be associated in all studies; financing of costs of 
local services. 
3. The "Reverse Engineering" Strategy 
The origin of the CEDO would be the groups that operate imported turnkey 
plants and carry out troubleshooting. As experience accumulates and market 
pressure mounts for efficiency and new designs, serious attempts will be made 
to build up this CEDO, which will draw its staff and expertise from the 
operating plant. Detailed engineering will be emphasized very little; the 
CEDO will deal principally with maintenance and operation, and with procurement 
and inspection services. 
This CEDO will mean a very good way of utilizing scarce technical manpower. 
It will be found in sectors with high maintenance costs or where product 
redesign is needed. It will be medium-scale, and belong to the manufacturing 
organization, or to a foreign-owned subsidiary of the company that provided 
the initial hardware for the project. 
The following policies may help its development and growth: tax rebates 
to manufacturing organizations if CEDOs form a part of them; use of these 
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groups for evaluation of technology being offered for new plants; fiscal 
incentives for indigenization of components; development of local codes and 
standards; operation and maintenance services to form part of contracts. 
4. The "Total Consultancy" Strata 
Here the CEDO is responsible for the entire project from concept to 
commissioning. In some cases it will supply services for maintenance and 
operation. 
These CEDOs are missing in most developing countries. Most small CEDOs 
cannot provide comprehensive services even to medium-scale projects, while the 
larger CEDOs that can are either not interested in the smaller projects or are 
too expensive. The technology would come from local R&D institutes, and the 
emphasis would be on developing a turnkey package based in local R&D. 
Successful CEDOs of this type will be medium-level organizations, 
independent or a part of an R&D institute, serving small and medium scale 
process plants or the medium-scale manufacturing sector. 
Policies for their development would be: restrictions on import of tech- 
nology in areas where local R&D is available; fiscal incentives to CEDO if 
project is based on local R&D; support to projects through credit schemes, 
protective tariffs for products, backing of guarantees to the CEDOs by insurance 
companies; easier movement of personnel from R&D institutes to CEDOs. 
5. The "Foreign Collaboration" Strategy 
The CEDO may be a joint venture or a fully owned subsidiary of a foreign 
CEDO, which will be pressured to employ and train a maximum of local personnel. 
This CEDO will rely heavily on the name, expertise and marketing efforts of 
the parent company. It may offer guarantees and trouble-shooting services free 
as extra inducements to prospective customers. During the actual project foreign 
participation may be limited to some supervisory personnel, standard designs 
and blueprints, manuals on similar jobs, etc. The parent company may also try 
out new solutions or experimental technologies and train its own staff at the 
expense of the local company and its clients. 
These CEDOs will usually be medium-scale, in the private sector, they will 
cover a number of sectors and attempt to provide the full range of services, 
often on a turnkey basis. 
A-24 
Policies favouring their development include: lack of restrictions for 
their functioning, for profit-repatriation, for subcontracting of services 
to parent company on the latter's contracts; relaxation on double-taxation 
laws on expatriate personnel; favouring the training of local personnel at 
the parent company; incentives for increased local personnel; incentives for 
export of services; Government guidelines for absorption of parent company 
technology. 
These are the key strategies that will be employed in the development 
and growth of CEDOs, sometimes with minor variations according to the country 
and the sector. Often the same CEDO may adopt one strategy in its early days 
of growth and move on to other on maturation. Some successful CEDOs may 
adopt different strategies in different sectors at the same time. Malhotra 
feels that this conceptual model may help in identifying clearly the 
alternatives available to a CEDO at a particular stage in its growth, and in 
designing suitable policies in favour of CEDO creation and development. 
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REFERENCES 
The literature on consulting and engineering in developing countries 
has bean expanding at a fast pace in recent years. To prepare a complete 
bibliography would be too long a task for the present circumstances. We have 
opted for a simpler solution. First, we indicate several sources which may 
be consulted by the reader. Second, we list those references which have 
been particularly useful in preparing this paper. 
A. Sources 
A number of institutions have carried out work on the subject and several 
specialized meetings have been held in recent years. We list those that have 
been brought to our attention. 
1. CODELCA Meeting (Conference on Consulting Services in Latin America and the 
Caribbean), sponsored by UNDP, the Inter American Development Bank and 
Nacional Financiera S.A. This meeting took place in Mexico in 1975 and had 
a very ample participation. A large number of papers were presented, and 
were published together with a Final Report and Recommendations by Nacional 
Financiera, Mexico, December 1975. 
2. FINEP (Financiera de Estudos e Projetos), Rio de Janeiro, a Government 
organization, has carried out research and published a number of papers on 
C&E and related topics, since about 1974. Some of the latter have been 
translated into English. 
3. IREP, Universite de Sciences Sociales de Grenoble, France; its"Centre de 
Recherche sur l'Industrialisation et le Developpement "made pioneering 
studies on the role of C&E in development and has put out since 1970 a large 
number of papers on the subject. 
4. OECD Development Centre, Paris. The Centre has done research on CEDOs of 
developed countries that worked in developing countries, and sponsored a 
number of country studies of C&E in sore developing countries. A number of 
publications have resulted. A meeting was held in Paris, in October 1978, 
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on "Engineering Consulting, Industry and the Development of Local 
Technological Capabilities in Developing Countries", to review the 
research results. The present author acted as Rapporteur. The Report 
is to be published shortly by OECD. 
5. STPI Project. Almost all the national teams in the STPI network carried 
out research on C&E. A meeting was held in Caracas, November 1975, to 
review work in progress and facilitate an exchange of views. A report 
was prepared by the present author, and circulated by the Field 
Coordinator's Office. Some time later Dr. A. Malhotra reviewed the 
results of the final research reports in his paper for the IDRC (see below). 
6. UNIDO has held a number of meetings on C&E. In each case the papers 
presented and the final reports have been published in mimeograph form. 
(a) Meeting on the Development of Engineering Design Capabilities in 
Developing Countries, Vienna, 1970; 
(b) Meeting on the Development of Management Consultancy in Latin America, 
Santiago, 1971; 
(c) Expert Group Meeting on the Role of Industrial Consultancy in Developing 
Countries, Ljubljana, June 1978 (the present author acted as Rapporteur). 
7. World Bank. A number of studies on C&E development in developing countries 
and the possible role of the Bank in this process have been carried out, 
principally at the Bank's Office of Science and Technology. 
B. Selected references 
1. Alves, S.F. and Mutzenbecher Ford, E., 0 comportamento technologico das 
empresas estatais: a selecao das empresas de engineering, a escolha de 
processos industriais e a compra de bens de capital, FINEP, Rio de 
Janeiro, 1975. 
2. Araoz, A., "Compras Estatales y Desarrollo Tecnol6gico", Comercio Exterior, 
June 1977. 
3. Araoz, A. and Politzer, K., Consulting Services in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, paper submitted to the CODELCA Meeting, Mexico, 1975. 
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4. Baranson, J., "Engineering for underdeveloped countries", Mechanical 
Engineering, March 1966. 
5. Brown, M., Some International Issues in the Development of Local Engineering 
Capabilities, OECD Development Centre, Occasional Paper No.28, Paris, 
July 1978. 
6. Brown, M. and J. Perrin, "Engineering and Industrial Projects", CD/R'(77)2, 
OECD, Paris 1977. 
7. Comisi6n Nacional de Energia At6mica (Argentina), Centrales Nucleares en la 
Republica Argentina. Su tecnologia y su impacto regional. (CNE TE 35/137), 
Buenos Aires 1974. See especially Chapter 2 (by G. Gargiulo). 
8. Cubillo, J., "Transferencia de tecnologia y la ingenieria de proyectos", 
Colegio de Ingenieros de Chile, Santiago 1974. 
9. De la Vega Navarro, A. and J. Perrin. Desarrollo y Fortalecimiento de la 
Ingenieria en Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, 1974. 
10. Erber, F.S., A empresa estatal e a escolha de tecnologias, FINEP, Rio de 
Janeiro, 1974. 
11. Felices, E., Development of Local Engineering Capabilities for Industry: 
Case Study of Peru, OECD Development Centre, Occasional Paper No. 24, 
Paris 1978. 
12. Fierro, G., Estudio sobre la participaci6n de la ingenieria nacional en 
proyectos chilenos de centrales termoelectricas, Centro de Planeamiento, 
Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Novembr 1977. 
13. FINEP, "Oferta de Servicios de Consultoria de Engenharia no Brasil", Rio 
de Janeiro, March 1977. 
14. Fondo de Garantia y Fomento a la Industria Mediana y Pequena (FOGAIN),, 
Mexico, "Fortalecimiento de los servicios oficiales de consultoria para 
impulsar el desarrollo de la industria mediana y pequefia", CODELCA, 1975. 
15. Furtado, C., Desarrollo y Subdesarroollo, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 
Mexico 1973. 
16. INDIA--Annual Report on the Working of Industrial and Commercial Under- 
takings of the Central Government, 1975-76. Chapter 11, on Ancillary 
Industries. 
17. Kamenetzky, M., Engineering and Preinvestment Work. Report submitted to 
IDRC, Ottawa 1976. 
18. Malhotra, A., Consulting and Engineering Design Organisations, a study 
prepared for IDRC, June 1976. 
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19. Mariwalla, K.D., Consultancy and Engineering Activities in Developing 
Countries and their Role in Industrial and Economic Development, 
ID/WG.278/1, UNIDO, Vienna, 1978. 
20. Perichitch, M.L., Engineering Capacities for Industrial Development: a 
Focus in the Technology Policies for Development, OECD Development 
Centre, Occasional Paper N° 23, Paris, February 1978. 
21. Perrin, J., Design Engineering and the Mastery of Knowledge for the 
Accumulation of Capital in Developing Countries, IREP, Universite de 
Grenoble, 1971. 
22. Perrin, J., "L'ingenierie en France", CD/TI(76)5, OECD, Paris,1977. 
23. Republica de Cuba, "Decreto N° 5; Reglamento del Proceso Inversionista", 
Gaceta Oficial, La Habana, 23 September 1977, pp.577-595. 
24. Roberts, J., "Engineering Consultancy, Industrialization and Development", 
in Science and Technology and Development, C. Cooper (ed.), London 1973. 
25. Sabato, J., "Atomic Energy-in Argentina: a Case History", World Develop- 
ment, August 1973. 
26. Sabato, J., and Martin, J.M., "La construction d'une cnetrale nucleaire 
en Argentine et ses consequences sur le processus d'industrialisation 
du pays", Revue du Tiers Monde, 1967. 
27. Sercovich, F., Ingenieria de Diseno y Cambio Tecnico End6geno, BID/CEPAL/BA/29, 
Economic Commission for Latin America, Buenos Aires, August 1978. 
28. Suarez, F. and Stuhlman, L., Estudio sobre firmas de ingenieria de proceso 
en Argentina, STPI Project, CLACSO, Buenos Aires 1976. 
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